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SHIP'S LIBRARY. 



4—1759 



U. S. S. Tl 



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 



International Law 



Situations 



WITH SOLUTIONS AND NOTES 



1910 



* 



GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON 

1911 



PREFACE. 



The international law situations discussed at the Naval 
War College in 1910, as in former years, were such as are 
likely to arise, in which naval officers may be required to 
act under urgent and difficult conditions, and in which 
the law and precedents are not well established. The 
Declaration of London has suggested certain questions, 
and for the purpose of these discussions it has been 
assumed to be binding. 

Mr. George Grafton Wilson, lately appointed professor 
of international law at Harvard, and still lecturer at 
Brown University, where he was for many years pro- 
fessor, who was himself a delegate to the International 
Naval Conference at London, conducted the discussions 
this year with the same ability and the same appreciation 
of the point of view of the naval officer that he has dis- 
played for the past ten years as lecturer on international 
law at the Naval War College. 

Officers are invited to propose situations for future 
discussion, either cases that have occurred within their 
own experience or questions left unsettled by the recent 
Conventions of The Hague or by the Declaration of London. 

An index will shortly be published to the ten volumes 
on international law of the years 1901 to 1910, inclusive. 

R. P. RODGERS, 

Rear Admiral, V. S. Navy, 

President. 
U. S. Naval War College, 

Newport, R. /., October 18, 1910. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Page. 

Situation I.— Coaling within neutral jurisdiction 9 

Solution 9 

Notes 10 

Introduction 10 

Geneva Arbitration on coaling 10 

Discussion in 1906 13 

Discussion in 1908 15 

Report of American delegation on Hague propositions. . 16 

Amount of coal 17 

Proclamations as to amount of coal 17 

Malta proclamation, 1904 20 

Opinions of Dr. Lawrence 23 

Opinions of Prof. Westlake 24 

Hall's opinion 25 

Opinions of continental writers 26 

Opinion of Prof. Hershey 27 

State Department letter 28 

The Hague Convention of 1907 29 

Discussion at The Hague, 1907 30 

Resume of propositions 32 

Report of American delegation 36 

Coaling in Spanish-American War 37 

Coaling in Russo-Japanese War 37 

Coaling outside of port but within neutral waters 38 

Hague Convention on maritime jurisdiction 39 

Dr. Higgins on amount of coal 39 

Prof. Oppenheim's opinion 40 

Application to Situation 1 40 

(a) Right to regulate supply of fuel 40 

(b) Colliers sent to meet fleet 43 

(c) General control of waters 43 

Solution 44 

Situation II. — Declaration of war 45 

Solution 45 

Notes 45 

Historical 45 

Reasons for a declaration of war 47 

Moral obligation to declare war 48 

5 



6 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Situation II. — Effect of declaration of war — Continued. 

Notes— Continued. p age . 

Bague Convention, opening of hostilities 4i» 

Report of American delegation 55 

Commencement of hostilities after declaration 56 

( '< immencement of Spanish-American War ">7 

( 'ommencemcnt of Russo-Japanese War 58 

Application to Situation II 60 

Effects of declarations of United States and State X. 61 

Attitude of commander 62 

Status of merchant vessels knowing of war 62 

Status of merchant vessels not knowing of war 62 

Notification to neutrals of the existence of war • 64 

Resume 1 65 

Solution 65 

Situation 1 1 1 . — Days of grace 66 

Solution 66 

Notes 66 

Early provisions 66 

Discussion of 1906 67 

( )pinion of Prof. Takahashi 68 

Propositions at Second Hague Conference 68 

Discussion at Second Hague Conference 69 

Report of American delegation 75 

Summary 76 

Conclusions 77 

Solution 78 

Situation IV. — Pursuit of neutral blockade runner 79 

Solution 79 

Notes 79 

Duration of penalty 79 

Differences in doctrine 81 

British Commission on Supply of Food 

Question of blockade at Hague Conference 83 

Propositions at International Naval Conference. 1908-9. s 4 

Observations on place of seizure 86 

Basis of discussion v 7 

Rule of the Declaration of London 87 

Application to Situation IV 88 

S. Jution 89 

Situation V. — Influence of destination on contraband character. 90 

Solution 90 

Notes 90 

Coal in time of war 90 

( oal as contraband 92 

Attitude of Peru. 1866 95 

Spain and Chile, 1866 95 

1 destination as element in contraband 98 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 7 

Situation V. — Influence of destination on contraband charac- 
ter — Continued. 

Notes — Continued. Page. 

Views of States in 1908 98 

Bases of discussion at International Naval Conference. . 103 

Discussion of bases 104 

Adaptation to modern conditions 106 

Solution 107 

Situation VI. — Transfer to another flag 108 

Solution 108 

Notes 108 

Topic and conclusion, 1906 108 

Question raised by Great Britain 109 

Opinion of United States Supreme Court 112 

French system and theory 113 

Russian regulations 115 

Japanese regulations 115 

Attitude of States in 1908 115 

Discussion at the International Naval Conference in 

1908-9 118 

Report of Commission to International Naval Conference 121 

Rule adopted by the Conference 123 

Consideration of Article 55 124 

Application of Article 55 to Situation VI 125 

Application of doctrine of Article 56 126 

Consideration of Article 64 126 

Solution 128 



International Law Situations, 

WITH SOLUTIONS AND NOTES. 



Situation I. 

COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

There is war between States X and Y. Other States 
are neutral. 

(a) A detachment of armed vessels of State X puts 
in to port B of State Z for the purpose of coaling from 
colliers accompanying the detachment. 

Y protests against this coaling. 

The authorities of State Z inform the commander of 
the detachment that he will be allowed to take from the 
colliers coal sufficient only to proceed to the nearest home 
port or to a port already passed en route to port B, and 
that any other course would render State Z liable for 
breach of neutrality. 

What are the rights in this case ? 

(b) Would the solution be the same if^the colliers had 
been sent to port B to meet the detachment ? 

(c) Would the solution be different if the coaling were 
not in a port, but merely within the three-mile limit off 
the coast of State Z ? 

SOLUTION. 

{a) State Z is competent to make the regulation 
allowing within neutral jurisdiction coal sufficient only 
to proceed to the nearest home port or to a port already 
passed en route to port B. State Z might be at liberty 
to adopt the rule of full bunker supply. 

(b) The same regulation would apply in case of colliers 
sent to meet the belligerent fleet at the neutral port of 
State Z. 

(c) The same regulation would apply if the coailng 
were not in port but merely within the three-mile limit 
off the coast of State Z. 



10 COAUNG WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

NOTES. 

Introduction. — The introduction of steam power in 
vessels is comparatively recent. International law has 
not developed sufficiently to cover all circumstances 
under which the supply of fuel for vessels might come in 
question. The rules which had been developed to cover 
sailing ships are not in all cases sufficient to meet the 
new conditions. Coaling became from the middle of the 
nineteenth century an increasingly important question 
in maritime warfare. Confusion naturally arose in the 
attempt to stretch old rules evolved to regulate the con- 
duct of sailing ships so that their provisions would apply 
to steam vessels. The transport of coal by neutrals was 
sometimes confused with the supplying of coal in a neu- 
tral port. 

Coaling, the Geneva arbitration. — The first extended 
discussion in regard to the supply of coal arose before the 
Geneva arbitration. Moore summarizes this very impor- 
tant discussion as follows: 

It was maintained in the case of the United States that an undue 
indulgence was shown to Confederate cruisers in the extent to which 
they were permitted to obtain supplies of coal in British ports, and 
that in this way they were enabled to use those ports as a base of 
hostile operations against the United States in violation of the duty 
defined in the second rule of the treaty. These allegations were denied 
in the British case. 

The British supplemental argument declared that supplies of coal 
in British ports were afforded equally and impartially to both the 
contending parties; that they were obtained, on the whole, more 
largely by ships of war of the United States than by the Confederate 
cruisers; and that such supplies were lawful under the principles of 
international law. 

Mr. Evans, in his supplemental argument, and Mr. Waite, in 
another special argument, argued that the permission to take coal, 
unless properly restricted, amounted to permitting the belligerent to 
make use of the neutral ports as a base of naval operations, and that 
the Confederate cruisers were suffered to obtain supplies of coal in 
British ports to facilitate their belligerent operations. 

On this subject Count Sclopis expressed the following opinion: 

"I can only treat the question of the supply and shipment of coal 
as connected with the use of a base of naval operations directed against 
one of the belligerents, or as a flagrant case of contraband of war. 



GENEVA ARBITRATION AS TO COALING. 11 

"I will not say that the simple fact of having allowed a greater 
amount of coal than was necessary to enable a vessel to reach the 
nearest port of its country constitutes in itself a sufficient grievance 
to call for an indemnity. As the Lord Chancellar of England said on 
the 12th of June, 1871, in the House of Lords, England and the United 
States equally hold the principle that it is no violation of international 
law to furnish arms to a belligerent. But if an excessive supply of 
coal is connected with other circumstances which show that it was 
used as a veritable res hostilis, then there is an infringement of the 
second rule of Article VI of the treaty. It is in this sense also that the 
same Lord Chancellor, in the speech before mentioned, explained the 
intention of the latter part of the said rule. Thus, when I see, for 
example, the Florida and the Shenandoah choose for their field of action, 
one, the stretch of sea between the Bahama Archipelago and Bermuda, 
to cruise there at its ease, and the other, Melbourne and Hobson's Bay. 
for the purposes, immediately carried out, of going to the Arctic seas, 
there to attack the whaling vessels, I can not but regard the supplies 
of coal in quantities sufficient for such purposes as infringements of 
the second rule of the sixth article." 

Mr. Adams, in his opinion, said: 

"This question of coals was little considered by writers on the law 
of nations, and by sovereign powers, until the present century. It has 
become one of the first importance, now that the motive power of all 
vessels is so greatly enhanced by it. 

"The effect of this application of steam power has changed the char- 
acter of war on the ocean, and invested with a greatly preponderant force 
those nations which possess most largely the best material for it within 
their own territories and the greatest number of maritime places over 
the globe where deposits may be conveniently provided for their use. 

"It is needless to point out the superiority in this respect of the posi- 
tion of Great Britain. There seems no way of discussing the question 
other than through this example. 

"Just in proportion to these advantages is the responsibility of that 
country when holding the situation of a neutral in time of war. 

"The safest course in any critical emergency would be to deny alto- 
gether to supply the vessels of any of the belligerents, except perhaps 
when in positive distress. 

"But such a policy would not fail to be regarded as selfieh, illiberal, 
and unkind by all belligerents. It would inevitably lead to the 
acquisition and establishment of similar positions for themselves by 
other maritime powers, to be guarded with equal exclusiveness, and 
entailing upon them enormous and continual expenses to provide 
against rare emergencies. 

"It is not therefore either just or in the interest of other powers, by 
exacting severe responsibilities of Great Britain in time of war, to force 
her either to deny all supplies, or, as a lighter risk, to engage herself in 
war. 



12 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

"It is in this sense that I approach the arguments that have been 
presented in regard to the supply of coals given by great Britain to the 
insurgent American steamers as forming a base of operations. 

"It must be noted that throughout the war of four years supplies of 
coal were furnished liberally at first, and more scantily afterwards, but 
still indiscriminately to both belligerents. 

"The difficulty is obvious how to distinguish those cases of coals 
given to either of the parties as helping them impartially to other ports 
from those furnished as a base of hostile operations. 

"Unquestionably, Commodore Wilkes, in the Vanderbilt, was very 
much aided in continuing his cruise at sea by the supplies obtained 
from British sources. Is this to be construed as getting a base of 
operations? 

"It is plain that a line must be drawn somewhere, or else no neutral 
power will consent to furnish supplies to any belligerent whatever in 
time of war. 

' ' So far as I am able to find my way out of this dilemma, it is in this 
wise: 

"The supply of coals to a belligerent involves no responsibility to 
the neutral when it is made in response to a demand presented in good 
faith, with a single object of satisfying a legitimate purpose openly 
assigned. 

"On the other hand, the same supply does involve a responsibility 
if it shall in any way be made to appear that the concession was made, 
either tacitly or by agreement, with a view to promote or complete 
the execution of a hostile act. 

"Hence I perceive no other way to determine the degree of the 
responsibility of a neutral in these cases than by an examination of the 
evidence to show the intent of the grant in any specific case. Fraud or 
falsehood in such a case poisons everything it touches. Even indiffer- 
ence may degenerate into willful negligence, and that will impose a 
burden of proof to excuse it before responsibility can be relieved. 

"This is the rule I have endeavored to apply in judging the nature of 
the cases complained of in the course of this arbitration." 

Sir Alexander Cockburn contended that the term "base of naval 
operations " had no relation to the case of a vessel which, while cruising 
against an enemy's ships, puts into a port, and after obtaining neces- 
sary supplies again pursues 'her course, but that it referred to the use 
of a port or water as a place from which a fleet or a ship might watch an 
enemy and sally forth to attack him, with the possibility of falling back: 
upon the port or water in question for fresh supplies, or shelter, or a 
renewal of operations. The term signified "a local position which 
serves as a point of departure and return in military operations, and 
with which a constant connection and communication can be kept up, 
and which may be fallen back upon whenever necessary. " 

Mr. Staempfli, in his opinion in the case of the Sumter, said: 

"The permission given to the Sumter to remain and to take in coal at 
Trinidad does not in itself constitute a sufficient basis for accusing the 



DISCUSSION OF COALING, 1906. 13 

British authorities of having failed in the observance of their duties 
as neutrals, because this fact can not be considered by itself, since the 
Sumter, both before and after that time, was admitted into the ports 
of many other States, where it stayed and took in coal, and it is proved 
that the last supply she obtained to cross the Atlantic did not take 
place in a British port; so that it can not be held that the port of Trini- 
dad served as a base of operations for the Sumter." 

The tribunal of arbitration, in its award, said: 

"In order to impart to supplies of coal a character inconsistent with 
the second rule, prohibiting the use of neutral ports or waters as a base 
of naval operations for a belligerent, it is necessary that the said sup- 
plies should be connected with special circumstances of time, of per- 
sons, or of place, which may combine to give them such character." 

In signing the award, Viscount d'ltajuba made the following state- 
ment: 

"Viscount d'ltajubd, while signing the decision, remarks, with 
regard to the recital concerning the supply of coals, that he is of opinion 
that every Government is free to furnish to the belligerents more or less 
of that article." 

It did not appear that in any case Great Britain was held responsible 
for the acts of a vessel in consequence of supplies of coal. (4 Moore, 
International Arbitrations, p. 4097.) 

Discussion of 1906. — Under Topic IV of the Naval 
War College International Law Topics and Discussions 
of 1906 (p. 66) the subject of supplying fuel and oil in a 
neutral port was considered. The development of the 
recognition of neutral obligations was set forth at that 
time in considerable detail. The proclamations of 
various States in recent wars are also shown, and the 
policy and practice of some of the more important States 
is discovered to be divergent. A regulation was proposed 
in 1906 as follows: 

The supply of fuel or oil within a neutral port to vessels in belligerent 
service in no case shall exceed what is necessary to make the total 
amount on board sufficient to reach the nearest unblockaded port of 
the belligerent vessel's own State or some nearer named destination. 

The supply may be subject to such other regulation as the neutral 
may deem expedient. (International Law Topics and Discussions. 
Naval War College, 1906, p. 87.) 

The reasons for this conclusion in 1906 were based upon 
the general drift of policy and practice toward restriction, 
as shown in recent wars and in opinions of writers. In 
the way of a general statement as to the reasons for the 
regulation proposed in 1906 in answer to the question, 



14 COALING AVITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 



"What regulations should be made in regard to the 
supplying of fuel or oil to belligerent vessels in neutral 
ports?'' it was said — 

The proposition to limit the Bupply to the amount necessary to take 
the ship to the nearest port of her home country, which has been a 
form often used and was that approved by the Institute of International 
Law in 1898, leaves much to be desired. The nearest port may not 
be in the direction in which the vessel may be voyaging, or if it is it 
may not be a port suitable for the entrance of such a vessel. The 
gradual change in recent years has shown that this formula is not 
sufficient. Such words as the following have been added in certain 
proclamations: "Or to some nearer neutral destination," or that coal 
shall not be supplied to "a belligerent fleet proceeding either to the 
seat of war or to any position or positions on the line of route with the 
object of intercepting neutral ships on suspicion of carrying contraband 
of war. " 

In most declarations there has been a provision against allowing 
a neutral port to become a base for equipping a belligerent's vessel 
with coal, oil, or other supplies. By "base," as thus used, is meant 
a place to which the vessel frequently returns. The idea of "frequent, " 
as thus used, is generally covered by the prohibition against taking a 
new supply of coal from the same neutral port till after the expiration 
of a period of three months. Some States, however, allow such supply 
within three months, provided permission is obtained from the proper 
authority. 

It would seem to be evident that while the supplying of coal to a 
belligerent is not prohibited by international law, though it has been 
prohibited in many proclamations, yet the supplying of coal at such 
frequent intervals as would make the neutral port a base is generally 
regarded as prohibited by international law, as is practically admitted 
in the reply of France to Japan in 1905. 

It seems to be the general opinion that the supply of fuel, etc., 
to belligerents should be somewhat retricted in neutral ports. 

There are differences of opinion as to the extent of necessary restric- 
tions. Doubtless there would be need of special restriction in special 
cases. Some degree of freedom should remain to the neutral in making 
provisions for special conditions. It would seem reasonable that the 
neutral should not afford a greater supply of coal or oil even for lubri- 
cating purposes than an amount sufficient to carry the vessel to the 
home port. The purpose is to guard against the furnishing of supplies 
for hostile uses and at the same time not to intern a vessel of a belligerent 
which may enter a neutral port. It would probably be desirable to 
restrict the supply of oil for purposes of fuel, which would be included 
under the general head of fuel, and for lubricating purposes, which 
makes necessary specific mention of oil. (Ibid., p. 86.) 



DISCUSSION OF COALING, 1908. 15 

International Law Situations, 1908. — The Naval War 
College in 1908 again considered the question of supply 
of coal in neutral waters after the Second Hague Peace 
Conference, 1907. The resume of the reasoning upon 
which the conclusion of International Law Situation IV 
of 1908 was based is as follows: 

By Article 1 of the Convention concerning the Rights and Duties 
of Neutral Powers in Naval War: 

" Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral Powers 
and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from all acts which 
ivould constitute on the part of the neutral Powers which knowingly per- 
mitted them, a nonfulfillment of their neutrality." 

Unrestrained or repeated coaling in neutral waters, if knowingly 
permitted by a neutral, would unquestionably constitute a nonfulfil- 
ment of neutrality, and is therefore an act from which the belligerent 
is bound to refrain. Further, Article 18 of the same convention 
prohibits the use of territorial waters for "replenishing or increasing" 
supplies of "war material" or "armament." Coal destined for the 
belligerent forces has in recent years been regarded as war material. 
In Situation IV there has been within three months an actual increasing 
of the supply of war material within neutral jurisdiction. Under the 
spirit of Article 18, the taking on of coal would not be allowed to the 
war vessel of State X. 

As is evident from the neutrality proclamations of recent years it is 
the purpose of neutrals to strictly limit the use of neutral territorial 
waters by belligerents to such purposes as the neutrals may specifically 
enumerate. In most proclamations prohibitions have been extended 
to ports, roadsteads, and territorial waters. 

The provisions of the Convention concerning the Rights and Duties 
of Neutral Powers were agreed upon to harmonize divergent views. 
The divergency of view in regard to coaling was in regard to the amount 
rather than in regard to the frequency and place of coaling. This con- 
vention also provides that "it is expedient to take into consideration 
the general principles of the law of nations." 

From the general principles set forth in the Convention, from the 
neutrality proclamations, from practice in recent wars, and from the 
general principles of the laws of nations it is evident that the conten- 
tion of State Z (in Situation IV of 1908) is correct. Very wide freedom 
has been allowed to belligerents in matter of coaling. The use of any 
place within neutral jurisdiction, except under the terms of the con- 
vention regulating the supply of coal to belligerents, would be using 
such place as a base, which is prohibited. Certain propositions made 
by neutral States have not only prescribed the refusal of such supplies, 
but also the interning of a belligerent vessel which disregards such 
neutral regulations. (International Law Situations, Naval War College, 
1908, p. 96.) 



16 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

As cited in the notes upon this Situation IV of 1908, 
the United States delegation to the Second Hague Con- 
ference reported in regard to the matter of limitation of 
the supply of coal in neutral ports as follows: 

Report of American delegation. — The proposition advanced by Eng- 
land represented the strict views of neutral lights and duties which are 
held by States maintaining powerful naval establishments, supple- 
mented by a widely distributed system of coaling stations and ports of 
call, in which their merchant vessels could find convenient refuge at 
the outbreak of war and which enable them to carry on operations at 
sea quite independently of a resort to neutral ports for the procurement 
of coal or other supplies or for purposes of repair. As tne policy of the 
United States Government has generally been one of strict neutrality, 
the delegation found itself in sympathy with this policy in many, if not 
most, of its essential details. France for many years past has taken a 
somewhat different view of its neutral obligations, and has practiced a 
liberal rather than a strict neutrality. The views of France in that 
regard have received some support from the Russian delegation and 
were favored to some extent by Germany and Austria. 

It was constantly borne in mind by the delegation in all delibera- 
tions in committee that the United States is and always has been a 
permanently neutral power, and has always endeavored to secure the 
greatest enlargement of neutral privileges and immunities. Not only 
are its interests permanently neutral, but it is so fortunately situated, 
in respect to its military and naval establishments, as to be able to 
enforce respect foi such neutral rights and obligations as flow from its 
essential rights of sovereignty and independence. 

With a view, therefore, to secure to neutral States the greatest pos- 
sible exemption from the burdens and hardships of war, the delega- 
tion of the United States gave constant support to the view that stipu- 
lations having for that purpose the definition of the rights and duties 
of neutrals should, at a rule, take the form of restrictions and prohibi- 
tions upon the belligerents, and should not, save in case of necessity, 
charge neutrals with the performance of specific duties. This rule was 
only departed from by the delegation in cases where weak neutral 
powers demanded and need the support of treaty stipulations in fur- 
therance of their neutral duties. It was also borne in mind that a 
State resorting to certain acts with a view to prevent violations of its 
neutrality derives power to act from the fact of its sovereignty rather 
than from the stipulations of an international convention. (Senate 
Doc, 60th Cong., 1st sess., No. 444, p. 50.) 

The solution of Situation IV of 1908 was to the effect 
that coaling by a vessel of war from a collier within the 
three-mile limit of the coast of a neutral State would be 
a just ground upon which the neutral could deny that 



AMOUNT OF COAL ALLOWED BY NEUTRAL. 17 

vessel of war the right to take coal within its ports till 
after three months had elapsed. 

The amount of coal. — Situation I (a) of 1910 raises the 
question of the regulation of the amount of coal to be 
allowed to a belligerent in a neutral port or waters. The 
regulations suggested in the Naval War College conclu- 
sion in 1906 are not the same as those adopted at The 
Hague in 1907. The Hague regulations would be regarded 
as binding in most cases. The Hague Convention con- 
cerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in 
Naval War provides — 

Article 19. Belligerent war ships may only revictual in 
neutral ports or roadsteads to bring up their supplies to 
the peace standard. 

Similarly these vessels may only ship sufficient fuel to 
enable them to reach the nearest port in their own country. 
They may, on the other hand, Jill up their bunkers built 
to carry fuel when in neutral countries which have adopted 
this method of determining the amount of fuel to be supplied. 

If, in accordance with the law of the neutral power, the 
ships are not supplied with coal within twenty-four hours 
of their arrival the permissible duration of their stay is 
extended by twenty-four hours. 

Proclamations as to amount of coal. — The proclamations 
issued in recent years as to the amount of coal to be 
allowed, in general not more often than once in three 
months, to a belligerent within a neutral port show the 
tendency toward regulation. The following are examples 
of regulations: 

Denmark, 1904: 

So much coal only may be taken in as may be necessary to carry such 
vessels to the nearest nonblockaded home port; or, with permission 
from the proper Danish authorities, to some other neutral destination. 
(U. S. Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 22.) 

Netherlands Indies, 1904: 

Sufficient provender may be shipped as is necessary for the mainte- 
nance of the crew, while the stock of fuel may not exceed an amount 
necessary for the vessel to reach the nearest harbor of the country to 
which the vessel belongs or of one of its allies in the war. 

70387—11 — 2 



18 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

And in case of privateers it was provided that— 

They shall not take in more provisions than is required for them to 
reach the neatest harbor of the country to which they belong or that of 
one of their allies in the war. and not more coal than is necessary to 
provide tor their requirements for a period of twenty-four hours, 
sailing at a maximum of three English miles an hour. (Ibid., p. 28.) 

Sweden-Norway, 1904: 

In regard to coal, they can only purchase the necessary quantity to 
reach the nearest nonblockaded national port, or, with the consent of 
the authorities of the King, a neutral destination. (Ibid., p. 31). 

United States, 1904: 

No ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be permitted 
while in any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters within the jurisdiction 
of the United States, to take in any supplies except provisions and 
such other things as may be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, 
and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel, 
if without any sail power, to the nearest port of her own country; or in 
case the vessel is rigged to go under sail, and may also be propelled by 
steam power, then with half the quantity of coal which she would be 
entitled to receive, if dependent upon steam alone. (Ibid., p. 34.) 

Bermuda, 1898: 

No coal except for the specific purpose (to be satisfactorily shown) 
of enabling her to proceed direct to the nearest port of her own country 
or other named nearer neutral destination. (U. S. Foreign Relations, 
1898, p. 844.) 

Brazil, 1898: 

The ships of belligerents shall take material for combustion only for 
the continuance of their voyage. 

Furnishing coal to ships which sail the seas near Brazil for the pur- 
pose of making prizes of an enemy's vessels or prosecuting any other 
kind of hostile operations is prohibited. (Ibid., p. 848.) 

China, 1898: 

In coal only sufficient must be allowed to take it (the belligerent 
ship) to its nearest port. (Ibid., p. 853.) 

Denmark, 1898: 

Nor to take coal in greater quantity than is necessary to enable the 
vessel to arrive at the nearest port of its own country, or to some other 
destination nearer by. (Ibid., p. 857.) 

Governor of Curasao, 1898: 

Nor more coal than is needed for their consumption for twenty-four 
hours at a maximum speed of 10 English miles per hour. (Ibid., p. 861 . 



NEUTRALITY PROCLAMATIONS ON COAL. 19 

Great Britain, 1898: 

So much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the 
nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer destination. (Ibid., 
p. 869.) 

Japan, 1898: 

Coal necessary for the purpose of taking such men-of-war and such 
other ships to the nearest port of their own countries. (Ibid., p. 880.) 

Netherlands, 1898: 

Not more coal than is necessary to provide for their wants for twenty- 
four hours, sailing at a maximum pace of 10 English miles per hour. 
(Ibid., p. 889.) 

These regulations of 1898 were in general reissued at the 
time of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. 

Many States would allow no coal to ships in possession 
of prizes. Some States required that a belligerent ship 
should obtain permission before coaling at all. Some 
made special provisions owing to the geographical situa- 
tion of certain ports. 

Naturally Great Britain would from the number and 
position of her ports be called upon to make definite 
rules. These w T ere mentioned in the International Law 
Situations of the Naval War College of 1908. 

According to the British proclamation of 1898: 

Rule 3. No ship of war of either belligerent shall hereafter be per- 
mitted, while in any such port, roadstead, or waters subject to the 
territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, to take in any supplies, except 
provisions and such other things as may be requisite for the subsistence 
of her crew, and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry 
such vessel to the nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer 
destination, and no coal shall again be supplied to any such ship of 
war in the same or any other port, roadstead, or waters subject to the 
territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, without special permission, 
until after the expiration of three months from the time when such 
coal may have been last supplied to her within British waters as afore- 
said. 

This rule was amended to read "nearer named neutral 
destination," in 1904. 

Certain explanations of Rule 3 were later issued: 

It must, however, be borne in mind that the reason for the practice 
of admitting belligerent vessels of war into neutral ports arises out of 
the exigencies of life at sea and the hospitality which it is customary 
to extend to vessels of friendly powers, and that this principle does not 



20 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

extend to enabling such vessel to utilize a neutral port directly for the 
purpose of hostile operations. The rule above quoted is not to be 
understood as having any application to the case of a belligerent fleet 
proceeding either to the seat of war, or to a position or positions on the 
line of route, with the object of intercepting neutral vessels on sus- 
picion of carrying contraband of war. Such fleet can not be permitted 
to make use in any way of a British port for the purpose of coaling, 
either directly from the shore, or from colliers accompanying the 
fleet, whether the vessels of the fleet present themselves at the port 
at the same time or successively. His Majesty's Government further 
directs that the same practice be pursued with reference to single 
belligerent war vessels, if it be clear that they are proceeding for the 
purpose of belligerent operations as above defined. This is not to be 
applied to the case of a vessel putting in on account of actual distress 
at sea. 

The amount of coal which might be supplied to a belligerent warship 
was defined as so much as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the 
nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer named neutral desti- 
nation — a formula which would, e. g., entitle a Russian ship of war to 
take on board, say at Aden, an amount of coal sufficient to carry her to 
Vladivostok. The practice recognized under this rule, which is based 
upon considerations of hospitality, ought not, in the opinion of His 
Majesty's Government, to be extended so as to enable such vessels to 
make use of a neutral port directly for the purpose of hostile operations. 
Instructions had accordingly been given that the rule is not to be taken 
as applying to a belligerent fleet, or to vessels proceeding to the seat of 
war itself, or to stations from which operations connected with the war 
might be conducted. (Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge, August 
16, 1904.) 

Malta proclamation of 190 %. — In the proclamation of 
the Governor of Malta of August 12, 1904, there is a 
reference to and interpretation of the British rule — 

We, therefore, in the name of His Majesty, order and direct that the 
above-quoted rule No. 3, published by proclamation No. 1 of the 12th 
February, 1904, inasmuch as it refers to the extent of coal which may be 
supplied to belligerent ships of war in British ports during the present 
war, shall not be understood as having any application in case of a 
belligerent fleet proceeding either to the seat of war or to any position 
or positions on the line of route with the object of intercepting neutral 
ships on suspicion of carrying contrabrand of war, and that such fleet 
shall not be perlnitted to make use in any way of any port, roadstead, 
or waters subject to the jurisdiction of His Majesty for the purpose of 
coaling, either directly from the shore or from colliers accompanying 
such fleet, whether vessels of such fleet present themselves to any such 
port or roadstead or within the said waters at the same time or succes- 
sively; and, second, that the same practice shall be pursued with 



BRITISH PROCLAMATIONS, 1904. 21 

reference to single belligerent ships of war proceeding for purpose of 
belligerent operations as above defined; provided that this is not to be 
applied to the case of vessels putting in on account cf actual distress at 
sea, in which case the provision of rule No. 3 as published by procla- 
mation No. 1 of the 12th February, 1904, shall be applicable. 

It will be observed that this proclamation specifically 
announces the principle " that belligerent ships of war are 
admitted into neutral ports in view of exigencies of life at 
sea and the hospitality which it is customary to extend to 
vessels of friendly powers;'' and that "this principle 
does not extend to enable belligerent ships of war to 
utilize neutral ports directly for the purpose of hostile 
operations." It is not the intention to. extend hospitality 
to belligerent vessels proceeding to the seat of war or 
advancing for the purpose of belligerent operations, 
whether against other belligerents or against neutrals 
carrying contraband or otherwise involved in the war. 
In short, the doctrine would seem to involve the privilege 
of coaling for navigation to a home port, but no such 
privilege in order to reach the area of warfare or for 
direct hostile operations. This position taken by Great 
Britain is an advanced one. As was said in the discus- 
sions of the Naval War College in 1905, "It can not rea- 
sonably be expected that a neutral power will permit its 
own ports to be used as sources of supplies and coal, using 
which the belligerent vessel or fleet may set forth to seize 
the same neutral's commerce or interrupt its trade." (In- 
ternational Law Topics and Discussions, 1905, p. 158.) 

Prof. Holland raises the question of supply of coal to a 
belligerent ship, and briefly summarizes the British 
practice as follows: 

May she also replenish her stock of coal? To ask this question may 
obviously, under modern conditions and under certain circumstances, 
be equivalent to asking whether belligerent ships may receive in 
neutral harbors what will enable them to seek out their enemy, and to 
maneuver while attacking him. It was first raised during the American 
Civil War, in the first year of which the Duke of Newcastle instructed 
colonial governors that "with respect to the supplying in British juris- 
diction of articles ancipitis usus (such, for instance, as coal), there is no 
ground for any interference whatever on the part of colonial authori- 
ties." But, by the following year, the question had been more ma- 
turely considered, and Lord John Russell directed, on January 31, 



22 COALING WITHIN NKITHAL JURISDICTION. 

1862, that the ships of war of either belligerent should be supplied with 
"so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the 
nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer destination." Iden- 
tical language was employed by Great Britain in 1870, 1885, and 1898, 
but in the British instructions of February 10, 1904, the last phrase was 
strengthened so as to run: "Or to some nearer named nzutral destina- 
tion." The Egyptian proclamation of February 12, 1904, superadds 
the requirement of a written declaration by the belligerent commander 
as to the destina tion of his chip and the quantity of coal remaining on 
board of her, and Mr. Balfour, on July 11, informed the House of Com- 
mons that "directions had been given for requiring an engagement that 
any belligerent man-of-war, supplied with coal to carry her to the 
nearest port of her own nation, would in fact proceed to that port 
direct." Finally a still stronger step was taken by the Government of 
this country, necessitated by the hostile advance toward eastern waters 
of the Russian Pacific Squadron. Instructions were issued to all 
British ports, on August 8, which, reciting that "belligerent ships of 
war are admitted into neutral ports in view of the exigencies of life at 
sea, and the hospitality which is customary to extend to vessels of 
friendly powers; but the principle does not extend to enable belligerent 
ships of war to utilize neutral ports directly for the purpose of hostile 
operations," goes on to direct that the rule previously promulgated, 
"inasmuch as it refers to the extent of coal which may be supplied to 
belligerent ships of war in British ports during the present war, shall 
not be understood as having any application to the case of a belligerent 
fleet proceeding either to the seat of war, or to any position or positions 
on the line of route, with the object of intercepting neutral shipb on 
suspicion of cairying contraband of war, and that such fleets shall not be 
permitted to make use, in any way, of any port, roadstead, or waters, 
subject to the jurisdiction of His Majesty, for the purpose of coaling 
either directly from the shore or from colliers accompanying such fleet, 
whether vessels of such fleet present themselves to such port or road- 
stead, or within the said waters, at the same time or successively; and 
that the same practice shall be pursued with reference to single bellig- 
erent ships of war proceeding for the purpose of belligerent operations, 
as above defined, provided that this is not to be applied to the case of 
vessels putting in on account of actual distress at sea. (83 Fortnightly 
Review, 1905, p. 795.) 

These neutrality regulations of 1898 and 1904 were 
issued by the States named, but France, Germany, and 
Austria-Hungary did not issue similarly detailed regula- 
tions. The policy of France has not been the same as 
that of those States whose proclamations have been cited. 
Germany has usually been content with a more or less 
definite utterance to the effect that she would remain 
neutral. 



ENGLISH OPINIONS. 23 

Opinion of Dr. Lawrence. — Speaking in regard to coal- 
ing in May, 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, 
Dr. Lawrence, at that time lecturer on international law 
at the British Royal Naval College, stated the British 
position: 

The case of coal is peculiar and unsatisfactory. There is great need 
of a further advance in the rules which deal with it. Before the appli- 
cation of steam to navigation no one gave it a thought in connection 
with warlike purposes. Belligerent ships were as little likely to ask 
for it as they are to-day to demand granite or sand. But when, in the 
middle of the last century, the navies of the world changed from sailing 
vessels to steamships, it suddenly became immensely important. Yet 
the law of nations, based upon the practice of nations, still regarded it 
as an innocent article which might be supplied without restraint to any 
belligerent ship whose commander was so curiously constituted as to 
want it. But in 1862 Great Britain led the way in an attempt to put 
it on a more satisfactory footing. Taking advantage of the power 
possessed by neutrals to make reasonable regulations for their own 
protection, she issued in the midst of the great American Civil War a 
number of rules which dealt, among other matters, with supplies of 
coal. They were limited almost exactly as they are in the present 
war. We have kept to our rules ever since, when neutral in a maritime 
struggle; and several powers, notably the United States, have adopted 
them. Meanwhile coal has become much more important for warlike 
purposes than it was in 1862. Without it a ship of war is a useless log. 
It is as essential for fighting purposes as ammunition, and much more 
essential for chasing or escaping. Moreover, the great increase in the 
size, or speed, or both, of modern vessels causes them to consume it in 
much greater quantities than before. A belligerent which can obtain 
full supplies of it in neutral harbors gains thereby an enormous 
advantage. The neutral may be perfectly willing to grant similar 
supplies to the other side, but its wants may never be so great, and 
consequently the assistance given to it may never be so effective. 
Besides it is of the essence of neutrality that no aid should be given 
to the belligerents, and this is by no means the same thing as giving 
aid to both equally. Is it not time we went further and prohibited all 
supplies of coal to belligerent vessels in our ports? Probably some 
powers would follow our example, as happened when we strengthened 
our rules in 1862. Certainly some would not. France, who has not 
yet come up to our standard of 40 years ago, and whose policy with 
regard to coal in warfare is to place no restrictions upon the trade in it, 
could hardly be expected to come into line with us at first. But if 
she persisted in granting supplies when most other countries refused 
them, she might lay herself open to awkward remonstrances and 
demands on the part of a belligerent who had suffered severely in con- 
sequence of her liberality. An experience like our own in the matter 



24 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

of the Alabama claims might convert her to our views. But even if 
she remained unconverted, we could go on acting as we deem best. 
We have more to gain than most States by the changes I suggest. 
Their first result would be to make warships dependent upon the coal 
they obtained in their own ports, or from colliers sent out by their 
Government. We are better off for coaling stations than any other 
power, and we have greater facilities for keeping our fleets supplied 
by colliers. On the other hand, we have more to lose than most States 
by the present system, for our sea-borne trade is so enormous and so 
important that an enemy could do vast damage by means of two or 
three swift commerce destroyers, which might for a time obtain coal 
in neutral ports, though we had closed all their own against them. 
The Egyptian neutrality order of February 12, 1904, lays down that 
before the commander of a belligerent ship of war is allowed to obtain 
coal in any port of Egypt he must obtain an authorization from the 
authorities of the port specifying the amount which he may take, and 
such authorization is to be granted only after the receipt from him of a 
written statement setting forth his destination, and stating the amount 
of coal he has in his bunkers. Probably this is as far as it is possible 
to go at present. (Problems of Neutrality, Journal of the Royal 
United Service Institution, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 922.) 

Elsewhere Dr. Lawrence speaks of the absolute refusal 
of coal to belligerent ships of war in a neutral port: 

No doubt we should be told that if such ships are no longer to be 
allowed to buy coal in our ports we can hardly claim for our merchant- 
men the right to carry it to their ports unmolested, as long as they are 
not ports of naval equipment. And yet this argument does not seem 
conclusive. An article of commerce may be so essential for hostile 
purposes that no warship ought to be supplied with it in neutral waters, 
and yet so essential for the ordinary purposes of civil life that it ought 
not to be prevented from reaching the peaceful inhabitants of bellig- 
erent countries. The two propositions are not inconsistent. If both 
are upheld in reference to coal, we can work for the abolition of the 
present liberty to supply it to combatant vessels when visiting neutral 
ports and harbors, and at the same time maintain that when it is sent 
abroad in the way of ordinary trade belligerents must treat it as con- 
ditionally and not absolutely contraband. But at present, as we have 
seen (see pp. 129-132), there can be no question of complete prohibition. 
All we can hope to gain is a rule which will deny coal in future to war 
vessels when they have broken the conditions on which neutrals 
allowed them to take a supply. Such an advance in strictness would 
in no way conflict with our existing doctrine that coal is properly 
placed among goods conditionally contraband. (War and Neutrality 
in the Far East, 2d ed., p. 161.) 

Opinion of Prof. Westlake. — The principles enumerated 
in the British proclamations of 1862 were reaffirmed in 



ENGLISH OPINIONS. 25 

the proclamations of 1870 during the Franco-Prussian 
War and during the Spanish-American War of 1898. 
The regulations during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 
were more detailed and imposed greater restraint upon 
the belligerents particularly as regards the supply of coal. 
Of these stricter rules Prof. Westlake says: 

It is understood that the coal supplied under such a rule shall be used 
in proceeding to the destination which the commander of the ship 
named as being that of which the distance authorized the supply, and 
it may fairly be argued that in proceeding to that destination she shall 
make no captures, since her making any during a voyage which she had 
been expressly coaled for would constitute the neutral port her base 
of operations for the specific operation of war constituted by them; only 
if she is attacked during that voyage she may of course defend herself. 
But the legitimation by international practice, however faulty in 
principle, of the mere receipt of supplies without a specification of the 
use to which they are to be put, must imply the legitimation of any use 
to which they may be put. (International Law, Part II, War, p. 211.) 

HalVs opinion. — Hall states the conditions under which 
neutral territory is sometimes used by belligerents: 

Much the larger number of cases in which the conduct of a neutral 
forms the subject of complaint is when a belligerent uses the safety of 
neutral territory to prepare the means of ultimate hostility against his 
enemy, as by fitting out expeditions in it against a distant objective 
point, or by rendering it a general base of operations. In many such 
cases the limits of permissible action on the part of the belligerent, and 
of permissible indifference on the part of the neutral, have not yet been 
settled. Generally the neutral sovereignty is only violated construct- 
ively. The acts done by the offending belligerent do not involve force, 
and need not entail any interference with the supreme rights of the 
State in which they are performed. They may be, and often are. 
innocent as regards the neutral except in so far as they endanger the 
quiescence of his attitude toward the injured belligerent; and their 
true quality may be, and often is, perceptible only by their results. 
(International Law, 5th ed., p. 603.) 

Speaking of the limitation to the amount necessary to 
reach the nearest home port and of refusal of a second 
supply till after three months he says : 

There can be little doubt that no neutral States would now venture 
to fall below this measure of care; and there can be as little doubt that 
their conduct will be as right as it will be prudent. When vessels were 
at the mercy of the winds it was not possible to measure with accuracy 
the supplies which might be furnished to them, and as blockades were 
seldom continuously effective, and the nations which carried on distant 



26 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

naval operations were all provided with colonies, questions could 
hardly spring from the use of foreign possessions ae a source of supplies. 
Under the altered conditions of warfare matters are changed. When 
supplies can be meted out in accordance with the necessities of the 
case, to permit more to be obtained than can, in a reasonably liberal 
sense of the word, be called necessary for reaching a place of safety, is 
to provide the belligerent with means of aggressive action; and conse- 
quently to violate the essential principle* of neutrality. (Ibid., p. 606 J 

The States of the world represented at the Hague 
Conference in 1907 did not at that time, however, come 
up to Hall's standard in regard to limitation upon the 
supply of coal. 

Opinions of continental writers. — Certain continental 
writers, inclining to less restriction upon the supply of 
coal than that proposed in the British and some other 
declarations, and particularly in the declaration of the 
Governor of Malta, have criticized these. 

Such writers maintain that, while coal is essential for 
aggressive fighting on the part of a vessel of war, for a 
neutral to furnish coal is analogous to the furnishing of 
sails, masts, tar, and similar supplies to a ship of war 
before the days of steam navigation; that such supplies 
afforded to the belligerents whenever sought did not 
imply any violation of neutrality, as they were for pur- 
poses of navigation rather than for purposes of hostile 
combat. It is also maintained that, since the navigation 
of the seas is free to all, acts making navigation possible 
are not violations of neutrality but legitimate. 

The claim is also made tit at coal is merely one form of 
supply. This is essential food for the engines while other 
supplies are essential for the personnel. Some say it 
w T ould be as reasonable to limit one as the other; that to 
permit the repair of an engine and to forbid the supply of 
coal to run the engine is a manifest absurdity; that while 
it may be and is generally forbidden to sell arms for the 
crew of a ship of war, food and drink may be procured 
in a neutral port; similarly while a ship of war may not 
purchase armament and war materials, she may properly 
obtain such supply of coal as is necessary. 

The fact that the belligerents may not reap equal 
advantages from the possibility of taking coal in a neutral 



CONTINENTAL OPINIONS. 27 

port is not due to any act of the neutral, but due to con- 
ditions which both belligerents might fully understand 
before entering upon the hostilities. To offer as a reason 
for refusing coal the argument that one belligerent might 
use the neutral port more for coaling would be equally 
applicable to most other permitted actions. 

M. de Lapradelle who has particularly written upon 
this side of the question, says: 

La neutrality ne doit pas faire a l'un des belligerants une autre con- 
dition qu'a l'autre. Mais la nature peut faire qu'entre eux les possi- 
bilities d'user de ces memes conditions soient differentes. Si les 
nentres devaient modifier leur droit toutes les fois que ces conditions 
changent, il n'y aurait plus de droit de la neutrality. Tel, que l'ennenii 
pense affamer, peut avoir plus besoin de vivres: est-ce une raison pour 
les declarer contrebande de guerre? Tel peut avoir plus besoin que 
l'autre de s'arreter dans les ports neutres; est-ce une raison pour les 
fermer? Tel peut avoir plus besoin de charbon; est-ce une raison 
pour le refuser? La encore, dans le raisonnement adverse, il existe 
une confusion entre l'inegalite des conditions geographiques et l'ine- 
galite des conditions militaires. Les unes et les autres ne doivent, en 
aucune maniere, etre modifiees, soit par Taction, soit par 1' omission 
des Etats neutres. Les conditions militaires comprennent les unites de 
combat, l'armement, l'equipement; il n'est pas possible aux Etats 
neutres, ni d'en changer, ni d'en laisser, dans leur souverainete, 
changer le rapport. Les conditions geographiques comprennent la 
proximite de tel point, l'eloignement de tel autre, la necessite de passer, 
de tel ou tel point, par tel ou tel autre. La faculte de relacher dans 
les ports neutres et celle de prende du charbon s'y incorporent (1), 
car, dans l'etat actuel de la navigation, elles sont les conditions memes 
de l'usage normal de la mer. L'un des belligerants se plaint-il que 
l'autre puisse venir l'attaquer par mer, en relachant et en charbonnant 
dans les ports neutres? Autant se plaindre que, la terre les separant, 
la mer ait comble la distance, car la mer ne se concoit pas sans les 
facultes naturelles a la navigation, et les conditions de la navigation 
ne se concoivent pas autrement qu'en rapport avec les progres de 
l'invention contemporaine. (La nouvelle these du refuse de charbon 
aux belligerents dans les eaux neutres, 11 Revue Generale de Droit 
Int. Public, 1904, p. 553). 

Opinion of Prof. Hershey. — Prof. Hershey, writing of 
the coaling of the Russian fleet during the Russo-Japanese 
War, savs: 

Without the facilities for coal afforded it in neutral ports and waters 
(mainly French), it could not possibly have succeeded in circumnavi- 
gating the greater part of Europe, Asia, and Africa, with the avowed 
purpose of attacking the Japanese fleet. Not only have the French 



28 COAU[NG WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

" instructions " proven lamentably insufficient for the purpose of 
maintaining a real neutrality, but even a strict observance of the 
British and American rules would not have prevented that fleet from 
advancing from one neutral port to another by means of coal obtained 
at a previous port, or from using neutral coasts and waters as bases of 
supply, or as channels of transportation, even though the fleet itself 
had remained outside the three-mile limit. Nothing short of the total 
prohibitions contained in the proclamation of the Governor of Malta 
would seem to be sufficient for the maintenance of a strict or real 
neutrality. (International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese 
War, p. 202.) 

State Department opinion. — The following memoran- 
dum was given to the minister of the Netherlands by 
Secretary Hay in 1904: 

[Memorandum.] 

Department of State, 
Washington, February 16, 1904- 

The minister of the Netherlands inquires whether the declaration 
of Japan that coal is contraband of war entails any restrictions of the 
rule that coal may be supplied to a man-of-war of a belligerent (in a 
neutral port) in sufficient quantity to reach the belligerent's nearest 
home port . 

By the general rule of international law neutrals are free to sell con- 
traband of war, even arms and ammunition, to a belligerent, subject 
always to the risk of seizure by the other belligerent. The recently 
issued neutrality proclamation of the President merely limits the right 
of citizens of the United States to sell coal within the jurisdiction of 
the United States to a belligerent war ship to a certain amount, namely, 
enough to lake the vessel to its nearest home port. 

As the United States Government understands the matter, the 
Japanese proclamation merely declares that coal is contraband of war. 
the effect being to serve notice that where Japan finds coal being 
carried to her enemy by neutrals she will seize it. This does not 
appear to conflict with the declaration in the President's proclama- 
tion, which has application within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States. 

The receipt was acknowledged as follows: 

Washington. May 3, 1904. 
Mr. Se< kktary of State: The royal legation has not failed to 
forward to the Government of the Queen the memorandum relating 
to the Japanese declaration about the sale of coal during the actual 
war in the far Orient which accompanied the note which your excel- 
lency kindly addressed to it on February 16 last. 



HAGUE ARTICLE ON COALING. 29 

I have been instructed to transmit to the Government of the United 
States the thanks of the Royal Government for the memorandum of 
which it has taken notice with great interest and in which it fully 
concurs. 

I take this occasion, etc., 

Van Swinderen. 

(U. S. Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 523.) 

The Hague Convention of 1907. — The amount of coal 
which can be taken on board by a belligerent vessel in 
a neutral port is specified in the Hague Convention of 
1907 concerning the Eights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
in Naval War. Of this provision the United States 
delegation in its report says: 

Article 19 is an extremely important one. It provides that: 
"Art. 19. Belligerent vessels of war can not revictual in neutral ports 
and roads except to complete their normal supplies in time of peace. 

II Neither can these vessels take on board fuel except to reach the nearest 
port of their own country. They may, however, take on the fuel necessary 
to fill their bunkers, properly so called, when they are in the ivaters of 
neutral countries which have adopted this method of determining the amount 
of fuel to be furnished. 

"If, according to the rules of the neutral Power, vessels can only receive 
coal 24 hours after their arrival, the lawful duration of their sojourn shall 
be prolonged 24 hours. 

"Art. 20. Belligerent vessels of war which have taken on board coal in 
the port of a neutral Power, can not renew their supply within three months 
in a port of the same Power." 

The great Powers of the world are susceptible of being grouped into 
two classes in the matter of neutral policy. England, having great 
naval power, supplemented by an extensive system of coaling stations 
and commercial ports, has always favored and practiced a policy of 
strict neutrality. France, less powerful at sea, having few naval 
stations and with few distant colonial possessions, has been more 
liberal in the enforcement of its neutral obligations, and has allowed 
considerable aid to be extended to belligerent vessels in its ports. 
As England has treated both belligerents with impartial strictness, 
France has treated them with impartial liberality. With this view 
Russia and, to some extent, Germany and Austria are in sympathy. 
As has been seen, the policy of the United States has been in the 
main similar to that of Great Britain. 

In the matter of coal the English delegation proposed that the 
amount of coal which a belligerent vessel might obtain in a neutral 
port should be restricted to quarter bunkers. The substantial opera- 
tion of this rule would be that any public armed vessel that entered 
a neutral port short of coal would have to be interned until the close 



30 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

of the war. as it would be impossible, in a majority of eases, to reach 
a home port with so meagre an allowance of coal as quarter-bunker 
capacity. This proposition was rejected, as were a number of sug- 
gestions based upon bunker capacity, condition of bottoms, etc., 
which were so complicated as to be practically impossible in their 
application. 

The result was to reach the compromise which is stated in article 
19, as to which it may be said that the liberal States have yielded 
rather more than those whose policy is one of strict neutrality. The 
article represents, it would seem, the most satisfactory conclusion 
possible for the Conference to reach. (Senate Doc. No. 444, 60th 
Cong., 1st Sess.. p. 52.) 

Discussion at The Hague in 1907 . — The discussion at 
The Hague in 1907 showed that there were two dis- 
tinct points of view in regard to belligerent coaling in 
a neutral port. One party claims that the determina- 
tion of the amount on any such basis as the estimate of 
the number of tons necessary to reach the nearest home 
port is from the nature of the case impossible because 
of variations due to the conditions of ship, boilers, 
weather, qualit}^ of coal, etc. The other party claims 
that to allow the belligerent to take coal sufficient to 
till the bunkers built to carry fuel would practically 
make the neutral coaling port a base for the belligerent. 

Sir Ernest Satow, representing Great Britain, proposed 
to insert the following article: 

Une Puissance neutre ne devra pas permettre sciemment a un 
navire de guerre d'un belligerant se trouvant dans sa juridiction de 
prendre a bord des munitions, vivres ou combustibles pour aller a 
la rencontre de l'ennemi ou pour se livrer a des operations de guerre. 
(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 636.) 

The representatives of Spain and Japan approved. 
Germany, United States, Denmark, France, Norway, 
Netherlands, Russia, and Sweden disapproved. Brazil, 
Italy, and Turkey refrained from voting. This vote 
was taken to show the attitude of the committee upon 
this restriction. It is evident that it was not favorable 
to placing upon the neutral any responsibility for deter- 
mining for what end the ship may be taking supplies 
or coal and that the determination of the amount of coal 
within the allowed period is the main matter for the 
neutral. 



DISCUSSIOX AT THE HAGUE, 1907. 31 

The rejection of this British proposition gave evidence 
of the disposition on the part of several leading naval 
powers. They were not inclined to impose such restric- 
tions as would make it necessary for the naval forces 
of a belligerent to be practically independent of neutral 
ports of call. 

It was fully recognized at" The Hague in 1907 that the 
interests of the several powers in time of war might be 
very diverse and that it might be difficult, if not impos- 
sible, to reconcile these interests in all respects. 

M. Renault reviewed the difficulties upon this subject 
as follows : 

La necessite d'une reglementation precise ayant pour but d'ecarter 
des difficultes et meme des conflits dans cette partie du droit de la 
neutralite a ete affirmee de tous les cotes. Ce n'etaient pas seulement 
des considerations theoriques, mais des experiences recentes qui la 
faisaient ressortir de la maniere la plus saisissante. 

La guerre continentale se poursuit en regie sur le territoire des deux 
belligerants. Sauf dans des circonstances exceptionelles, il n'y a pas 
contact direct entre les forces armees des belligerants et les autorites 
des pays neutres; quand ce contact se produit, quand des troupes 
doivent se refugier sur un territoire neutre, la situation est relative- 
ment simple, le droit positif coutumier ou ecrit l'a reglee d'une maniere 
precise. Les choses vont autrement dans la guerre maritime. Les 
vaisseaux de guerre des belligerants ne peuvent toujours rester sur le 
theatre des hostilites, ils ont besoin d'aller dans des ports et ils ne trou- 
vent pas toujours a proximite des ports de leur pays. La situation 
geographique influe forcement ici sur la guerre, parce que les navires 
des belligerants n'auront pas un egal besoin de se rendre dans des 
ports neutres. 

Resulte-t-il de la qu'ils aient droit d'y trouver et que les neutres 
puissent leur accorder un asile sans restriction? C'est ce qui est 
con teste. La difference qui vient d'etre indiquee est la suite natu- 
relle de ce qui se passe en temps de paix. Les forces armees d'un 
pays ne penetrent jamais pendant la paix sur le territoire d'un autre 
Etat, de sorte qu'il n'y a rien de change quand la guerre eclate; les 
forces armees doivent continuer a respecter le territoire neutre comme 
elles le faisaient auparavant. II en est autrement pour les forces 
maritimes qui sont admises, en general, a frequenter pendant la paix 
les ports des autres Etats. Si la guerre survient, les Etats neutres 
doivent-ils interrompre brusquement cette pratique du temps de 
paix? Peuvent-ils agir a leur guise ou la neutralite restreint-elle leur 
liberte d'action? Si le desarmement se concoit quand une troupe 
belligerante penetre sur le territoire neutre, parce qu'il s'agit d'un 
fait qui ne serait pas tolere en temps de paix, la situation est autre 



32 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

pour le navire de guerre d'un belligerant qui arrive dans un port ou 
il aurait pu regulierement penetrer en temps de paix et d'ou il aurait 
pu librement partir. 

Quel accueil ce navire va-t-il done y recevoir? Que lui laissera-t-on 
faire? II s'agit pour l'Etat neutre de concilier son droit de l'hospitalite 
avec le devoir de s'abstenir de toute participation aux hostilites. Cette 
conciliation qu'il appartient au neutre de faire dans le plein exercise 
de sa souverainete n'est pas toujours aisee et ce qui le prouve, e'est la 
diversite des regies et des pratiques. Suivant les pays, le traitement 
qui doit etre fait aux navires de guerre des belligerants dans un port 
neutre resulte de la legislation permanents (Code italien de la marine 
marchande par exemple) ou des regies edictees a propos d'une guerre 
determinee (Declaration de neutrality). Non seulement les regies 
promulguees dans les divers pays different entre elles, mais un meme 
pays ne prescrit pas des regies identiques a des epoques rapprochees 
l'une de l'autre; de plus, parfois, les regies se modifient au cours de la 
guerre. 

La chose essentielle, e'est que tous sachent a quoi s'en tenir et qu'il 
n'y ait pas de surprise. Les Etats neutres demandent avec instance 
des regies precises dont 1' observation les net'te a l'abri des recrimina- 
tions de Tun et de l'autre des belligerants. lis declinent des obliga- 
tions qui seraient sou vent en disproportion avec leurs moyens et leurs 
ressources ou dont l'accomplissement supposerait de leur part de 
veritables mesures inquisitoriales. 

Ce qui doit etre le point de depart d'une reglementation, e'est la 
souverainete de l'Etat neutre, qui ne peut etre alteree par le seul fait 
d'une guerre a laquelle il entend demeurer etranger. Cette souve- 
rainete doit etre respectee par les belligerants qui ne peuvent l'im- 
pliquer dans la guerre ou le troubler par des actes d'hostilite. 

Toutefois les neutres ne peuvent pas user de leur liberte comme en 
temps de paix, ils ne doivent pas faire abstraction de l'etat de guerre. 
Aucun acte ou aucune tolerance de leur part ne peuvent licitement 
constituer une immixtion dans les operations de guerre. Ils doivent 
de plus etre impartiaux. 

II semble inutile de developper des considerations generates qui 
pourraient donner lieu a de longues discussions, la neutralite n'etant 
pas envisagee de la m§me facon par tout le monde. II vaut mieux se 
borner a l'etude de propositions visant des cas determines que Ton 
regie naturellement en tenant compte des principes, mais qui se pre- 
sentent d'une maniere concrete et precise. (Deuxieme Conference 
Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 466.) 

Resume of propositions at The Hague in 1907. — The 
propositions made by the representatives of the States 
at The Hague in 1907 resolved into two: 

1. A belligerent ship of war may take in a neutral 
port fuel sufficient only to enable her to reach her nearest 
home port or some nearer neutral destination. 



PROPOSITIONS AT THE HAGUE, 1907. 33 

2. A belligerent ship of war may take in a neutral 
port fuel sufficient to fill her coal bunkers to the normal 
peace standard. 

These propositions were somewhat differently stated 
by the representatives of the several States. 

Spain: 

lis pourront, toutefois, se pourvoir des vivres et du charbon neces- 
saires pour atteindre le port le plus rapproche de leur pays ou un port 
neutre plus proche encore. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale 
de la Paix, Tome III, p. 701.) 

Great Britain: 

Une Puissance neutre ne devra pas permettre sciemment a un navire 
de guerre d'un belligerant se trouvant dans sa juridiction de prendre 
a bord des munitions, vivres ou combustibles si ce n'est dans le cas 
oil les munitions, vivres ou combustibles deja a bord du navire ne lui 
suffiraient pas pour gagner le port le plus proche de son propre pays; 
la quantite de munitions, vivres ou combustibles charges a bord du 
navire dans la juridiction neutre ne devra en aucun cas depasser le 
complement necessaire pour lui permettre de gagner le port le plus 
proche de son propre pays. (Ibid., p. 697.) 

Japan: 

Les navires belligerants ne pourront dans les ports ou les eaux neu- 
tres, ni augmenter leurs forces de guerre, ni faire de reparations sauf 
celles qui seront indispensables a la securite de leur navigation, ni 
charger aucun approvisionnement excepte du charbon et des provi- 
sions suffisant avec ce qui reste encore a bord pour les mettre a m§me 
d'atteindre a une vitesse economique le port le plus rapproche de 
leur pays ou une destination neutre plus proche encore. (Ibid., p. 
700.) 

Russia: 

II est interdit aux batiments de guerre des Etats belligerants, pendant 
leur sejour dans les ports et les eaux territoriales neutres, d'augmenter, 
a Faide des ressources puissees a terre, leur materiel de guerre ou de 
renforcer leur equipage. 

Toutefois les batiments susmentionnes pourront se pourvoir de 
vivres, denrees, approvisionnements, charbon et moyens de reparation 
necessaires a la subsistence de leur equipage ou a la continuation de 
leur navigation. (Ibid., p. 702.) 

The report of the third commission, to which the con- 
sideration of the rights and duties of neutrals in case 

70387—11 3 



34 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

of maritime war was intrusted, in presenting Article 
19, says: 

Nous arrivbna a la question qui est, avec celle de la duree de sejour 
la plus important de la matiere. Dans quelle mesure les navires de 
guerre des belligerants peuvent-ile s'approvisionner de vivres et de 
charbon dans les ports neutres? 

La proposition russe (article 7) (Vol. Ill, Trois. Com. Annexe 48) 
(lit que ces batiments pourront se pourvoir de vivres, demies, appro- 
visionnement s, charbon et moyens de reparation necessaires a la sub- 
sistence de leur equipage ou a la continuation de leur voyage. La 
proposition britannique (article 17) (Vol. Ill, Trois. Com. Annexe 44) 
dit que la quantite de munitions, vivres ou combustibles charges a 
bord du navire dans la juridiction neutre ne devra, en aucun cas, 
depasser le complement neeessaire pour lui permettre de gagner le 
port le plus proche de son propre pays. D'apres la proposition japo- 
naise (article 4) (Vol. Ill, Trois. Com. Annexe 46), les navires ne peu- 
vent charger aucun approvisionnement, a l'exception du charbon et des 
provisions suffisant avec ce qui reste encore a bord, pour les mettre 
a meme d'atteindre, a une vitesse economique, le port le plus rap- 
proche de leur pays ou une destination neutre plus proche encore. 
Enfin, sans parler de ce qui pourrait etre a bord, la proposition espagnole 
(article 5) (Vol. Ill, Trois. Com. Annexe 47) permet aux navires 
belligerants de se pourvoir des vivres et du charbon necessaires pour 
atteindre le port le plus rapproche de leur pays ou tin port neutre plus 
proche encore. 

II faut, tout d'abord, mettre a part le ravitaillement en dehors du 
combustible. La premiere regie de Particle 19, d'apres laquelle les 
navires belligerants ne peuvent se ravitailler que pour completer leur 
approvisionnement normal du temps de paix, a ete acceptee sans 
difficulte. 

Le d£bat n'a porte que sur le charbon, ou mieux sur le combustible, 
puisque le charbon n'est plus le seul combustible employed 

C'est depuis une quarantaine d'annees que cette question a surgi et on 
en comprend toute 1' importance, si Ton songe que, suivant une expres- 
sion saisissante de S. Exc. M. Tcharykow, si un homme sans vivres est un 
cadavre, un navire sans charbon est une epave. Les efforts les plus 
grands ont ete faits dans le Comite pour arriver a un systeme acceptable 
par les interesses, qui sont les neutres et les belligerants eventuels. 
Pourceux-ci, ilstiennent naturellementcomptede leur situation geogra- 
phique, qui leur rend plus ou moins neeessaire la faculte de se ravi- 
tailler dans des ports neutres; pour les premiers, ils peuvent demander 
une regie precise, qu'ils soient en mesure d'appliquer sans s'exposer a 
des recriminations des deux parts. 

Des arguments ont ete abondamment fournis en faveur de diverses 
solutions. Si on n'admet pas la regie britannique, qui est de nature, 
comme on Fa fait remarquer, a soulever diverses difficultes d'ordre 
pratique, et si, d'autre part, on ne veut pas du systeme de liberte 



REPORT OF COMMISSION ON ARTICLE. 35 

absolue, on peut concevoir et on a presente des systemes tres divers 
pour determiner la quantite de combustible qui pourra etre chargee 
par le navire belligerant: la dotation normale, une quantite propor- 
tionnelle au deplacement ou au nombre des chevaux-vapeur, la quan- 
tite necessaire pour parcourir une certaine distance, etc. Un comite 
technique charge d'etudier la question n'a pu arriver a une solution 
unanime. La proposition allemande d'accorder aux belligerants la 
permission de completer leurs soutes entieres y a reuni 9 voix (Alle- 
magne, Bresil, Danemark, France, Italie, Pays-Bas, Russie, Suede, 
Turquie) contre 5 (Etats-L T nis d'Amerique, Espagne, Grande-Bretagne, 
Japon, Chine). 

C'est dans ces conditions que la question a ete soumise en seconde 
lecture au Comite d'Examen. 

II y avait en presence deux propositions: 

1. La proposition britannique (Vol. Ill, Trois. Com. Annexe 44): Les 
navires ne peuvent prendre du combustible que pour gagner le port le 
plus proche de leur propre pays. Le sens de cette proposition a ete 
nettement precise par Sir Ernest Satow, en reponse a une question de 
M. Hagerup. La regie constitue un simple mode de calcul et ne cree 
pour le neutre aucune obligation d'avoir a surveiller la destination du 
navire requerant. Xous nous permettons d'ajouter qu'elle n'implique 
non plus aucune obligation pour le navire de se rendre a une destina- 
tion quelconque. Ainsi seraient supprimees des contestations parfois 
soulevees. 

2. Une proposition ainsi concue: Ces navires ne peuvent prendre du 
combustible que por completer leur plein normal du temps de paix. 

S. Exc. M. Tcharykow a presente, a titre transactionnel, la formule 
suivante: "Ces navires ne peuvent, de meme, prendre du combustible 
que pour gagner le port le plus proche de leur propre pays. lis peuvent, 
d'ailleurs, prendre le combustible necessaire pour completer leur plein 
des soutes proprement dites, quand ils se trouvent dans les pays neutres 
qui ont adopte ce mode de determination du combustible a fournir." 

Cette proposition a ete acceptee par 11 voix (Allemagne, Bresil, Dane- 
mark, Espagne, France, Italie, Xorvege, Pays-Bas, Russie, Suede, 
Turquie) avec 3 abstentions (Etats-Unis d'Amerique, Grande-Bretagne, 
Japon), apres que la proposition faite par S. Exc. M. Tsudzuki en vue 
de la suppression de tout Particle eut ete rejetee par 10 voix (Allemagne, 
Bresil, Danemark, France, Italie, Xorvege, Pays-Bas, Russie, Suede, 
Turquie) contre 4 (Etats-L T nis d'Amerique, Espagne, Grande-Bretagne, 
Japon) . 

Le ravitaillement ne peut suffire pour justifier la prolongation de la 
duree normale du sejour. II faut toutefois tenir compte de la circon- 
stance que, dans certains pays, un navire belligerant ne peut obtenir 
de charbon que 24 heures apres son arrivee. (Article 249, alin^a 2, du 
Code italien de la marine marchande.) 

Article 19. Les navires de guerre belligerants ne peuvent se ravitailler 
dans les ports et rades neutres que, pour completer leur approvisionnement 
normal du temps de paix. 



36 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

Ces navires ne peuvent, de mime, prendre du combustible que pour 
gagner le port le plus proche de leur propre pays. lis peuvent, d'ailleurs, 
prendre le combustible nccessaire pour completer le plein de leurs soutes 
proprement ditcs, quand Us se trouvent dans les pays neutres qui ont 
adopte ce mode de determination du combustible a fournir. 

Le raritaillement et la prise de combustible ne donnent pas droit a pro- 
longer la duree legale du scjour. Toutefois, si, d'apres la hi de la Puis- 
sance neutre, ces navires recoivent du charbon que 24 heures apres leur 
arrivee, cette duree est prolongee de 24 heures. 

(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 505.) 

The last paragraph of Article 19 was after discussion 
amended as follows: 

Si, d'apres la loi de la Puissance neutre, les navires ne reqoivent du 
charbon que vingt-quatre heures apres leur arrivee, la duree legal de leur 
sejour est prolongee de vingt-quatre heures. 

Report of American delegation. — It is proper to reprint 
here the clauses of the report of the United States dele- 
gation to the Second Hague Conference so far as this 
report bears upon the subject under consideration. 

The proposition advanced by England represented the strict 
views of neutral rights and duties which are held by States main- 
taining powerful naval establishments, supplemented by a widely 
distributed system of coaling stations and ports of call, in which their 
merchant vessels could find convenient refuge at the outbreak of war 
and which enable them to carry on operations at sea quite independently 
of a resort to neutral ports for the procurement of coal or other supplies 
or for purposes of repair. As the policy of the United States Govern- 
ment has generally been one of strict neutrality, the delegation found 
itself in sympathy with this policy in many, if not most, of its essential 
details. France for many years past has taken a somewhat different 
view of its neutral obligations, and has practiced a liberal, rather than 
a strict, neutrality. The views of France in that regard have received 
some support from the Russian delegation and were favored to some 
extent by German y and Austria. 

It was constantly borne in mind by the delegation, in all delibera- 
tions in committee, that the United States is, and always has been, a 
permanently neutral power, and has always endeavored to secure the 
greatest enlargement of neutral privileges and immunities. Not only 
are its interests permanently neutral, but it is so fortunately situated, 
in respect to its military and naval establishments, as to be able to 
enforce respect for such neutral rights and obligations as flow from its 
essential rights of sovereignty and independence. (Senate Doc. No. 
444, 60th Cong., 1st sess., p. 50.) 



COALING IN SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 37 

Coaling in the Spanish- American War. — In a telegram 
from Mr. Hay, the American ambassador in London, of 
June 29, 1898, when the Spanish fleet was supposed to 
be bound for the East, it was said: 

British Government concludes Camara can not remain at Port Said 
more than 24 hours, except in case of necessity, and can not coal there 
if he has coal enough to take him back to Cadiz, which appears to 
be the case. (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 983.) 

It was said of the Spanish fleet bound westward that 
it also might find it difficult to obtain coal. 

When, in the latter part of May, 1898, it was rumored that the Spanish 
armored squadron had sailed or was about to sail to the United States 
and might stop at the Azores for coal, the minister of the United States 
at Lisbon was instructed to protest against its coaling at those islands, 
on the ground that, as they lay entirely outside the route from Spain 
to the Spanish West Indies, such an act would convert the Portuguese 
territory into a base of hostile operations against the United States. 
(7 Moore, Int. Law Digest, 945.) 

Prof. Moore quotes from a letter of the Secretary of State 
to the Secretary of the Navy of August 5, 1898, in regard to 
coaling of United States ships of war in Mexican waters: 

Before the outbreak of hostilities the Pacific Mail Steamship Co. was 
permitted, under its agreement with the Mexican Government, to 
furnish supplies of coal to United States men-of-war at Acapulco. 
During the war the Mexican Government placed limitations on the 
supply of coal to belligerent vessels in its ports and made no exception 
as to United States vessels at Acapulco. The Department of State 
abstained from addressing any representation to Mexico on the subject, 
on the ground that as it had "on numerous recent occasions asked of 
Mexico the strict execution of its neutral duties," it was "not disposed, 
upon the strength of an agreement between the Pacific Mail Steamship 
Co. and the Mexican Government, made before the war, to insist that 
public ships of the United States may now be allowed to take coal 
without limit in a Mexican port." (7 Moore, Int. Law Digest, p. 946.) 

Coaling in the Russo-Japanese War. — The proclamation 
of the Governor of Malta of August 12, 1904, declares 
that the provisions in regard to coaling — 

shall not be understood as having any application in case of a bellig- 
erent fleet proceeding either to the seat of war or to any position or 
positions on the line of route with the object of intercepting neutral 
ships on suspicion of carrying contraband of war, and that such fleet 
shall not be permitted to make use in any way of any port, roadstead, 



38 COAIJNG WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

or waters subject to the jurisdiction of His Majesty for the purpose of 
coaling, either directly from the shore or from colliers accompanying 
Blich fleet, whether vessels of such fleet present themselves to any such 
port or roadstead or within the said waters at the same time or sue- 
jively, and second, that the same practice shall be pursued with 
reference to single belligerent ships of war proceeding for purpose of 
belligerent operations as above defined. (Xaval War College. Inter- 
national Law Situations, 1906, p. 78; also the London Times, Aug. 
23, 1904.) 

The notes issued by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs February 10 and 12, 1904, provide that coal shall 
be granted to belligerent ships of war only on written 
authorization from the port authorities specifying the 
amount, and that the port authorities shall grant such 
authorization "only after a written statement from the 
ship's commander shall have been obtained, stating the 
destination of his vessel and the quantity of coal already 
on board." 

The royal ordinance of Sweden and Norway of April 30, 
1904, interdicts "to war vessels of the belligerents entry 
to the territorial waters within the fixed submarine 
defenses, as well as to the following ports" (4 Swedish, 
6 Norwegian). Entrance is accorded to vessels of war 
to other ports under the following rule-: 

They are forbidden to obtain any supplies except stores, provisions, 
and means for repairs necessary for the subsistence of the crew or for the 
security of navigation. In regard to coal, they can only purchase the 
necessary quantity to reach the nearest nonblockaded national port, or, 
with the consent of the authorities of the King, a neutral destination. 
Without special permission the same vessel will not be permitted to 
again purchase coal in a port or roadstead of Sweden or Norway within 
three months after the last purchase. (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1904, 
p. 31.) 

The range of proclamations is from almost unlimited 
freedom of entrance to prohibition of entrance except 
under force majeure. 

Coaling outside of port, but within neutral waters. — 
Situation IV of the Naval War College International 
Law Situations of 1908 was as follows: 

Coaling in neutral waters. — While there is war between States X and 
Y and other States are neutral, a war vessel of State X coals from a 
collier just off the coast within three miles of State Z. A month later 



HAGUE RESTRICTIONS. 39 

the same war vessel enters a port of State Z and requests a reasonable 
supply of coal. This is refused, on the ground that the vessel has taken 
coal within the waters of State Z within three months. 

The conclusion as a result of the conferences and of 
the consideration of the principles involved was that 
the contention of State Z under the circumstances was 
correct. 

The Hague Convention on maritime jurisdiction. — The 
Hague Convention of 1907, respecting the Lights and 
Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War, provides: 

Art. 1. Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign 
rights of neutral Powers and to abstain, in neutral territory 
or neutral waters, from all acts which would constitute on 
the part of the neutral Powers which Tcnowingly permitted 
them, a nonfulfilment of their neutrality. 

Art. 5. Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports 
and waters as a base of naval operations against their adver- 
saries. 

It is evident that the aim of these regulations is to pre- 
vent the use of neutral waters as a base of operations. 

It is also evident from Article 19 of the above Conven- 
tion that a State may allow coal sufficient only to reach 
the nearest home port, or, if it adopts the alternative 
method, then sufficient to fdl the coal bunkers. 

It is unquestionably within the power of a State to 
adopt either method. 

Coaling within a port, whether from an accompanying 
collier or from a collier sent to the port to meet a fleet, 
would be acts of like nature, because taking place within 
the area clearly under the immediate jurisdiction of the 
port authorities. 

Dr. Higgins on amount of coal. — Dr. A. Pearce Higgins, 
at present lecturer on international law at the British 
Royal Naval War College, summarizes the discussion at 
The Hague upon Article 19 of the Convention respecting 
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War 
so far as it relates to the amount of coal to be supplied 
in a neutral port as follows : 

The second paragraph deals with the supply of fuel and gave rise to 
lengthy discussions. The British proposal (Article 17) said that the 



40 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

quantity of provisions or fuel (munitions, vivres ou combustibles) taken 
on board in neutral jurisdiction should in no case exceed that which 
was necessary to enable it to reach the nearest port of its own country ; 
the Japanese proposal added "or some nearer neutral destination;" 
the Spanish proposal was to the same effect. On the other hand it was 
contended by Germany, France, and Russia that belligerents should 
be allowed to take in enough fuel to complete their normal supply in 
time of peace. These two alternatives were considered by the examin- 
ing committee on the 11th and 12th of September, 1907, and again at 
the full meeting of the third committee on the 4th of October, 1907. 
Admiral Siegel (Germany) contended that there was a great difficulty 
in arriving at the quantity of fuel necessary to take a ship to its nearest 
home port. It was necessary to ascertain what was the nearest port, 
what was its distance, the most economical speed, which would neces- 
sarily vary with the quality of the coal supplied, the state of the boilers, 
etc., the condition of the weather and a consequent lengthening of the 
voyage. These were burdens which should not be placed on neutrals. 
In support of the British proposal, Sir Ernest Satow argued that a neu- 
tral had no right to give assistance to a belligerent to reach his adversary; 
that the only reason why coal should be given to a belligerent ship 
was to prevent it from becoming a helpless derelict on the ocean; suffi- 
cient should therefore be given to enable it to preserve its existence, and 
this was the origin of the rule of the nearest home port, a rule which had 
been accepted by nearly all States which had issued rules on the sub- 
ject. The Japanese delegate preferred the suppression of the provisions 
relating to coal in the Article to the acceptance of the German proposal 
but this was rejected by 10 to 4. The Russian proposal combined both 
tests as alternatives as stated in the second paragraph and this was car- 
ried in the examining committee by 11 votes, with 3 abstentions. 
(The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 475.) 

Prof. Oppenheim 1 s opinion. — Oppenheim maintains 
that — 

A neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war admitted to his 
ports or maritime belt from taking in more provisions and coal than are 
necessary to bring them safely to the nearest port of their home State, 
for otherwise he would enable them to cruise on the open sea near his 
maritime belt for the purpose of attacking enemy vessels. And it 
must be specially observed that it matters not whether the man-of-war 
concerned intends to buy provisions and coal on land or to take them 
in from transport vessels which accompany or meet her in neutral 
waters. (2 International Law, p. 355.) 

Application of discussion to Situation I. — (a) Right to 
regulate supply of fuel. — It is evident from practice and 
it is in accord with the Hague Convention that neutral 
powers " should issue specific enactments regulating the 
consequences of the status of neutrality whenever 



RIGHT TO REGULATE SUPPLY OF FUEL. 41 

adopted by them." It is an obligation resting on neutrals 
to apply these enactments impartially. 

When, in time of war between States X and Y, the 
authorities of neutral State Z inform the commander of a 
detachment of armed vessels of State X, entering port B 
of State Z for the purpose of coaling from colliers accom- 
panying the detachment, that he will be allowed to take 
from the colliers coal sufficient only to proceed to the 
nearest home port or to a port already passed en route to 
port B, the authorities are acting within their rights. A 
State has the right to make such regulations as it may 
regard necessary for the protection of its neutrality pro- 
vided these do not violate conventions to which the State 
is a party. Such a restriction as State Z announces is in 
accord with the clause of Article 19 of the Hague Conven- 
tion respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
in Maritime War, which provides that belligerent ships 
of war "may only ship sufficient fuel to enable them to 
reach the nearest port in their own country." The addi- 
tion of the provision allowing the detachment to ship 
fuel sufficient to reach " a port already passed en route" 
does not deprive the belligerent of any right, but may 
enlarge his privileges. 

The provision of the Hague Convention leaves to the 
neutral State the determination of the amount of fuel 
necessary, if the neutral State adopts as the standard 
the amount necessary to take the ships of war to the 
nearest home port. To deny this amount in a port which 
ships of war were permitted to enter would result practi- 
cally in the internment of such ships. The protest of State 
Y against any coaling within port B of neutral State Z would 
not be valid. It has been recognized in recent years that 
coaling from colliers in a neutral port, if not in violation 
of the amount allowed and if not within the period during 
which coaling is prohibited because of previous coaling 
in a port of the same State, is not a breach of neutrality. 
Indeed it is considered that coaling from colliers accom- 
panying a fleet, if under proper regulations, may be less 
in contravention of neutrality than taking a supply of 
coal from the merchants of a neutral State, since the 



42 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

reserve coal supply of the belligerent would be by that 
amount reduced. 

The protest of State Y is not valid. The rules estab- 
lished by State Z must, of course, be impartially applied. 

State Z is competent to make the regulation mentioned 
in Situation I (a). The enforcement of the rule in case 
of the detachment of the fleet of State X is justified. 

Certain aspects of the question as regards coaling in a 
neutral port or roadstead and coaling in neutral waters 
outside of these limits were discussed in Situation IV of 
the International Law Situations of 1908. It was stated 
(p. 97) that— 

As is evident from the neutrality proclamations of recent years, it 
is the purpose of neutrals to strictly limit the use of neutral territorial 
waters by belligerents to such purposes as the neutrals may specifically 
enumerate. In most proclamations prohibitions have been extended 
to ports, roadsteads, and territorial waters. 

There is a difference in the actual degree of control 
which a neutral exercises over a port or roadstead and 
that which the neutral exercises over the territorial waters 
along the open coast. The Hague Convention of 1907, 
respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in 
Maritime War, provides in Article 10 that — 

The neutrality of a Power is not affected by the mere pas- 
sage through its territorial waters of ships of war or of prizes 
belonging to belligerents. 

Prizes belonging to belligerents are in general not to 
be brought into neutral ports except under stress of 
weather or other force majeure. Thus the status of a 
prize is not the same in a neutral port as in passage 
through neutral waters outside a port. The obligation 
of the neutral power to exercise jurisdiction does not 
extend in the same manner to the marine league along 
the coast as within its ports. 

The United States declaration of neutrality in 1904, 
regulating the taking of coal by the belligerents during 
the Russo-Japanese war, extended to "any port, harbor, 
roadstead, or waters within the jurisdiction of the United 
States." The British wording is similar. Most of the 
other proclamations mention coaling in ''neutral ports" 
only. 



COLLIERS SENT TO MEET FLEET. 43 

(b) Colliers sent to meet fleet. — In a neutral port coaling 
from the shore, from colliers accompanying the fleet, or 
from colliers sent to meet the fleet would be analogous. 
The acts would in each case be performed within juris- 
diction of the authorities of the neutral port B. As 
explained above under (a), the neutral State Z has a right 
to make regulations for the protection of its neutrality 
and for the use of its ports by belligerents in time of war. 
The neutral State has, according to the Hague Conven- 
tion respecting the Eights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
in Maritime War, Article 26, the right to enforce the 
regulations : 

The exercise by a neutral Power of the rights laid down 
in the present Convention can never be considered as an 
unfriendly act by either belligerent who has accepted the 
Articles relating thereto. 

This is simply an enunciation of the general principle 
that a neutral may protect its neutrality. Each neutral 
must judge what is necessary for such protection. If it 
is neglectful one belligerent may claim that it has not 
used "due diligence;' 7 if it is too rigorous in the regula- 
tions and in their enforcement the other belligerent may 
feel aggrieved. It is, however, for the neutral to deter- 
mine where the line shall be drawn. 

In the situation under consideration there would be no 
difference in the solution owing to the fact that the col- 
liers had been sent to the neutral port B, to meet the 
detachment of the fleet instead of accompanying the fleet. 
The explanation given of the British rule met with little 
objection when Lord Lansdowne wrote to Sir C. Hardinge 
on August 16, 1904, in regard to belligerent vessels that 
"Such fleet can not be permitted to make use in any way 
of a British port for the purpose of coaling, either directly 
from the shore or from colliers accompanying the fleet, 
whether the vessels of the fleet present themselves at the 
port at the same time or successively." 

(c) General control of waters. — From all points of view 
it is evident that a neutral State can not exercise the same 
effective jurisdiction over remote waters along the coast 
as over the waters of the ports and roadsteads. The 



44 COALING WITHIN NEUTRAL JURISDICTION. 

time of arrival, the amount of coal taken, and other data 
necessary for the determination of the treatment of the 
belligerent fleet might not and probably would not be 
available. 

While the obligation of the neutral according to article 
25 of the Hague Convention concerning the Rights and 
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War is that "A neu- 
tral Power is bound to exercise such surveillance as the 
means at its disposal allow to prevent any violation of 
the provisions of the above Article occurring in its ports 
or roadsteads or in its waters," the belligerent is bound 
"to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from 
all acts which would constitute on the part of the neutral 
Powers which knowingly permitted them, a non-fulfilment 
of their neutrality." (Art. 1.) Such acts would be, if no 
provisions were announced to the contrary, sojourn for 
more than 24 hours (Art. 18), taking in more than coal 
sufficient to reach nearest home port (Art. 19). 

Conclusion. — The obligation upon the belligerent is to 
observe the regulations prescribed by the neutral under 
penalty of denial of the use of neutral waters or such 
other measures as the neutral maybe able to take (Art. 25). 
The neutral would be justified in regulating the supply 
of coal as specified in (a) ; the only difference would be 
in the fact that the neutral would not be under equal 
obligation to exercise surveillance over all coast waters. 

SOLUTION. 

(a) State Z is competent to make the regulation allow- 
ing within neutral jurisdiction coal sufficient only to pro- 
ceed to the nearest home port or to a port already passed 
en route to port B. State Z might be at liberty to adopt 
the rule of full bunker supply. 

(b) The same rule would apply in case of colliers sent 
to meet the belligerent fleet at the neutral port of 
State Z. 

(c) The same rule would apply if the coaling were not 
in port but merely within the three-mile limit off the 
coast of State Z. 



Situation II. 

DECLARATION OF WAR. 

The relations between the United States and State X 
are strained. The United States issues an ultimatum on 
July 1 to the effect that, if certain demands are not satis- 
fied before July 10, war will exist from that date. 

State X breaks off diplomatic relations with the United 
States on July 3 and announces that unless the demands 
of the United States are withdrawn before July 7 war will 
be declared on that date. 

On July 8 a war vessel of the United States whose com- 
mander knows only that neither the United States nor 
State X has withdrawn its demands meets a merchant 
vessel of State Y which in case of war would be neutral. 
This vessel is known to be loaded with coal and is bound 
for a port of State X which, besides being a large commer- 
cial port, also contains a naval station. 

What action should the commander take ? 

SOLUTION. 

Unless exempt by treaty or otherwise the commander 
should send the merchant vessel of State Y to a prize 
court on the ground that the cargo was contraband of war 
if the vessel sailed with knowledge of the existence of the 
war. 

If the vessel clearly had no knowledge of the existence 
of the war, he should consider that the cargo will probably 
be liable to expropriation rather than condemnation. 

NOTES. 

Historical. — It was in early times considered neces- 
sary that there should be some formal declaration of 
war. It was thought that a war should not be begun by 
what without State authorization might be regarded 
simply as a violent act of an individual. It was consid- 
ered atone time that to commit an act of hostility before 
a public declaration of war would be perfidious. 

45 



46 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

It was the opinion in the eighteenth century that the 
State against which the war was to be waged and other 
States were entitled to demand that they be informed by 
a declaration of the purpose of a State to engage in war. 

The Roman idea of a helium justum involved a previous 
declaration. The ceremony of declaration was, however, 
a religious one and may have been rather to justify the 
war before the gods than before men. 

The chivalry of the middle ages demanded a previous 
declaration and this was frequently formally carried to 
the ruler against whom the hostilities were to be waged. 
Such was the practice in the early part of the seventeenth 
century. 

Grotius says that not only must a war to be just be 
waged by the sovereign authority, but it must be duly and 
formally declared. He distinguishes among wars allow- 
ing wars without declaration for the recovery of a State - 
own property or to ward off danger. He, however, 
maintains that in order to obtain the advantages flowing 
from the law of nations a declaration of war by one of the 
parties if not by both is essential. His treatise provides 
for the conditional declaration of war when it is conjoined 
with a demand for restitution. (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 
Lib. Ill, cap. III.) 

Bvnkershoek in the early eighteenth centurv regarded 
declaration as the honorable method of entering on war, 
but not as absolutely essential, and before his period it 
had become more and more common for States to go to 
war without declaration. During the eighteenth century 
and the early ninteenth century the practice of declara- 
tion declined, and it was not till the latter half of the 
nineteenth century that there arose a movement in favor 
of declaration. 

Maurice, in his book on ' 'Hostilities without Declaration 
of War," covers the period between 1700 and 1870. Of 
111 wars during this period he finds four formal declara- 
tions. Eleven declarations seem to have been made 
either formally or informally. In some instances diplo- 
matic relations were broken off or some action involving 
an ultimatum was taken. A large number, perhaps 



REASONS FOR DECLARATION. 



47 



forty, seem to have been begun without declaration in 
order to take the enemy by surprise. 

Since 1870 there have been thirty or more cases where 
States have resorted to arms. Some of these hostilities 
hardly deserve the dignity of the classification as wars. 
Domestic revolutions have often begun without declara- 
tion. The list includes: 



Peruvian revolution, 1872. 
Carlist revolution, Spain, 1873. 
Balkan War, 1876. 
Russo-Turkish War, 1877. 
Afghan War, 1879. 
Colombian revolution, 1879. 
Chile-Peru-Bolivian War, 1879. 
Anglo-Boer War, 1880. 
Franco-Tunis campaign, 1881. 
Egyptian campaign, 1882. 
Haitian revolution, 1882. 
Tonquin campaign, 1882. 
Haitian revolution, 1883. 
Franco-Chinese War, 1884. 
Servia-Bulgarian War, 1885. 
Burmese War, 1885. 



Haitian revolution, 1888. 
Argentine revolution, 1890. 
Chilean revolution, 1891. 
Brazilian revolution, 1891. 
Venezuelan revolution, 1892. 
Hawaiian revolution, 1893. 
British- African War, 1893. 
Chino- Japanese War, 1894. 
Italian-Abysinnian War, 1894. 
Cuban revolution, 1895. 
Greco-Turkish War, 1897. 
Spanish- American War, 1898. 
South African War, 1899. 
German- African War, 1903. 
Russo-Japanese War, 1904. 



Of these, hostilities consequent upon internal revolu- 
tions would ordinarily not be declared nor would hostili- 
ties upon uncivilized tribes. But of the entire list there 
were only nine declarations, of which five might be con- 
sidered preliminary. 

Before 1907 post facto declarations were common; even 
the United States Congress, with which rests the power 
to declare war, declared on April 25, 1898, "that war exists 
and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, A. D. 
1898, including said day, between the United States of 
America and the Kingdom of Spain." 

From this review of more than two hundred years it is 
evident that preliminary declarations were rarely issued 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 

Reasons for a declaration of war. — If war were simply a 
fact without legal consequences, there might be reasons 
why a declaration should not be regarded as necessary 
in all cases. War gives rise to certain legal consequences. 
The relations of citizens of the belligerent States to one 



48 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

another are changed. The relations of citizens of bellig- 
erent and of neutral States are changed. The relations 
and obligations of the neutral States and of citizens of 
neutral States to the belligerents are changed. The neu- 
tral State is bound to prohibit certain actions ordinarily 
permitted. The citizen of a neutral State is liable to 
treatment which in time of peace would not be tolerated. 
A neutral State in time of war may not sell arms to a 
belligerent State. A neutral merchant vessel in time of 
war must tolerate visit and search and other restrictions 
upon her freedom. 

The custom developed during the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries of dating the beginning of war from the 
date of the first act of hostilities, but in practice that 
was not easy to determine. The courts of different States 
have given different interpretations to the phrase "first 
act of hostilities." Indeed, the courts of one State have 
at different periods and in different cases given different 
interpretations to the phrase. When wars were mainly 
upon land and the interests and well-being of States not 
concerned in the hostilities were not greatly affected the 
necessity of a declaration of the time at which war 
existed or would exist was not so essential. 

Moral obligation to declare war. — Prof. Westlake sets 

forth the moral obligation to make a declaration: 

The wars between the continental powers in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were often commenced in fact before their decla- 
ration, and were sometimes carried through without any declaration, 
quite as a matter of course, without that confused reference to reprisals 
as a distinct institution, which helped to warp the thoughts and the 
conduct of the maritime powers. Thus on all sides the habit arose of 
regarding lawful war — that is, war with all its legal effects, as com- 
menced no less by fact than by declaration, and dating it from the 
commencement of hostilities. By that term, if we try to put a definite 
meaning on it, we must understand the first act of force done with the 
intent of war and not with that of reprisals or pacific blockade, or the 
first act of force done with the intent of reprisals or pacific blockade if 
a war follows, or the first act of force done with whatever intent — self- 
defense, seizing what is called a material guarantee, or any other — 
which the State affected by it chooses to regard as one of war. Nor is 
it possible to refuse its legal effects to a state of war so entered on or to 
date its commencement as between the parties otherwise. But from 



CONVENTION ON OPENING OF HOSTILITIES. 49 

the point of view of political morality it can not be too strongly main- 
tained that so serious a step as the entrance on a state of war ought 
not to be taken without the deliberation for which the only security 
approaching to adequacy is the necessity of expression. No power 
doing an act of force with the intent of war, nor any power treating as 
war an act of force done by another, is morally justified in omitting to 
accompany its conduct by some kind of declaration. Nor again is any 
power doing an act of force morally justified in not having a clear view 
whether it intends it as war or not. If an act of force affects third 
powers and they submit to it, deeming at the same time that it places 
them in the position of neutrals in war with neutral rights and duties, 
they can scarcely avoid stating the view which they take of the situa- 
tion. (International Law, Part II, War, p. 22.) 

Hague Convention, opening of hostilities. — The Second 
Hague Conference proposed and adopted a Convention 
Relative to the Opening of Hostilities. The Convention 
was ratified by the United States March 10, 1908. 

The official French text is as follows: 

Art. 1. Les Puissances contractantes reconnaissent que 

les Jwstilites entre elles ne doivent pas commencer sans un 

avertissement prealable et non equivoque, qui aura, soit la 

forme d'une declaration de guerre motivee, soit celle d'un 

ultimatum avec declaration de guerre conditionnelle. 

Art. 2. L'etat de guerre devra etre notifie sans retard aux 
Puissances neutres et ne produira effet a leur egard qu'apres 
reception d'une notification qui pourra etre faite meme par 
voie telegraphique. Toutefois les Puissances neutres ne 
pourraient invoquer V absence de notification, s'il etait etabli 
d'une maniere non douteuse qu'en fait elles connaissaient 
Vetatde guerre. 

Article 1 is as proposed by the French delegation at the 
Hague Conference of 1907 at the session of the second 
commission on June 22, 1907. This proposition was sec- 
onded by the Belgian delegation. The Belgian delegate 
pointed out the uncertainty of practice and opinion as to. 
the necessity of a declaration of war before engaging in 
hostilities. The Netherlands delegate said, in the discus- 
sion before the second subcommission, on July 5, 1907: 

II. "Convient-il " — est demande ensuite — "que l'ouverture des hos- 
tilites soit precedee d'une declaration de guerre ou d'un acte equiva- 
lent?" 

70387—11 4 



50 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

Notre point de vue en cet egard est le meme que l'lnstitut de droit 
international a exprime dans sa session de Gand au mois de septembre 
de l'annee passee. 

II est conforme aux exigences de 1' esprit du droit international 
moderne, a la loyaute que les nations se doivent dans leurs rapports mu- 
tuels, ainsi qu'a 1'interSt commun de tous les Etats que les hostilites ne 
puissent commencer sans un avertissement prealable et non equivoque. 

Pourquoi? Pour des raisons qui, selon moi, se trouvent sous la main. 

On demande le desarmement. Pourquoi done, ne commencerions- 
nous pas par ce qui est tres-facilement a atteindre? Si cela ne mene pas 
direetement et ostensiblement au but voulu, du moins cela contribuera 
indirectement a ce que les Etats n'aient pas autant besoin de rester 
armes en temps de paix, pour ne pas etre pris a l'improviste. 

De plus, pour tant de relations commerciales qui de nos jours sesont 
developpees si extraordinairement, il importe que le moment oii la 
guerre, qui bouleverse et change tout, a commence, soit fixe et puisse- 
etre determine exactement. 

III. A la troisieme question: ' ' Convient-il de fixer un delai qui 
devra s'ecouler entre la notification d'un tel acte et l'ouverture des 
hostilites?" ma reponse est encore affirmative. 

C'est pour cette raison que je me suis permis d'amender la proposition 
de la Delegation francaise avec laquelle je suis au reste d'accord. 

II me semble que dans une matiere d'aussi grande importance que 
celle qui nous occupe, il est desirable de preciser et d'eviter les termes- 
vagues. 

Or, si Ton ne precise pas ce que Ton desire et veut atteindre avec le 
terme avertissement prealable, cet avertissement en peut etre un, envoye 
a l'adversaire une heure, meme une demie-heure ou moins encore- 
avant que les soldats passent la frontiere. II va sans dire que le prealable 
ne sert alors a rien. 

Veut-on ecarter les surprises, desire-t-on prevenir que l'avertisse- 
ment ne devienne a cet egard qu'une simple forme, aime-t-on a con- 
tribuer au tranquille developpement des relations pacifiques dea 
peuples, alors il faut fixer un delai et mettre au moins un intervalle de 
24 heures, et, comme il me semble que c'est bien le moindre qu'on 
puisse donner, j'aurai l'honneur de le proposer. (Deuxieme Conference- 
Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p 166.) 

The Comite d'Examen, which considered the proposed 
rules, reported that the question of opening of hostilities 
without declaration had often led to recriminations on the 
part of the belligerents; that it was certainly expedient 
that there be some definite regulation. The two propo- 
sitions were from France and the Netherlands, France 
proposing that there be a declaration prior to hostilities 
and the Netherlands that there be in addition a delay of 



REPORT OF COMMITTEE. 51 

24 hours. It was decided that there ought to be a pre- 
vious unequivocal declaration before the commencement 
of hostilities. 

In the words of the Comite d J Examen — 

La disposition principale, inspiree par une resolution de l'lnstitut de 
droit international (Session de Gand, septembre 1906), se justifie aise- 
ment. Elle prevoit deux cas distincts. Une difficulte surgit entre 
deux Etats: elle donnera ordinairement lieu a des negociations diplo- 
matiques plus ou moins longues dans lesquelles chaque partie cherche 
a faire reconnaitre ses pretentions ou tout au moins a obtenir une satis- 
faction partielle. I/accord ne se realisant pas, Tune des Puissances 
peut determiner dans un ultimatum les conditions qu'elle exige et 
dont elle declare ne pas vouloir se departir en fixant un delai pour la 
reponse et en declarant que, en l'absence de reponse satisfaisante, elle 
recourra aux armes. Dans ce cas, il n'y a aucune surprise et aucune 
equivoque. La Puissance a laquelle s'adresse un pareil ultimatum 
peut se decider en connaissance de cause, satisfaire son adversaire ou se 
preparer a combattre . 

Le conflit peut surgir brusquement et une Puissance peut vouloir 
recourir aux armes sans tenter ou prolonger des negociations diplo- 
matiques jugees inutiles. Elle doit alors avertir directement son 
adversaire de son intention et cet avertissement doit etre non equivoque. 

Quand l'intention de recourir aux armes est formulee condition- 
nellement dans un ultimatum, elle est forcement motivee, puisque la 
guerre doit etre la consequence du refus des satisfactions demandees. 
II n'en est pas necessairement ainsi quand l'intention de faire la guerre 
est manifest ee directement et sans ultimatum anterieur. La proposi- 
tion veut que Tintention soit aussi motivee dans ce cas. L~n Gouverne- 
ment ne doit pas recourir a une resolution aussi extreme que la guerre 
sans la motiver. II faut que tout le monde, dans les deux pays qui 
vont etre belligerants comme dans les pays neutres, sache pourquoi 
l'on va se battre, afin qu'un jugement puisse etre porte sur la conduite 
des deux adversaires. Sans doute, on ne saurait se faire l'illusion de 
croire que les veritables causes de la guerre seront toujours indiquees; 
mais la difficulte d'indiquer ces causes, la necessite de mettre en avant 
des causes n'ayant rien de fonde ou en disproportion avec le fait meme 
de la guerre, sont de nature a attirer l'attention des Puissances neutres 
et a eclairer l'opinion publique. 

L'avertissement doit etre prealable en ce sens qu'il doit preceder les 
hostilites. S'ecoulera-t-il un certain temps entre la reception de 
l'avertissement et l'ouverture des hostilites? La proposition francaise 
ne fixe aucun delai, ce qui implique que les hostilites peuvent com- 
mencer des que l'avertissement est parvenu a l'adversaire. La limita- 
tion de la guerre dans le temps est ainsi moins nettement determined 
que dans le cas de l'ultimatum. La Delegation francaise avait estimo 
que les necessites de la guerre moderne ne permettent pas de demander, 



52 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

& celui qui a la volonte d'attaquer, d'autres delais que ceux qui sont 
absolument indispensables pour que son adversaire sache que la force 
va etre employee eontre lui. (Ibid., Tome I, p. 132.) 

Of the arguments in favor of a delay of 24 hours the 
Comite said: 

On ne saurait nier la force de ces raisons qui n'ont cependant pas 
convaincu la majorite de la Sous-Commission. La fixation d'un delai 
n'a pas paru conciliable avec les exigences militaires actuelles; c'est 
'deja un progres que d'avoir fair admettre la necessite d'un avertisse- 
ment prealable. Esperons que l'avenir permettra d'en realiser un 
autre, mais n'allons pas trop vite. II est a- remarquer que VInstitut de 
droit international, dans la resolution a laquelle il a ete fait allusion 
plus haut, n'a pas cru non plus pouvoir suggerer la fixation d'un delai, 
bien que, dans cet ordre d'idees, une assemblee de jurisconsultes 
puisse etre moins reservee qu'une assemble de diplomates, de mili- 
taires et de marins. II s'est borne" a dire ceci: "Les hostilites ne 
pourront commencer qu'apres l'expiration d'un delai suffisant pour 
que la regie de l'avertissement prealable et non equivoque ne puisse 
etre consideree comme eludee. (Ibid., Tome I, p. 133.) 

The proposition made by the French delegation at 
the Second Hague Conference in 1907, as said by the 
Comite d'Examen, was based upon the resolution of the 
Institut de Droit International at Ghent in September, 
1906, which may be translated as follows: 

(1) It is in accordance with the requirements of international law, 
and with the spirit of loyalty which nations owe to each other in their 
mutual relations, as well as in the common interest of all States, that 
hostilities should not commence without previous and unequivocal 
notice. 

(2) This notice may take the form of a declaration of war pure and 
simple, or that of an ultimatum, duly notified to the adversary by the 
State about to commence war. 

(3) Hostilities should not begin till after the expiry of a delay 
sufficient to insure that the rule of previous and unequivocal notice 
may not be considered as evaded. (Higgins, The Hague Peace Con- 
ferences, p. 203.) 

The Conference was mainly concerned not with the 
historical aspects, but rather with the expediency of 
introducing a regulation for the declaration of war. The 
Dutch delegation introduced the proposition that hos- 
tilities should not commence till 24 hours at least after 
an unequivocal declaration. 



TWENTY-FOUK HOUR PROPOSITION. 53 

The Dutch proposition received the support of the 
Russian delegate. 

Le probleme d'un tel delai est etroitement lie avec la question du 
rapport qui existe, dans chaque pays, entre les effectifs de paix et les 
effectifs de guerre. C'est done, par consequent, une question de re- 
duction de depenses plus ou moins considerable. Le temps n'est 
peut-etre pas si eloigne ou nous pourrons distinguer entre les effectifs 
et les preparations de guerre, que chaque pays, en pleine souverainete 
de sa decision, juge conformes a sa situation politique et ceux qu'il 
est oblige de maintenir, uniquement en vue de la necessite d'etre a 
tout instant sur le qui-vive. En etablissant un certain delai entre la 
rupture des relations de paix et le commencement des hostilites, nous 
donnerions au pays le moyen, a qui le couvrait, de realiser certaines 
economies pendant les period es de paix . Ces economies seraient incon- 
testablement bienfaisantes, de part et d'autre, et ne seraient pas sans 
apporter une grande detente dans l'etat de la paix armee, detente 
d'autant plus facile a accepter qu'elle ne toucherait en rien au droit 
de chaque nation d'etablir ses armements et ses effectifs uniquement 
d'apres ses propres vues et necessites. 

Le delai dont il s'agit aurait encore un autre a vantage: il doDnerait 
aux Puissances amies et neutres un temps precieux que celles-ci 
pourraient employer a faire des efforts de reconciliation, a persuader 
les nations en litige de porter leurs differends meme ici devant la 
Haute Cour d'arbitrage. Mais, en parlant de delai, il ne nous faut pas 
perdre de vue, cependant, les possibilites presentes. L'idee d'un delai 
considerable n'est pas encore mure dans la conscience des peuples. 
Peut-etre serait-il utile, par consequent, de ne pas aller dans nos 
desirs trop loin; de ne pas depasser a l'heure actuelle les possibilites 
reelles d'aujourd'hui. Bornons-nous done a accepter le delai de 24 
heures propose par la Delegation des Pays-Bas. Laissons a demain 
l'ceuvre de demain en exprimant seulement un vceu pour l'avenir 
d'un delai plus grand, plus bienfaisant. (Deuxieme Conference 
Internationale de la Paix, Tome I, p. 133.) 

The discussions in the Conference resulted in agree- 
ment upon the following: 

Art. 1 . The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities 
between them must not commence without a previous and 
unequivocal notice which shall have either the form of a 
declaration of war with reasons or an ultimatum with a con- 
ditional declaration of war. 

Thus there was established a rule requiring a declara- 
tion of war previous to the opening of hostilities, but not 
fixing the time which should elapse between the decla- 



54 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

ration and the opening of operations. It was, however, 
argued that neutrals should not be held responsible until 
notified of the existence of war. 

The report of the committee particularly concerned 
with the drafting of this Convention said: 

D'apres l'article 2 de la proposition de la Delegation francaise, 'Tetat 
de guerre devra etre notifie sans retard aux Puissances neutres." En 
effet, la guerre ne modifie pas seulement les rapports entre les belli- 
gerants, elle inrlue gravement sur la situation des Etats neutres et de 
leurs ressortissants; il importe des lors qu'ils soient prevenus le plus 
tot possible. Aujourd'hui, avec la divulgation rapide des nouvelles, 
il n'est guere a supposer que Ton tarde beaucoup a connaitre dans le 
monde entier l'existence d'une guerre ay ant eclate sur un point quel- 
conque du globe et qu'un Etat puisse invoquer son ignorance de l'etat 
de guerre pour se soustraire a toute responsabilite. Mais, enfin, il peut 
arriver que, malgre les telegraphes terrestres ou sous-marins et la 
radiotelegraphie, la nouvelle ne parvienne pas d'elle-meme aux 
interesses; il y a done des precautions a prendre. D'une part, la 
Delegation de Belgique avail propose ramendenient suivant: " L'etat 
de guerre devra etre notifie aux Puissances neutres. Cette notification, qui 
pourra etre jaite meme par voie telegraphique, ne produira effet a leur egard 
que 48 heures aprh sa reception." ( Vol. Ill, Deux. Com., Annexe 21.) 
D'autre part, la Delegation britannique, dans un article faisant partie 
d'une proposition soumise a la Troisieme Commission et renvoye a 
votre Sous-Commission, disait: " Un Etat neutre n'est term de prendre 
des mesures pour preserver sa neutralite que lorsqu'il aura recu d'un des 
belligerants un avis du commencement de la guerre." (Vol. Ill, Trois. 
Com., Annexe 44.) 

L'amendement beige, qui n'avait en vue que de mettre les Etats 
neutres en mesure de remplir leurs obligations, mais qui, pris a la 
lettre, aurait pu etre interpreted autrement, a ete modifie; meme sous 
sa forme nouvelle, il n'a pas obtenu l'approbation de la Commission. 

L'opinion qui a prevalu est qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de fixer de delai. 
L'idee maitresse est tres simple. Un Etat ne peut etre tenu de remplir 
les devoirs de la neutralite que lorsqu'il connait lY'tat de guerre qui 
fait precisement naitre ces devoirs. Des qu'il en est informe, peu 
importe par quel moyen, pourvu qu'il n'y ait aucun doute a cet egard, 
il ne peut rien faire de contraire a la neutralite. Est-il en meme temps 
tenu d'empecher les actes contraires a la neutralite qui pourraient etre 
commis sur son territoire? L'obligation suppose la possibility de la 
remplir. Ce que Ton peut demander au Gouvernement neutre, e'est 
de prendre sans retard les mesures necessaires. Le delai dans lequel 
les mesures pourront etre prises variera naturellement suivant les cir- 
constances, l'etendue du territoire, la facilite des communications. 
Le delai de 48 heures qui etait propose pourrait etre, selon les cas, trop 
long ou trop court. II n'y a pas a etablir de preemption legale de 



REPORT OF AMERICAN DELEGATION. 55 

Tesponsabilite ou d'irresponsabilite. C'est une question de fait qui le 
plus sou vent sera resolue assez aisement. 

La Sous-Commission s'est done bornee a adopter la redaction suivante: 

"L'etat de guerre devra etre notifiesans retard aux puissances neutresetne 
produira effet a lew egard qu'aprh reception d'une notification qui pourra 
Mrefaite meme par voie telegraphique." 

Au Comite d'Examen, on a fait remarquer que la regie ainsi posee est 
trop absolue, puisqu'elle supposerait qu'un Gouvernement neutre, qui, 
par suite de telle ou telle circonstance, n'aurait pas recu la notification 
prevue, mais qui cependant aurait, sans doute aucun, connu l'etat de 
guerre, peut se degager de toute responsabilite a raison de ses actes, en se 
fondant simplement sur l'absence de notification. L'essentiel n'est-il 
pas qu'un Gouvernement connaisse l'etat de guerre pour prendre les 
mesures necessaires? La preuve est facile dans le cas d'une notification; 
s'il n'y a pas eu de notification, le belligerant qui se plaint d'une viola- 
tion de neutralite doit prouver nettement que l'etat de guerre etait cer- 
tainement connu dans le pays oil se sont passes les actes incrimines. 

Apres discussion, la majorite du Comite a decide d'ajouter la phrase 
suivante: 

11 II est du reste entendu que les Puissances neutres ne pourraient invoquer 
Vabsence de notification s'il etait etabli d'une maniere non douteuse qu'en 
fait elles connaissaient l'etat de guerre." 

Ce texte, accepte par la Commission, semble tenir sufnsamment 
compte des interets en presence. (Ibid., p. 134.) 

With the substitution of the word "Toutefois" for the 
clause "II est du reste entendu que" this formula was 
adopted by the Conference. 

Report oj American delegation. — The American dele- 
gates to the Second Hague Conference, in reporting to 
the Secretary of State, said, regarding the Convention 
Relative to the Opening of Hostilities: 

The convention is very short, and is based upon the principle that 
neither belligerent should be taken by surprise, and that the neutral 
shall not be bound to the performance of neutral duties until it has 
received notification, even if only by telegram, of the outbreak of war. 
The means of notification is considered unimportant, for if the neutral 
knows, through whatever means or whatever channels, of the existence 
of war, it can not claim a formal notification from the belligerents 
before being taxed with neutral obligations. While the importance of 
the convention to prospective belligerents may be open to doubt, it is 
clear that it does safeguard in a very high degree the rights of neutrals, 
and specifies authoritatively the exact moment when the duty of neu- 
trality begins. It is for this reason that the American delegation sup- 
ported the project and signed the convention. (60th Congress, 1st Sens., 
S. Doc. 444, p. 34.) 



56 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

Commencement oj hostilities ajter declaration. — It is 
recognized by this Hague Convention "that hostilities 
between Contracting Powers must not commence without 
previous and unequivocal notice." The period of time 
which must elapse is not prescribed, and the proposition to 
make it at least 24 hours was not accepted. Therefore, 
in strict conformity with the law of this Convention, the 
declaration could be made at as short a time previous to 
the opening of hostilities as suited the convenience of the 
belligerent. 

It is also evident that this Convention is operative only 
among States which have become parties to it. (Before 
1910 this Convention had been signed by all the States 
represented at The Hague in 1907, except China and 
Nicaragua.) The Convention being binding between 
States only is not necessarily applicable in time of civil 
war or similar hostilities. 

Prof. Westlake maintains that under certain circum- 
stances the commencement of hostilities without a pre- 
ceding declaration "is left possible by the fact that the 
parties are not made to contract that they will not com- 
mence hostilities against one another otherwise than is 
described, but recognize that hostilities ought not {ne 
doivent pas) to be otherwise commenced.' ' (International 
Law, Pt. II, War, p. 267.) If this interpretation of the 
French is admitted, it is evident that the purpose of the 
Convention was, as the preamble says, to prevent the 
"commencement of hostilities without previous notice." 
It would seem, however, if the Convention has been signed 
in good faith, as must be acknowledged, ne doivent pas- 
becomes obligatory and lays a prohibition on the Con- 
tracting Powers to refrain from commencement of hos- 
tilities till after notice or declaration. 

A much more difficult question arises when it is asked 
what constitutes the commencement of hostilities. It is 
an undoubted fact that the first shot fired by order of 
the State might be regarded as the opening of hostilities; 
similarly, a proclamation of blockade or other like act of 
the State might be so regarded. The Constitution of the 
United States provides that Congress shall have power 
"to declare war." (Art. I, sec. 8, 11.) 



COMMENCEMENT OF SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 57 

In case of an ultimatum, with a conditional declaration 
of war, the conditional provision gains importance. 

Commencement of Spanish- American War. — In 1899 
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said of the Spanish merchant 
steamer Pedro: 

When, on the 22d day of April, this Spanish steamer sailed from 
Havana, the United States and Spain were at war. Congress had 
adopted a resolution, April 20, demanding "that the Government of 
Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of 
Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban 
waters," and directing and empowering the President "to use the 
entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the 
actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to 
such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect." 
Time was given by the Executive until April 23 for Spain to signify 
compliance with the demand, but the Spanish Government at once, on 
April 21, recognized the resolution as "an evident declaration of war," 
and diplomatic relations were broken off. Blockade had been pro- 
claimed April 22, and put into effective operation at Havana, and, 
immediately thereupon, elsewhere, under the proclamation. And by 
the act of Congress of April 25 it was declared that war had existed since 
the* 21st day of April. (The Pedro, lib U. S. Supreme Court Reports, 
p. 354.) \ 

This was in accord with the general opinion in regard 
to the relation of declaration of war to the opening of 
hostilities as summarized by Prof. Moore in 1906. 

It is universally admitted that a formal declaration is not necessary 
to constitute a state of war. From this principle, however, an unneces- 
sary and perhaps unwarranted inference is often drawn, namely, that 
a nation may lawfully or properly begin a war at any time and under 
any circumstances, with or without notice, in its own absolute discre- 
tion. Such a theory would seem to be altogether inadmissible. Al- 
though a contest by force between nations may, no matter how it may 
have been begun, constitute a state of war, it by no means follows that 
nations, in precipitating such a condition of things, are not bound by 
any principles of honor or good faith. If, for example, a nation, wishing 
to absorb another, or to seize a part of its territory, should, without 
warning or prior controversy, suddenly attack it, a state of war would 
undoubtedly follow, but it could not be said that the principles of 
honor and good faith enjoined by the law of nations had not been 
violated. In other words, to admit that a state of war exists is by no 
means to justify the mode by which it was brought about or begun. 
Nor is the practice of fraud and deceit permitted by a state of war sup- 
posed to be admissible in time of peace. (7 Moore, Internatinal Law 
Digest, p. 171.) 



58 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

Commencement of Russo-Japanese War. — During the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904 the question arose as to 
what action really constituted the opening of hostilities. 
In the case of the Russian steamship Argun which was 
captured on the 7th of Februar3 T , 1904, at about 4 p. m.. 
and condemned by the Sasebo Prize Court the plea was 
entered that the capture was made before the opening of 
hostilities as follows: 

(1) It is a rule in international law that the state of war begins with 
the opening of actual hostilities. The ship under consideration was 
captured on the day before the sea fight off Port Arthur; that is, before 
the opening of actual hostilities. She ought, therefore, to be released. 
(Takahashi, International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War, 
p. 574.) 

Other pleas were also entered against the legality of 
the capture. 

After due consideration the Court concludes as follows: 

When diplomatic negotiations concerning the Manchurian and 
Korean questions were going on between Japan and Russia, the latter 
country unreasonably failed to give her answer to Japan. On the 
other hand, she showed great activity in her army and navy, sent her 
land forces to Manchuria and Korea, collected her war vessels at Port 
Arthur, and thus showed her determination to fight. This fact was 
clear. 

Whereupon Japan, on the 5th of the second month of the thirty- 
seventh year of Meiji, notified Russia that all diplomatic relations 
were at an end. 

At the same time Japan made preparations for action and the next 
day. the 6th, at 7 a. m., her fleet left Sasebo with the object of attacking 
the Russian fleet. Inferring from the conduct of the navies of both 
countries and from the state of things at the time, hostile operations 
were publicly opened prior to the capture of the steamship now under 
consideration. And as it is thus clear that a state of war had begun 
before the time of the ship's capture, there is no need to discuss whether 
it was made before the declaration of war or not. (Ibid., p. 575.) 

On protest against the decision of this Court, the 

Higher Prize Court at Tokyo sustained the decision of 

the prize court of first instance. The decision of the 

Higher Prize Court is explained as follows: 

In (1) of the protest the advocate argues that the state of war com- 
mences with the opening of actual hostilities, and as hostilities actually 
opened between Japan and Russia on the 8th of the second month of 
the thirty-seventh year of Meiji, the ship ought not be confiscated. 
P>ut the commencement of the state of war does not necessarilv lie at 



COMMENCEMENT OF RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 59 

the moment when two armed forces open fire upon each other, but 
rather at the time when the intention of making war is made public; 
that is to say, at the time when such intention is carried into effect, or 
when by a declaration of war or otherwise any such notification is made. 
And as the intention of making war had been publicly announced on 
the 6th of the second month of the thirty-seventh year of Meiji, before 
the battle was fought at Port Arthur on the 8th, the state of war already 
existed on the 7th; and the argument of the advocate that the war 
commenced on the 8th has no ground. (Ibid., p. 577.) 

In referring to the capture of the Russian Volunteer 
Fleet Company's steamship ETcaterinoslav which was 
made about 9 o'clock on the morning of February 6, 
1904, the Higher Prize Court said in regard to the protest 
against the decision of the lower court: 

The state of war does not necessarily begin at the moment when the 
two opposing armed forces open fire upon each other, but rather when 
the intention of making war is made public; that is to say, when the 
intention is carried into action, or when a declaration of war or any 
such notification is made. When diplomatic negotiations were going 
on between Japan and Russia concerning the independence and terri- 
torial integrity of China and Korea, the Russian unreasonableness put 
an amicable settlement beyond hope. And when it became very 
clear that Russia intended to force Japan to submission by force of arms, 
the Japanese Government ordered its diplomatic agent at St. Peters- 
burg on the 5th dav of the 2d month of the 37th year of Meiji to notify 
the Russian Government that diplomatic relations between the two 
countries were at an end. At the same time the imperial fleet made 
preparations for war and left Sasebo the next day, the 6th, at 7 a. m., 
with the object of opening hostilities. On the way the fleet captured 
the ship under consideration, which was liable to naval service in 
time of war. This (i. e., the sailing of the fleet) was nothing more than 
putting the intention into action, and the Russo-Japanese War must 
be said to have been opened from that moment. Thus the state of war 
existed on the 6th day of the 2d month of the 37th year o\ Meiji; that 
is, the day on which the Japanese man-of-war Saiyen captured the 
ship under consideration. (Ibid., p. 590.) 

If this case had arisen subsequent to the agreement 
upon the Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the 
Commencement of Hostilities, in which ' ' the Contracting 
Powers recognize that hostilities between them must not 
commence without a previous and unequivocal notice," 
the declaration should have preceded the departure of 
the fleet from Sasebo at 7 a. m. on the morning of Feb- 
ruary 6, 1904. 



60 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

If the sailing of a fleet "with the object of opening hos- 
tilities'' constitutes a state of war, there may be conse- 
quences of far-reaching significance to naval powers in 
this Hague Convention. If the Russo-Japanese troubles 
had been deferred till 1908 and a Russian fleet had sailed 
from St. Petersburg with the intention of attacking the 
Japanese fleet at Sasebo, would it have been necessary 
in order that Russia might not be accused of bad faith that 
the Russian authorities should have made a previous 
declaration of war, thus giving to Japan the advantage 
of weeks of preparation? 

If the sailing of the Russian fleet, as above, constituted a 
state of war, Russia, by Article 2 of the Hague Convention 
would have been under obligation to notify " neutral 
Powers without delay;'' otherwise such Powers might be 
subjeet to the necessity of proving that they were unaware 
of the state of war. 

After considering cases Prof. Takahashi says, "On the 
whole, the author's view is that the Russo-Japanese war 
was commenced by the capture of the Elcaterinoslav , as 
she was liable to be appropriated for naval service during 
the war." (Ibid, p. 25.) 

While the Convention relative to the Opening of Hos- 
tilities would probably give rise to few, if any, questions 
in case of war on land, it would seem necessary to deter- 
mine what constitutes the commencement of hostilities , 
upon the sea in order that the contracting powers may 
not be accused of bad faith. 

Application of principles to Situation 11. — In spite of the 
previous ultimatum of the United States, it would seem 
that the United States could consider that a state of war 
exists between July 7 and 10. 

This situation is not expressly covered by the Hague 
Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities. 

There is, however, nothing in international law which 
prevents State X from issuing a subsequent ultimatum 
to take effect at a date earlier than that named by the 
United States. 

Since State X has then the power of declaring war 
against the United States before July 10, it could hardly 



APPLICATION OF HAGUE CONVENTION. 61 

be consistently argued that the United States has tied 
its own hands from all offensive or defensive warfare 
until July 10, if war is declared by X before that date. 

Reasons of fairness and of necessity demand that we 
find by implication in the United States ultimatum an 
intention of postponing war till July 10, if X does not 
sooner declare war against the United States. If X declares 
war prior to the 10th, then for the purposes of the United 
States war dates from this prior date. 

This same result is practically reached by Dr. Stowell 
when he says in discussing an interval before the opening 
of hostilities — 

When one State declares war against another, giving an interval be- 
fore the opening of hostilities, it goes without saying that the State 
against which war is declared may in turn declare war at once, or it may 
allow a shorter interval before the commencing of hostilities. But what 
if it make no rejoinder — may it begin hostilities at the expiration of the 
interval? Yes; because if attacked it would certainly defend itself, 
and the measures of defense necessary to its security must in some 
instances go to the extent of attacking the declaring State. (American 
Journal of Int. Law, vol. 2, Xo. 1, p. 56.) 

Effect of the declarations of the United States and State 
X. — Considering the Hague Convention of 1907 as opera- 
tive unless there is evidence or a statement to the con- 
trary, these declarations by the United States and State 
X may be considered to be made under the provisions of 
the Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities. 

In accordance with the ultimatum of the United States 
war would exist from July 10 unless certain demands are 
satisfied before that date. These demands are not satis- 
fied; therefore there would be no doubt as to the existence 
of war from July 10. 

State X announces that war will be declared on July 7 
unless the United States withdraws its demands before 
that date. 

These acts of the United States and State X may prop- 
erly be regarded as ultimatums with conditional declara- 
tions of war conforming to the requirements of the Hague 
convention. 

In order that war may exist by declaration it is not 
necessary that both parties should make declaration. 



6 2 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

War may exist by declaration on one side. State X has 
announced that it would make such a declaration for 
July 7 if the United States did not take certain action. 
This action the United States did not take. No state- 
ment is made as to whether State X did, as it announced 
it would do, declare war on July 7. However, in the 
absence of any withdrawal of the demand, it would be 
legitimate for the United States to consider the action of 
State X as a declaration of war and to regard a state of t 
war as existing from July 7 in accord with the announce- 
ment of State X. 

Attitude of the commander. — The commander of the 
United States war vessel knows only that the demands of 
neither the United States nor of State X have been modi- 
fied. He may accordingly regard a state of war as exist- 
ing between the United States and State X from July 7. 
It would be only in accord with proper interpretation of 
the statement of State X to accept July 7 as the date of 
the beginning of the war. For the commander, therefore, 
war between the United States and State X would exist 
on July 8, when he meets the merchant vessel of State Y 
loaded with coal and bound for a port of State X. He 
would first have to consider what is the status of the coal 
under the conditions and then must consider what is the 
status of the vessel under the conditions. 

Status of the merchant vessel if sailing with knowledge of 
war. — If the merchant vessel had sailed with knowledge 
of the existence of war between the United States and 
State X she would be liable to capture by the war vessel 
of the United States as bound to a hostile destination 
with a cargo which under the conditions w r ould presum- 
ably be contraband. The evidence would certainly be 
sufficient to justify the commander in sending the vessel 
to a prize court. In forming his decision to take such 
action, he could be reasonably certain that he could act 
without making his State liable to damages if the mer- 
chant vessel knew of the existence of war. 

Status of the merchant vessel if sailing without knowledge 
of the war. — If the merchant vessel had sailed before July 
1 and had no knowledge of the prospect of hostilities, the 



MERCHANT VESSEL SAILING IN IGNORANCE OF WAR. 63 

vessel could not have sailed for a belligerent destination, 
as at that time the port of State X was not the port of a 
belligerent. Accordingly the cargo would not at the 
beginning of the voyage be contraband, but in the highest 
degree innocent. 

If the vessel had sailed after July 1 and before July 7 
with a knowledge of the strained relations and of the action 
of one or of both the States, it might be without guilty 
intent, for the strained relations might not result in war, 
as both declarations were conditional. The mechant 
vessel of a neutral State Y could not be presumed to 
know whether or not the conditions had been met. 
Until July 7 the destination would be peaceful and cargo 
innocent. If war existed from that date the destination 
might be belligerent, and the question would arise as to 
whether the cargo would be liable, as it would in case it 
had been shipped for a belligerent destination. A neutral 
ship is entitled to knowledge of the existence of blockade 
before incurring any penalty. It would seem that a neu- 
tral vessel would similarly be entitled to know of the 
existence of war before she would be liable for the car- 
riage of contraband and before the articles of the nature 
of contraband could be condemned as contraband. The 
commander should therefore exercise more caution in 
sending in such a vessel. It will also be expedient to have 
regard to treaty provisions in respect to the treatment of 
contraband. Such provisions as Article 10 of the treaty 
of the United States with Sweden of April 3, 1783, might 
apply. 

Art. 10. These which follow shall not be reckoned in the number of 
prohibited goods — that is to say, all sorts of cloths and all other manu- 
factures of wool, flax, silk, cotton, or any other materials, all kinds of 
wearing apparel, together with the things of which they are commonly 
made; gold, silver, coined or uncoined, brass, iron, lead, copper, 
latten, coals, wheat, barley, and all sorts of corn or pulse, tobacco, all 
kinds of spices, salted and smoked flesh, salted fish, cheese, butter, 
beer, oyl, wines, sugar, all sorts of salt and provisions which serve for 
the nourishment and sustenance of man; all kinds of cotton, hemp, flax, 
tar, pitch, ropes, cables, sails, sailcloth, anchors, and any parts of 
anchors, ship masts, planks, boards, beams, and all sorts of trees and 
other things proper for building or repairing ships. Nor shall any 
goods be considered as contraband which have not been worked into the 



64 DECLARATION OF WAR. 

form of any instrument or thing for the purpose of war by land or by sea, 
much less such as have been prepared or wrought up for any other use. 
All which shall be reckoned free goods, as likewise all other, which 
are not comprehended and particularly mentioned in the foregoing 
article; so that they shall not, by any pretended interpretation, be com- 
prehended among prohibited or contraband goods. On the contrary, 
they may be freely transported by the subjects of the King and of the 
United States, even to places belonging to an enemy, such places only 
excepted as are besieged, blocked, or invested, and those places only 
shall be considered as such which are nearly surrounded by one of the 
belligerent powers. 

This treaty also contains in Article 15 a statement in 
regard to the liability of commanding officers — 

And that more effectual care may be taken for the security of the two 
contracting parties, that they suffer no prejudice by the men of war of 
the other party or by privateers, all captains and commanders of ships 
of His Swedish Majesty and of the United States and all then' subjects 
shall be forbidden to do any injury or damage to those of the other 
party, and if they act to the contrary, having been found guilty on 
examination by their proper judges they shall be bound to make satis- 
faction for all damages and the interest thereof and to make them good 
under pain and obligation of their persons and goods. 

Notification to neutrals of the existence of war. — There is 
a provision in the Hague Convention of 1907 relative to 
the Opening of Hostilities to the effect that — 

The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers 
without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after 
the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by tele 
graph. Neutral Powers, nevertheless, can not rely on the absence of 
notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of 
the existence of a state of war. 

Prof. Moore cites a report of the Argentine Supreme 
Court : 

In February, 1865, a British subject shipped from Liverpool to his 
agent in Buenos Ayres a quantity of rifles, with a view to their sale in 
Paraguay. After the arrival of the goods at Buenos Ayres such a sale 
was negotiated, and the rifles were shipped from Buenos Ayres on 
April 8, 1865, for Corrientes, Argentine Kepublic, where they were to 
be transshipped for Paraguay. On April 14 war broke out between 
the Argentine Republic and Paraguay, and the steamer on which the 
rifles were transported was stopped by the governor of Corrientes, who 
took out the rifles and placed them at the disposal of the Argentine 
Government. The owner subsequently presented a claim for the 
value of the rifles, as well as for an indemnity of about a fourth of their 



KESUME. 65 

value for their detention for 18 months. Their value he estimated by 
the price which they would have fetched in Paraguay. A suit was 
brought in the federal court at Buenos Ayres, which held that the 
rifles could not be lawfully confiscated, and that they should be re- 
turned to the owner or that a just equivalent should be paid to him or 
his representative. From this decision the Argentine Government 
appealed to the supreme court, which decided that, as the arms were 
shipped by the owner before the declaration of war, they were not 
subject to confiscation; that their taking by the Argentine Republic 
was to be considered as an act of expropriation for public use, and not 
as an act of preemption under the law of nations; that according to 
the law of expropriation the price to be paid was what the goods were 
worth in place where they were taken; and that, as the Government 
had in detaining the arms exercised a legitimate right, from which no 
obligation to pay indemnity could arise, the Government should pay 
only the current rate of interest on the value of the arms from the date 
of their expropriation. (7 Moore Int. Law Digest, p. 747.) 

Resume. — From the conditions and regarding prin-. 
ciples and international conventions and agreements and 
such precedents as may be applicable, it would seem 
that the merchant vessel of neutral State Y loaded with 
coal should be treated with caution if she had sailed 
without knowledge of the existence of war, as might 
easily be the case if she was met on July 8, as stated in 
the situation. According to the precedent from the 
Argentine court the goods seized under such circum- 
stances would be liable to expropriation rather than 
condemnation as prize. 

SOLUTION. 

Unless exempt by treaty or otherwise the commander 
should send the merchant vessel of State Y to a prize 
court on the ground that the cargo was contraband of 
war if the vessel sailed with knowledge of the existence 
of the war. 

If the vessel clearly had no knowledge of the existence 
of the war, he should consider that the cargo will prob- 
ably be liable to expropriation rather than condemnation. 

70387—11 5 



Situation III. 

DAYS OF GRACE. 

States X and Y are at war. The war has broken out 
suddenly. State X proclaims that it will allow to vessels 
of State Y within the ports of State X 48 hours in which 
to load and depart. State Y protests that this is not a 
reasonable delai defaveur, and that as State Y has allowed 
14 days for vessels of State X to depart, the vessels of 
State Y should be allowed a longer period than 48 hours, 
and also states that if a longer period is not allowed the 14- 
day period will be reduced. 

(a) Is 48 hours a reasonable period ? 

(6) Has State Y the right to shorten the period already 
proclaimed ? 

(c) Has State Y the right to withdraw all delai defaveur? 

SOLUTION. 

(a) Under certain circumstances 48 hours may be a rea- 
sonable limit for delai defaveur. 

(b) State Y, if it deems such action expedient, should 
be allowed to shorten the period which it has already 
proclaimed to correspond with the period granted by 
State X. 

(c) Under the conditions proposed in Situation III and 
having regard to the preamble of the Hague Convention 
on this subject, State Y has not the right to withdraw all 
delai defaveur, though in an extreme case it may adopt 
the alternative of the Convention which requires enemy 
vessels to depart " immediately." 

NOTES. 

Early provisions for days of grace. — Provision was made 
for days of grace in the treaty of Utrecht between Great 
Britain and France in 1713. 

Art. 27. On the contrary, it is agreed that whatever shall be 
found to be laden by the subjects and inhabitants of either party, in 
any ship belonging to the enemy of the other, and his subjects, the 

66 



DISCUSSION OF DAYS OF GRACE, 1906. 67 

whole, although it be not of the sort of prohibited goods, may be con- 
fiscated, in the same manner as if it belonged to the enemy himself; 
except those goods and merchandises as were put on board such ship 
before the declaration of war, or even after such declaration, if so be it 
were done within the time and limits following; that is to say, if they 
were put on board such ship, in any port and place within the space of 
six weeks after such declaration, within the bounds called The Naze 
in Norway, and The Soundings; of two months, from The Soundings to 
the city of Gibraltar; of ten weeks, in the Mediterranean Sea; and of 
eight months in any other country or place in the world; so that the 
goods of the subjects of either prince, whether they be of the nature of 
such as are prohibited, or otherwise, which, as is aforesaid, were put on 
board any ship belonging to an enemy before the war, or after the dec- 
laration of the same; within the time and limits abovesaid, shall no ways 
be liable to confiscation, but shall well and truly be restored without 
delay to the proprietors demanding the same; but so as that if the said 
merchandises be contraband, it shall not be any ways lawful to carry 
them afterwards to the ports belonging to the enemy. (1 Chalmers Col- 
lection of Treaties, p. 407.) 

Discussion of 1906. — Topic III of the International 
Law Topics discussed by the Naval War College in 1906 
was as follows: 

What regulations should be made in regard to the treatment of vessels 
of one belligerent bound for or within the ports of the other belligerent 
at the outbreak of war? 

The conclusion was stated in the following form : 

1. Each State entering upon a war shall announce a date before which 
enemy vessels bound for or within its ports at the outbreak of war shall 
under ordinary conditions be allowed to enter, to discharge cargo, to 
load cargo, and to depart, without liability to capture while sailing 
directly to a permitted destination. If one belligerent State allows a 
shorter period than the other, the other State may, as a matter of right, 
reduce its period to correspond therewith. 

2. Each belligerent State may make such regulations in regard to 
sojourn, conduct, cargo, destination, and movements after departure 
of the innocent enemy vessels as may be deemed necessary to protect 
its military interests. 

3. A private vessel suitable for warlike use, belonging to one bellig- 
erent and bound for or within the port of the other belligerent at the 
outbreak of war, is liable to be detained unless the government of the 
vessel's flag makes a satisfactory agreement that it shall not be put to 
any warlike use, in which case it may be accorded the same treatment 
as innocent enemy vessels.. 

The notes upon this topic, discussed in 1906, show the 
early origin of some form of days of grace. The practice 



68 DAYS OF GRACE. 

as to time allowed enemy vessels to load and depart has 
varied. At the time of the Spanish- American war of 
1898 the United States allowed 30 days, Spain allowed 
5 days. At the time of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904, 
Russia allowed 48 hours and Japan allowed 10 days. Six 
weeks were allowed in some instances, as during the 
Crimean war, and the Austro-Prussian war of 1866. 

While 6 weeks were allowed for enemy merchant 
vessels to load and depart in some of the wars of the latter 
half of the 19th century, only 30 days were allowed to 
Spanish vessels by the United States in 1898 and only 
10 days by Japan to Russian vessels in 1904. The 
United States regulations of 1898 were held by the Su- 
preme Court to grant exemption from capture to vessels 
that had sailed prior to the beginning of the war. 

Opinion of Prof . Takahashi. — Prof. Takahashi says: 

It may be stated with confidence that the days of grace of one week ' 
were sufficient for Russian ships to enjoy the full benefits of exemp- 
tion, considering the nature of marine traffic, commercial interest 
between Japan and Russia, as well as the position of the commercial 
ports in the Far East; consequently the one week's grace was adopted 
by the experienced experts of the Japanese Navy. (International 
Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War, p. 66.) 

Propositions as to delai de faveur at the Second Hague 
Conference. — There were made at the Second Hague Con- 
ference various propositions in regard to the treatment 
of merchant vessels of one belligerent in the ports of the 
other belligerent at the outbreak of hostilities. 

Russia: 

Dans le cas ou un batiment de commerce d'un des belligerants serait 
surpris par la guerre dans un port d'un autre belligerant, celui-ci doit 
accord er a ce batiment un delai suffisant afin de lui permettre: 

D'achever son dechargement, ou le chargement des marchandises 
qui ne constituent pas de contrebande de guerre et de quitter libre- 
ment le port et de gagner en securite le port le plus rapproche de son 
pays d'origine ou un port neutre. 

Netherlands : 

Le delai sera fixe pour chaque port par les belligerants au commence- 
ment de la guerre; il ne pourra etre de moins que de cinq jours. 

1 Seven days were allowed after the date of the ordinance, ten from the beginning of 
the war. 



PROPOSITIONS AT THE HAGUE, 1907. 69 

This proposition was further elaborated: 

Les navires de commerce ressortissant aux Puissances belligerantes, 
qui, a l'ouverture des hostilites, se trouveraient dans les ports ennemis, 
pourront, a moins que leur chargement ne constitue de la contrebande 
de guerre, quitter librement le port et gagner en securite le port national 
le plus rapproche ou un port neutre interpose. 

Afin de leur permettre d'achever leur chargement ou leur decharge- 
ment, un delai suffisant, a fixer par les autorites locales, leur sera 
accorde. 

France : 

Les navires de commerce ressortissant aux Puissances belligerantes 
qui a l'ouverture des hostilites se trouveraient dans les ports ennemis, 
et auxquels aucun delai de faveur ne serait accorde pour reprendre 
la mer, ne peuvent etre confisques. 

Toutefois la sortie du port peut leur etre refusee et ils sont alors 
sujets a requisition, moyennant indemnite, conformement aux lois 
territoriales en vigueur. 

Sweden : 

Dans le cas oil un batiment de commerce d'un des belligerants 
serait surpris par la guerre dans un port d'un autre belligerant, il est 
desirable que celui-ci accorde a ce batiment un delai de faveur afin 
de lui permettre: 

D'achever son dechargement, ou le chargement des marchandises 
qui ne constituent pas de contrebande de guerre et de quitter libre- 
ment le port et de gagner en securite le port le plus rapproche de son 
pays d'origine ou un port neutre. 

Discussion of delai de faveur at the Second Hague Confer- 
ence. — The questionnaire submitted by Prof. Martens to 
the Second Hague Conference in 1907 contained the 
following : 

IV. Est-il de bonne guerre, au moment de l'ouverture des hostilites, 
de saisir et de confisquer les navires marchands ennemis stationnes 
dans les ports de l'un des Etats belligerants? 

V. Ne faut-il pas reconnaitre a ces navires le droit de quitter libre- 
ment, dans un laps de temps determine, avec ou sans cargaison, les 
ports de leur sejour au moment du commencement de la guerre? 
(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome. Ill, p. 1133.) 

The Russian opinion upon the general question of 
delai de faveur was in part: 

La pratique et la science ont etabli la procedure suivante, qui est 
en usage depuis la guerre de Crimee. Un delai de faveur suffisant 
doit etre accorde aux navires de commerce des belligerants, pris a 



70 DAYS OF GRACE. 

l'improviste par la declaration de guerre dans un port ennemi. Ce 
delai doit etre assez long pour permettre au navire d'achever son 
dechargement ou le chargement des marchandises qui ne constituent 
pas de contrebande de guerre, de quitter librement le port et de gagner, 
avec toutes les garanties de securite, le port le plus rapproche de son 
pays d'origine, ou n'importe quel autre port neutre. 

De meme ne peuvent etre ni captures, ni confisques a titre de prises, 
les navires de commerce de la nation ennemie, qui ont quitte un port 
quelconque avant la declaration de guerre, et qui ignorent le com- 
mencement des hostilites, l'ouverture de celles-ci ayant eu lieu lors- 
qu'ils se Trouvaient en pleine mer. (Ibid., p. 825.) 

The instructions given June 12, 1907, to the British 
delegation to the Second Hague Conference state: 

It has been customary on the outbreak of hostilities for belligerents 
to grant certain days of grace to enemy and neutral ships. In the view 
of His Majesty's Government the allowance of such an interval before 
the strict rules of hostilities are enforced should, as indeed the term 
"days of grace" implies, be treated purely as a matter of grace and 
favor, and not as one of right, and they are of opinion that any fixed 
rule on the point would be undesirable, as the circumstances of each 
case must necessarily differ. It will be to the general interest of this 
country to maintain the utmost liberty of action in this particular. 
(Correspondence, Second Peace Conference, Parliamentary Papers, 
Misc. No. 1 (1908), p. 16.) 

The British position was thus stated: 

Heureusement a l'heure actuelle il est d'usage d'accorder un tel 
delai aux navires de commerce, mais cet usage n'existe que depuis un 
certain nombre d'annees. II y a de plus le fait incontestable que la 
duree de ce delai % accorde aux vaisseaux ennemis et neutres, varie 
d'une facon considerable selon les circonstances. 

Pendant plus d'une cinquantaine d'annees la Grande-Bretagne a 
toujours accorde ce delai aux navires de commerce dans les cas ou elle 
se trouvait belligerante. En outre elle continuera toujours dans cette 
voie, a condition seulement que les operations militaires n'en soient 
pas lesees d'une facon serieuse. 

II est evident, cependant, que ce delai est accorde par faveur et 
qu'il n'y existe aucun droit, et de notre maniere de voir il ne serait 
jamais possible de formuler une loi internationale qui exigerait d'une 
Puissance belligerante qu'elle accorde un delai de faveur a l'ouverture 
d'une guerre sans aucune reserve. 

De ce que vient de dire l'honorable Delegue qui a parle en dernier 
lieu, il nous parait evident qu'il serait impossible de formuler une 
regie absolue qui donnerait pleine satisfaction a tout le monde en toutes 
circonstances. 

Un delai d'une telle duree qui satisferait les marines marchandes 
de deux Puissances voisines, serait tout a fait insuffisant dans le cas 



DISCUSSION AT THE HAGUE, 1907. 71 

oil les Puissances bellig£rantes se trouveraient dans de differents 
hemispheres. 

On doit encore envisager le cas d'une Puissance possedant des 
colonies dans les mers lointaines. Un delai de quelques jours qui 
pourra suffire pour les vaisseaux de commerce se trouvant dans ses 
ports metropolitains, ne serait nullement sumsant pour ceux qui se 
trouveraient dans les ports coloniaux. 

De plus, et laissant de cote la question geographique, il y a encore 
un argument non moins fort qui nous porte a demander que la limite 
du delai ne soit pas fixee d'une facon absolue. 

On peut imaginer le cas d'une guerre entre deux Puissances, l'une 
possedant une marine marchande tres grand e, et 1 'autre n' ay ant pas 
d'interet important dans le commerce sur mer. 

La premiere fera son possible afin de prolonger la duree du delai, 
la seconde, au contraire, voudra commencer aussitot que possible ses 
operations contre la marine marchande de son ennemi. 

Voila quelques facteurs du probleme qui nous est soumis. Pendant 
que ces differences existent, et pendant que le droit de capture et de 
blocus sont de regie, il nous parait raisonnable que chaque Puissance 
se reserve le droit d'agir a ce sujet selon ses interets comme dans le 
passe. 

Neanmoins, nous estimons qu'un belligerant ne doit pas seulement 
donner avis d'un blocus, mais qu'il doit en outre accorder aux vais- 
seaux neutres un delai convenable avant d'exercer ses pleins pouvoirs 
contre eux. 

Le Gouvernement britannique juge qu'il sera mieux de ne pas 
etablir des regies fixes qui pourront limiter les droits d'un belligerant 
a cet egard, ce qui n'implique nullement qu'on nedevra pas accorder 
les delais de faveur comme regie generale. 

Bien au contraire, mon Gouvernement a pleine intention d' adherer 
a ce qu'il a fait dans le passe depuis plus de cinquante ans. 

Dans le cas (qui j'espere n'arrivera jamais) ou la Grande-Bretagne 
serait belligerante, elle accorderait aux vaisseaux marchands, tant 
ennemis que neutres, un delai de faveur convenable, sous reserve 
tou jours que ce delai ne puisse compromettre ses interets nationaux. 

En un mot, le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne s'associe aux 
sentiments qui ont motive la proposition russe, mais en meme temps 
nous sommes d'opinion que le delai doit etre considere accorde comme 
un privilege et nullement comme un droit. (Ibid., p. 827.) 

The Japanese delegate said: 

Quoique le Japon ait toujours accorde un delai de faveur a tous les 
navires et dans tous les ports, la Delegation japonaise estime nean- 
moins qu'a l'avenir il n'y aurait pas de raisons suffisantes pour traiter 
les navires des belligerants qui, en temps de paix, sont subsidies par 
le Gouvernement pour etre transformed en instruments de guerre 
offensive, autrement que comme de contrebande mentionnes dans la 
proposition des honorables Dengues de Russie. Nous pensons aussi 



72 DAYS OF GRACE. 

que la Puissance belligerante doit avoir le droit de prendre les dis- 
positions necessaires pour indiquer les ports ou le privilege en question 
sera accorde, ainsi que les limites de la faveur qu'elle a l'intention de 
donner, de facon qu'elle puisse accorder aux interesses plus de facilites 
dans un port que dans un autre. Nous estimons ensuite que, des 
stipulations conventionnelles seront etablies a ce sujet, il est preferable 
de fixer un delai bien determine que d' indiquer un delai dependant 
de la duree du chargement et du dechargement de la cargaison, ce qui 
f- enable etre un terme equivoque, puisque dans quelques ports ces 
operations peuvent etre achevees dans deux ou trois jours et, dans 
d'autres, elles peuvent durer des semaines et memes des mois. 

En consequence, tout en acceptant le principe humanitaire qui est 
enonce dans la proposition de la Delegation russe, nous nous rangeons 
en meme temps a l'opinion de nos honorables collegues de la Grande- 
Bretagne en l'interpretant comme un privilege accorde par la Puissance 
belligerante, et non comme un droit qui pourrait etre invoqu6 par 
le vaisseau en question. (Ibid., p. 828.) 

The course of the discussion is shown in the resume 
given in the report of the fourth commission, which from 
its significance may be stated fully: 

La troisieme question inscrite au programme de la Quatrieme Com- 
mission est celle du "delai de faveur a, accorder aux vaisseaux pour quitter 
les ports neutres ou les ports ennemis apres V ouverture des hostilites. 11 

C'est, comme on le sait, depuis la guerre de Crimee en 1854 que les 
Etats belligerants ont pris l'habitude, au debut des hostilites, au lieu 
de confisquer les navires ennemis se trouvant ou entrant dans leurs 
ports, de leur permettre la sortie et meme de leur accorder un certain 
delai pour sortir en securite. 

Le motif de cette mesure, actuellemefit toute facultative, est de 
'"concilier les interets du commerce avec les necessites de la guerre " 
et, meme apres l'ouverture des hostilites ' ' de proteger encore, aussi large- 
ment que possible, les operations engagees de bonne foi et en cours 
d'execution avant la guerre." 

Cette question a ete soumise a l'examen de la Commission par notre 
President, M. de Martens, sous la forme suivante: 

"Est-il de bonne guerre, au moment de l'ouverture des hostilites, 
de saisir et de confisquer les navires marchands ennemis stationnes 
dans les ports de l'un des Etats belligerants? " 

"Ne faut-il pas reconnaitre a ces navires le droit de quitter librement, 
dans un laps de temps determine, avec ou sans cargaison, les ports de 
leur sejour au moment du commencement de la guerre? " 

Quatre propositions ont ete deposees sur ce sujet: 

La Delegation de Russie a propose de declarer desormais obligatoire 
la concession d'un delai aux batiments de commerce relevant d'une 
des Puissances belligerantes et surpris par la guerre dans les ports 
ennemis, afin de leur permettre d'achever leurs operations commer- 
ciales inoffensive? et de prendre librement la mer pour gagner en secu- 



DISCUSSIOX AT THE HAGUE, 1907. 73 

rite leur port national le plus rapproche ou un port neutre. Le navire 
qui, par suite de force majeure, n'aurait pu profiter de cette faculte, ne 
pourrait etre confisque. La proposition russe ajoutait, par un motif 
analogue, que le navire ayant quitte son dernier port de depart avant 
la guerre et surpris en mer par le commencement de la guerre, ne pour- 
rait etre capture, qu'il pourrait seulement etre retenu et enfin que la 
faveur de ces dispositions devait etre etendue egalement aux navires 
entrant dans les ports ennemis. 

A. l'appui de cette proposition, la Delegation Imperiale a fait valoir 
d'une part la necessite de sauvegarder, conformement a l'equite, les 
operations de commerce engagees de bonne foi et en toute confiance 
avant la guerre et d 'autre part la pratique universellement suivie 
depuis 1854. 

Quelque equitable qu'apparaisse le principe meme de cette mesure, 
on n'a pas manquee toutefois de faire remarquer combien une regie 
uniformement obligatoire etait pratiquement delicate a fixer et com- 
ment la consecration d'une obligation pourrait eventuellement leser 
l'interet legitime des belligerants. 

Les navires ennemis, qui se trouvent dans les ports d'un belligerant, 
peuvent, comme on l'a dit, etre des navires susceptibles de servir a la 
guerre; il est difficile, peut-etre impossible, de toujours les distinguer 
d'avance; peut-on alors obftger le belligerant a laisser, dans tous les cas, 
sortir de ses ports les navires de commerce ennemis, quels qu'ils soient, 
alors que la faculte de les retenir lui permet de priver son adversaire 
de moyens d'attaque et de defense pouvant bientot etre utilises? 

Pour ces raisons, la Delegation francaise a propose le maintien du 
regime facultatif actuel. Mais, s'associant pleinement aux sentiments 
d'equite exposes par la Russie, et au legitime souci des interets du 
commerce international, exigeant de ne point tromper la confiance du 
trafic engage en temps de paix, la Delegation de la Republique admet- 
tait que le navire auquel la sortie serait refusee ne saurait etre confisque 
et qu'il serait seulement sujet a requisition, moyennant indemnite, 
comme toutes autres proprietes se trouvant sur le territoire du belli- 
gerant. 

La Delegation neerlandaise, tout en se declarant partisan de l'obli- 
gation, proposa un amendement tendant a y apporter une exception 
pour les navires susceptibles d'etre transformed en batiments de guerre. 

Enfin la Delegation suedoise, dans un but de conciliation, proposa 
de combiner les propositions russe et francaise, en se bornant a consacrer 
le caractere desirable de la concession d'un delai. 

La discussion qui a eu lieu au sein de la Commission a ainsi prin- 
cipalement porte sur le caractere obligatoire ou facultatif de la mesure 
en question. 

Apres avoir constate qu'il y avait unanimite pour considerer la con- 
cession d'un delai tout au moins comme desirable, la Commission a 
decide de ne voter qu'apres le travail du Comite d'Examen et elle a 
pense qu'en vue de faciliter un accord, il convenait de charger ce 
Comite de rediger un projet prenant en consideration la preoccupation 



74 - DAYS OF GEACE. 

relative aux navires de commerce susceptibles d'etre transformed en 
batiments de guerre. 

C'est dans ces conditions que le Comite d'Examen a procede a ees 
deliberations. 

L'accord n'ayant pu se faire sur le principe de l'obligation, le Comite" 
a pris comme base de discussion la proposition transactionnelle su£doise, 
qui a abouti a un projet de reglement, dont voici l'economie, et qui, 
sauf certaines reserves, a obtenu, devant la Commission, l'unanimite 
moins deux abstentions. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la 
Paix, Tome I, p. 250.) 

As a result of discussion there was elaborated by the 
drafting committee the following rule : 

Lorsqu'un navire de commerce relevant d'une des Puissances bellig£- 
rantes se trouve au debut des hostilites dans un port ennemi, il est 
desirable qu'il lui soit permis de sortir librement, immediatement ou 
apres un delai suffisant, et de gagner directement, apres avoir etc muni 
d'un laisser-passer, son port de destination ou tel autre port qui lui 
sera designed 

II en est de meme du navire ayant quitte son dernier port de depart 
avant le commencement de la guerre et entrant dans un port ennemi 
dans l'ignorance des hostilites. 

The word desirable is used to indicate the degree of 
obligation resting upon the belligerent, as Great Britain 
at the Conference was particularly opposed to making the 
grant of delay a duty of the belligerent. 

The British delegation proposed the insertion of the 
words de faveur after the word delai. (For the several 
propositions see Deuxieme Conference Internationale de 
la Paix, Tome III, pp. 1150-1154.) 

Thus there was evolved at the Second Hague Confer- 
ence in 1907 a rule less stringent than the practice which 
had been recognized by the United States as generally 
obligatory. 

The Convention relative to the Status of Enemy Mer- 
chant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities according to 
the introductory clause was agreed upon by States 
11 anxious to insure the security of international com- 
merce against the surprises of war and wishing, in 
accordance with modern practice, to protect as far as 
possible operations undertaken in good faith and in 
process of being carried out before the outbreak of 
hostilities." 



REPORT OF AMERICAN DELEGATION. 75 

Report of the American delegation. — The report of the 
American delegation emphasized the grounds upon 
which the attitude of the United States was maintained. 

The uninterrupted practice of belligerent powers since the out- 
break of the Crimean war has been to allow enemy merchant vessels 
in their ports at the outbreak of hostilities to depart on their return voyages. 
The same privilege has been accorded to enemy merchant vessels 
which sailed before the outbreak of hostilities, to enter and depart from 
a belligerent port without molestation on the homeward voyage. It 
was therefore the view of the American delegation that the privilege 
had acquired such international force as to place it in the category of 
obligations. Such, indeed, was the view of a majority of the Confer- 
ence, but as the delegation of Great Britain adhered to the opinion that 
such free entry and departure was a matter of grace, or favor, and not 
one of strict right, the articles regard it as a delay by way of favor and 
refer to the practice as desirable. 

In support of the American view the case of the Buena Ventura is in 
point. This case was decided in 1899, and in his opinion Justice Peck- 
ham says: 

"It being plain that merchant vessels of the enemy carrying on inno- 
cent commercial enterprises at the time or just prior to the time when 
hostilities between the two countries broke out would, in accordance 
with the later practice of civilized nations, be the subject of liberal 
treatment by the Executive, it is necessary when his proclamation has 
been issued, which lays down rules for treatment of merchant vessels, 
to put upon the words used therein the most liberal and extensive 
interpretation of which they are capable; and where there are two or 
more interpretations which possibly might be put upon the language 
the one that will be most favorable to the belligerent party, in whose 
favor the proclamation is issued, ought to be adopted. 

1 ' This is the doctrine of the English courts, as exemplified in The 
Phoenix (Spink's Prize Cases, 1, 5) and The Argo (Id., p. 52). It is the 
doctrine which this court believes to be proper and correct. The 
Buena Ventura (175 U. S., 388)." 

At the first reading, the Convention seems to confer a privilege upon 
enemy ships at the outbreak of war. Free entry and departure are 
provided for, ships are not to be molested on their return voyages, and 
a general immunity from capture is granted to vessels from their last port 
of departure, whether hostile or neutral. But all these immunities 
are conditioned upon ignorance of the existence of hostilities on the 
part of the ship. This condition forms no part of the existing practice, 
and it was the opinion of the delegation that it substantially neutralized 
the apparent benefits of the treaty and puts merchant shipping in a 
much less favorable situation than is accorded to it by the international 
practice of the last fifty years. 

An enemy merchant vessel approaching a hostile port which is 
notified by an armed cruiser, or which obtains the information under 



76 DAYS OF GRACE. 

circumstances calculated to charge it with knowledge of the fact that 
hostilities exist, forfeits the immunities conferred by the treaty and 
becomes, eo instante, liable to capture. As the freight trade of the 
world is carried on in steamers which habitually carry only enough 
coal to reach their destination, the operation of the treaty is to render 
them instantly liable to capture, the alternative being to continue to 
the hostile destination and surrender. 

The Convention operates powerfully in favor of a State having a 
predominant naval force and possessed of numerous ports throughout 
the world so situated that a merchant vessel carrying its flag may take 
refuge in such ports on being notified that hostilities exist. All other 
powers would be placed in a position of great disadvantage, and their 
merchant marine would suffer incalculable injury as the result of its 
adoption. 

The effects upon the practice of marine insurance are also important. 
The ordinary contract does not cover a war risk. The operation of a 
war risk is simple because its conditions and incidents are fully known. 
But a policy calculated to cover the contingency of capture, the risk 
depending upon the chance or possibility of notification, would intro- 
duce an element of uncertainty into marine risks which, in view of the 
interests at stake, should not be encouraged. 

The Convention also presents an undesirable alternative in the 
treatment of enemy merchant ships, in that it provides that in certain 
oases they may be seized "subject to restoration after the war without 
indemnity," or to "immediate requisition with indemnity." As 
merchant marine commerce is carried on it is obvious that the condi- 
tion of the cargo which is detained in indifferent or inefficient custo- 
dianship during the ordinary duration of war would approach confis- 
cation. It would also be substantially impossible to make such a risk 
the subject of a practicable contract of insurance. 

The foregoing Convention was not signed by the delegation, and its 
acceptance as a conventional obligation is not recommended. (S. Doc. 
No. 444, GOth Cong., 1st sess., p. 38.) 

This Hague Convention, relative to the Status of 
Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities 
has not been adhered to by the United States. 

Summary. — Whether 48 hours is a reasonable period to 
allow to belligerent merchant vessels to load and depart 
will depend upon many circumstances. The relative 
distance of the enemy ports from one another, the nature 
of the commerce between the ports, the character of the 
vessels, strategic reasons, and other circumstances may 
influence a state in determining the number of days of 
grace. 



CONCLUSIONS. 77 

The discussion at The Hague in 1907 showed that the 
States were not willing to bind themselves to any fixed 
period of delay to be allowed to merchant vessels in an 
enemy port and that the rule as adopted did not determine 
even that any period should be allowed, though it is as- 
serted that it is desirable that a sufficient period be 
granted. 

Prof. Higgins says of the rule of the Hague Conference 
relating to the days of grace: 

The practice of granting of days of grace remains therefore as it was 
before the Conference. The powers have recognized its desirability, 
but no merchant ship can demand it, nor will there be a legal ground of 
complaint if all enemy merchant ships within a belligerent's ports at 
the outbreak of war are ordered to leave immediately or after a "suffi- 
cient" period. Whether the expression "It is desirable" will be con- 
sidered as equivalent to a command remains to be seen. States will 
probably act in the future as they have acted in the past. Capt. Ottley 
stated that the British GWernment had every intention of adhering to 
the practice which it had observed during the past 50 years in granting 
days of grace, subject always to the reservation that the time allowed 
should not compromise its national interests. It was doubtless with a 
similar mental reservation that the other powers accepted this article. 
States will in the future as in the past consult their own interests in 
this matter, but their interests may not infrequently involve a con- 
sideration for the interests of neutrals. Each State will determine for 
itself whether the desire to injure its enemy by detaining his merchant 
ships, which might be of the greatest value as auxiliary ships for the 
fleet, will "prevail over the fear of offending neutrals by causing a 
great dislocation of trade in which some of them are sure to be inter- 
ested." (The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 303.) 

Conclusions (a) It would seem from the current rules 
and opinion that 48 hours might under certain circum- 
stances be a sufficient period and under present rules State 
X could properly limit the delai de faveur to a period of 
48 hours. 

(b) As the allowance of days of grace is a favor rather 
than obligatory under present rules, a favor may be 
withdrawn. Certainly a favor granted by one belligerent 
to the other ought not to be taken advantage of to the 
detriment of the belligerent granting the favor. In the 
situation under consideration State Y should certainly 
be allowed to shorten the period already proclaimed to 



78 DAYS OF GRACE. 

correspond with that granted by State X to the vessels 
of State Y. 

(c) To withdraw all delai de faveur would involve the 
good faith of Y, as the vessels of State X had doubtless 
governed their action by the proclamation of State Y. 
To compel departure within 48 hours would be a hard- 
ship, but would still allow the vessels to depart and 
would be an adequate measure to meet the action of 
State X in limiting the delai de faveur to 48 hours and 
could be justified on the ground of retaliation. 

To withdraw all delai de faveur after once announcing 
that delai would be allowed would closely approach 
perfidy, which is generally regarded as prohibited in war. 

While it would be possible for a State to refrain from 
the grant of any specific delai de faveur, it would not be 
justifiable for a State to proclaim a delai and later with- 
draw 7 all delai. 

State Y has not the right under the conditions stated 
to withdraw all delai de faveur, but may in an 
extreme case allow the vessels to depart freely but 
"immediately." 

SOLUTION. 

(a) Under certain circumstances 48 hours may be a 
reasonable limit for delai de faveur. 

(b) State Y, if it deems such action expedient, should 
be allowed to shorten the period which it has already 
pioclaimed to correspond with the period granted by 
State X. 

(c) Under the conditions proposed in Situation III, 
and having regard to the preamble of the Hague Con- 
vention on this subject, State Y has not the right to with- 
draw all delai de faveur, though in an extreme case it 
may adopt the alternative of the Convention, which 
requires enemy vessels to depart "immediately.'' 



Situation IV. 

PURSUIT OF NEUTRAL BLOCKADE RUNNER. 

(In this Situation it is granted that the Declaration of 
London is binding.) 

There is war between the United States and State X. 
Great Britain is neutral. The Moon, a British merchant 
vessel, which has sailed from London with a cargo for 
port C of State X, before which the United States is 
maintaining an effective blockade, passes the blockading 
ships in the night and enters port C. When attempting 
to return the Moon is pursued by a cruiser of the block- 
ading squadron. The Moon runs into a neutral port, D, 
near the blockaded port. The cruiser waits outside the 
three-mile limit. When the Moon comes out of port 
three days later, the cruiser captures her. The master 
of the Moon protests that the capture is not valid and 
that the pursuit was at an end when he entered the 
neutral port. 

Is the master's protest valid ? What should be done ? 

SOLUTION. 

The pursuit by the cruiser was not abandoned. The 
protest of the master of the Moon is not valid. The cap- 
tain of the cruiser should send the Moon into port for 
adjudication as prize. If for any reason she should be 
released by the court, the action of the captain could 
be justified. 

NOTES. 

Duration of 'penalty. — Kleen discusses the grounds 
of difference of the offense of carriage of contraband and 
of violation of blockade and argues for a difference in 
duration of penalty. 

C'est ce ^caractere purement local qui distingue essentiellement les 
violations de blocus d'avec les autres transgressions de la neutrality. 
Dans un fait de contrebande, par exemple, le transport est delictueux 
n'importe oil se trouve l'ennemi qui est le but final et a quelle dis- 
tance de cet ennemi que soieht les objets prohibes qui lui sont destines. 

79 



80 PURSUIT OF NEUTRAL BLOCKADE RUNNER. 

Deja l'acte de les apporter peut etre poursuivi, a une etape quelconque 
dans le cours du voyage, alors que la destination interdite peut etre 
demontree comme telle; cela, parce que la signification du secours 
n'est pas attachee a telle ou telle localite, et que le secours lui-meme 
ne consiste pas dans quelque obstacle mis a une operation liee intime- 
ment a une place. Au contraire, le blocus est une telle operation. Inse- 
parable des lieux de son objet, ce n'est que la qu'il peut etre viole. 
(1 La Neutrality p. 630.) 

Kleen maintains that — 

Un navire pris en flagrant delit de violation de blocus peut etre saisi 
par la force bloquante et traduit devant le tribunal de prises pour etre 
puni selon le paragraphe suivant. 

Aucun acte n'est reprimable en dehors de la place et du moment du 
fait delictueux. 

Un navire ne peut etre saisi a moins d'etre pris pendant son entree 
meme au port bloque, ou dans le port, ou bien a son retour de celui-ci 
avant d'avoir atteint, soit un port ou une eau neutres, soit — sans etre 
poursuivi — la haute mer ou le port non bloque d'un belligerant. 
Toutefois, une poursuite commencee but les lieux du blocus peut etre 
continuee dans la haute mer et dans les eaux des belligerants, si elle 

est une et non interrompue. (Ibid., p. 636.) 

* * * * * 

Aussi ces publicistes s'accordent-ils a reconnaitre que, de meme 
qu'un blocus ne peut §tre viole que sur ses lieux et qu'il ne peut pas 
l'etre par le voyage, de meme la violation ne peut etre poursuivie qu'en 
flagrant delit, ni avant ni apres. Avant, aucune mesure quelconque 
ne peut legalement etre prise contre le navire suspect; et apres, aucune 
mesure ne peut etre prise autre que celles qui sont motivees par des 
circonstances et qui sont censees propres a prolonger la phase du fait, 
a savoir les saisies, soit dans le port meme, soit sur la place a la sortie 
de la, soit enfin sur la haute mer et dans les eaux des belligerants a la 
seule condition que la poursuite ait commence au moment du fait et 
sur la place, et que sa continuation aux dits lieux n'ait pas ete inter- 
rompue mais puisse etre considered comme une simple suite de Paction 
dirigee contre le delit pris sur le fait. Au contraire, un navire deja 
echappe dont Taction interdite n'a pas ete empechee ni attaquee sur 
la place du blocus, et qui n'a pas non plus ete poursuivi immediate- 
ment, ne peut pas etre attaque apres coup et ailleurs, fut-ce pendant 
le meme voyage. Et, une fois dans les ports ou les eaux neutres, il 
est pour toujours hors de portee de toute poursuite, independamment 
de la fin du voyage. (Ibid., p. 639.) 

Other opinions are given in the Naval War College 
International Law Situations, 1908, pages 21-26. Under 
the situation there considered the precedents and atti- 
tude of various States are presented. From that discus- 



DIFFERENCES IN DOCTRINE. 81 

sion it is evident that by American and British practice 
prior to 1908 the Moon would be liable to capture when 
coming out of neutral port D and before returning to 
her port of sailing, London. 

Differences in doctrine. — Prof. Westlake, writing in 
1907, mentions the difference between the Anglo-Amer- 
ican and the continental views and says: 

The time during which a vessel which has broken a blockade by 
egress, whether she was in the port at the commencement of the block- 
ade or had entered that port by a successful breach of it, may be cap- 
tured with condemnation as the result, is subject to a difference be- 
tween the Anglo-American and the continental schools analogous to 
that which we have seen to exist as to the commencement of the lia- 
bility for a breach by ingress. Those who hold that a blockade can 
only be maintained by a stationary squadron restrict to that squadron 
the right of vindicating a breach of it. A ship of that squadron may 
pursue the blockade runner who has succeeded in passing its line to 
any distance compatible with the maintenance of the blockade by 
the remainder of the force, but when he has once entered a neutral 
port the affair is closed and he is free. Those who hold that a blockade 
may be maintained by cruisers allow any ship of war, whether she has 
or not been a member of the blockading squadron, to capture the 
offender at any distance from the blockaded port until his destined 
voyage is ended, supposing always that the blockade is really in ex- 
istence at the time of the capture. In the opinion of that school the 
blockade runner has not got rid of his culpability, deposited it as the 
phrase is, by entering a neutral port not that of his destination in 
order to escape pursuit or under stress of weather. On his leaving it 
the chase can be renewed or taken up by some other ship. (Inter- 
national Law, Part II, Peace, p. 234). 

Dupuis states the British position in its extreme form: 

Un forceur de blocus sortant du port ne peut etre pris, d'apres les 
doctrines francaises, que par un navire de l'escadre de blocus; il ne 
peut etre pris qu'au moment oil il essaie de franchir les lignes, oil, s'il 
reussit a les traverser, au cours d'une poursuite commencee sur le 
champ, achevee avec succes en haute mer. 

Les Anglais considerent que le voyage entier, depuis le port bloque 
jusqu'au port de destination, constitue une infraction ininterrompue 
aux devoirs de la neutrality, une violation flagrante et continue du 
blocus. D'oii il suit que tout croiseur belligerant a qualite pour 
exercer le droit de suite, c'est-a-dire pour operer la capture du navire 
forceur de blocus, en quelque point qu'il le rencontre; il n'est pas 
besoin, pour le prendre sur le fait, que le capteur appartienne a l'escadre 
de blocus; quel que soit son emploi, il peut et doit reprimer l'acto 

70387—11 6 



82 PURSUIT OF NEUTRAL BLOCKADE RUNNER. 

hostile qui se poursuit devant lui et qui ne prendra fin qu'a l'arrivee 
au port de destination. 

Que faut-il entendre par le port de destination? La question est de 
grande importance; les Anglais la resolvent d'une maniere rigoureuse. 
Le port de destination sera habituellement le port designe dans la 
charte-partie comme le point final du voyage, sans qu'il y ait lieu de 
tenir compte des ports intermediaries ou le vaisseau pourrait relacher, 
soit pour prendre ou laisser quelque cargaison, soit pour chercher un 
abri contre le nauvais temps; a plus forte raison, ne reconnaitrait-on 
point la qualite" de port de destination au port ou la poursuite ou la 
<;rainte de l'ennemi engagerait le navire a demander un refuge. Cette 
solution rigoureuse est d'ailleurs la consequence logique de la con- 
ception anglaise du blocus; puisque le blocus interdit toute com- 
munication, tout voyage maritime des lieux bloques a un port quel- 
conque, l'infraction se mesure au mepris de cette interdiction; elle 
comprend done tout le trajet qu'on se propose jusqu'au dernier port 
oil doivent etre dechargees les marchandises prises aux lieux bloques. 
(La Guerre Maritime et los Doctrines Anglaises, p. 220.) 

The French contention has been that the vessel vio- 
lating a blockade by egress could be taken only in 
flagrant delit. As Pradier-Fodere says: 

Si l'escadre de blocus n'a pu arreter le navire coupable de violation, 
elle peut detacher un des vaisseaux qui la composent pour poursuivre 
d rue ce navire, et ce dernier ne sera valablement saisi que s'il est 
atteint par le vaisseau d£tache de l'escadre bloquante avant d'etre 
entre dans un port de son pays, oil dans un port neutre, car le droit 
de prise ne peut s'exercer dans les eaux neutres, et une fois entre dans 
un port de son pays, ou dans des eaux neutres, s'il en ressort il ne peut 
plus etre question de flagrant delit. Les navires forceurs de blocus 
ne peuvent etre captures que par les batiments de l'escadre bloquante. 
D'apres la doctrine franeaise, en un mot, s'il agit de violation de 
blocus par entree, le navire neutre qui viole un blocus par entree au 
port bloque ne peut etre capture que sur la ligne du blocus, ou sur 
poursuite commencee de la ligne du blocus, et terminee, avec succes, 
avant l'arrivee du navire poursuivi, dans un port de son pays ou dans 
les eaux territoriales d'un Etat neutre; s'il est question de violation 
par sortie, cette violation prend fin des que les lignes ont ete franchies 
avec succes. Celui qui viole un blocus par sortie ne peut etre pris 
■qu'au moment ou il essaie de franchir les lignes d'investissement, ou 
au cours d'une poursuite commencee sur le champ et achevee avec 
succes en haute mer. Dans l'un et l'autre cas de violation la capture 
ne peut avoir lieu que par les navires de l'escadre de blocus. (8 Droit 
International Public, sec. 3143, pp. 425-426.) 

' Blunt schli maintains that a neutral vessel which has 
violated a blockade by egress may continue its voyage 



PURSUIT AND NEUTRAL WATERS. 83 

without liability to capture after it has entered a neutral 
port. (Das moderne Volkerrecht, 836.) Other writers 
limit the right of capture to the waters under control of 
the blockading force or to the period of continuous pur- 
suit on the high seas by a ship of the blockading force. 
(3 Hautefeuille, Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations 
Neutres, p. 154; Heffter, Das Europaische Volkerrecht, 
156; 2 Cauchy, Droit Maritime, p. 214; Calvo, Droit 
International § 1184; Gessner, Le Droit des Neutres 
sur Mer, pp. 228, 244.) 

Ortolan, relying more upon the English precedents, 
says: 

Le delit resultant d'une violation du blocus subsiste generalement 
pendant tout le voyage, mais l'offence ne suit jamais le navire plus 
loin que le terme de son voyage de retour. Si le navire qui a commis 
cette violation est capture avant la fin de ce voyage de retour, il est 
considere comme pris en flagrant delit. (2 Diplomatic de la Mer, 
p. 354.) 

British Commission on Supply of Food. — The questions 
of Sir Gerard Noel and the replies of Prof. Holland before 
the British Royal Commission on the Supply of Food and 
Raw Material in Time of War raise the problem of pro- 
tection in neutral waters: 

6799. Do you consider that one of our merchant ships would be 
actually safe from capture within the three-mile limit of a neutral 
coast? — I think that rule is one of the best established rules of inter- 
national law; they differ in stringency, but I think that is as generally 
accepted as any of them. 

6800. And that it would be carried out? — I think you might fairly 
rely upon it; accidents might occur, of course; there might be pursuit 
into those waters. That would be illegal, but that might accidentally 
occur, and would have to be apologized for afterwards. I do think the 
rule is one of the best established rules of international law. 

6801. Then one of our merchant vessels passing through the Mediter- 
ranean, and remaining as much as possible in neutral waters, along the 
coast of Sicily and along the coast of Spain, and so on, would be free 
from capture by a French cruiser whilst in those waters? — Certainly. 

6802. You think they would recognize that? — Yes, there would be 
a very strong public opinion of the world against any infringement of 
that. (Report, Vol. II, Minutes of Evidence, p. 237.) 

Question of blockade at the Hague Conference. — In the 
proposition in regard to blockade submitted by Italy 



84 PURSUIT OF NEUTRAL BLOCKADE RUNNER. 

and supported by the Brazilian, the Netherlands, the 
German and other delegations at the Second Hague 
Conference in 1907, Article 5 provides: 

Un navire ne peut etre saisi comme coupable de violation de blocus qu '<tu 
moment oil il tente de franchir les lignes d'un blocus obligatoire. (Deu- 
xieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 1167.) 

The American delegation offered as a substitute for 
this Article the following: 

Tout navire qui, aprls qu'un blocus a ete dUment notifie, fait voile 
pour un port ou une place bloques, ou qui essaie de forcer le blocus, peut 
itre saisi pour violation de blocus. (Annexe 35, Ibid., p. 1168.) 

The British delegation indorsed this substitute. (Ibid., 
p. 169.) 

M. Fusinato of the Italian delegation, speaking upon 
Article 5, said: 

L'article 5 contient la consequence la plus importante de la notion 
du blocus, telle qu'elle est fixee par l'article I. II etablit qu'un navire 
ne pourra etre saisi pour violation de blocus qu'au moment oil il 
essaye de forcer la ligne d'un blocus obligatoire. La Delegation des 
Etats-Unis d'Amerique vient de presenter un amendement (Annexe 
35) a cet article, qui en modifierait substantiellement la valeur. II 
y a lieu toutefois d'esperer qu'on pourra s'accorder sur une base 
commune d'entente. Quant a nous, nous sommes d'avis que recon- 
naitre l'effectivite du blocus comme la premiere condition de sa 
valeur obligatoire, revient a declarer que le fondement et l'essence du 
blocus consiste entierement dans l'exercice reel de la puissance mili- 
taire du belligerant sur la zone bloquee. II s'en suit necessairement 
que le blocus ne commence pas, tant que cette puissance militaire 
n'est pas etablie, qu'il cesse, aussitot qu'elle finit, et que son action 
et ses consequences ne peuvent se realiser la oil elle n'existe pas reelle- 
ment. En d'autres termes, le blocus n'est qu'une action de guerre, 
inseparable des lieux oil elle s'exerce, et dont la violation ne saurait 
etre effectuee et punie que sur ces lieux memes. (Ibid., p. 888.) 

The discussion of the whole question of blockade at the 
Second Hague Conference showed so great a diversity 
of view between the continental and the Anglo-American 
doctrines in regard to blockade that it was decided to 
leave the subject of blockade to a subsequent conference 
of States. (Ibid., Tome I, p. 262.) 

Propositions at the International Naval Conference, 
1908-9. — Various propositions in regard to the dura- 



PROPOSITIONS AT NAVAL CONFERENCE. 85 

tion of liability to capture of a vessel that had violated 
blockade were submitted to the International Naval Con- 
ference at London. The following is a brief statement 
of these propositions: 

Germany : 

La capture n'est permise qu'autant que le navire tente de franchir 
les lignes du blocus ou qu'il est poursuivi in flagranti par un batiment 
de la force bloquante. (Proceedings of the International Naval Con- 
ference, British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), p. 88.) 

United States: 

The liability of a vessel purposing to evade a blockade, to capture 
and condemnation begins with her departure from the home port and 
lasts until her return, unless in the meantime the blockade of the port 
is raised. 

Spain: 

Le navire qui, apres avoir force ou tente de forcer le blocus et etant 
poursuivi par les vaisseaux bloquants, est perdu de vue par ceux-ci, 
ou reussit a gagner un port ouvert, devient libre. (Ibid., p. 88.) 

France : 

La violation d'un blocus regulierement etabli resulte aussi bien de 
la tentative de penetrer dans les lieux bloques que de celle d'en sortir 
apres la declaration du blocus, a moins que ce ne soit dans le delai de 
sortie accorde. La saisie des navires ne peut, en consequence, etre 
effectuee que dans le rayon d'action des batiments de guerre charges 
d'assurer la realite du blocus. 

Le navire qui a traverse les lignes, mais qui reste poursuivi, est de 
bonne prise. Si la chasse en est abandonnee, la saisie n'en peut plus 
etre pratiquee. (Ibid., p. 88.) 

Great Britain: 

Breach of blockade outward. — A vessel which has succeeded in coming 
out of a port in breach of blockade is liable to capture until the conclu- 
sion of the voyage, whether she has touched at an intermediate port or 
not. 

After a blockade has come to an end, a vessel can not be seized for 
breach of it, either by ingress or egress, except in the case where the 
blockaded port is captured and a vessel found therein which has entered 
in breach of blockade. (Correspondence and Documents, International 
Naval Conference, British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), 
p. 7.) 

Italy: 

Un navire qui tente de sortir du port bloque peut etre saisi meme en 
dehors de la ligne du blocus, pourvu qu'il ait ete poursuivi au moment 



86 PURSUIT OF NEUTRAL BLOCKADE RUNNER. 

oil il la franchissait, et rejoint avant qu'il n'ait pu toucher un port 
neutre. Si le navire a pu franchir sans dimculte et sans obstacles la 
ligne du blocus, il ne pourra plus etre saisi, meme s'il arrivait dans un 
port de la Puissance bloquante. (British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. 
No. 5 (1909), p. 90.) 

Netherlands: 

La violation du blocus a lieu au moment de la transgression de la 
ligne du blocus. Une poursuite. pour violation de blocus pourra 
s'etendre au dela de la ligne du blocus, mais finira aussitot que le navire 
aura atteint un port ouvert ou au moment anterieur de la levee du 
blocus. (Ibid., p. 90.) 

Observations on place of seizure. — Having regard to the 
propositions of the ten States participating, the British 
Foreign Office prepared for the International Naval Con- 
ference preliminary bases of discussion, in order that the 
attention of the delegates might be focused upon what 
seemed the essential questions. The observations upon 
this subject were as follows: 

Lieu de saisie. — Si l'on examine attentivement ce que la saisie a pour 
but de sanctionner, on ne peut nier que c'est assurement l'interdiction 
que proclame le blocus, c'est-a-dire, l'interdiction d'arriver au lieu 
bloque. Si parfois, en raison de la disposition tactique de la force 
bloquante, on a pu considerer que celle-ci formait en fait comme une 
barriere ou ligne dont elle surveille l'acces, on ne saurait oublier qu'a 
proprement parler ce n'est pas le passage meme de cette ligne qui est 
l'objet de cette interdiction, mais bien toujours l'arrivee au lieu bloque. 

D'autre part, il est depuis longtemps inconteste que la violation d'un 
blocus presuppose que le blocus est effectif, c'est-a-dire, que l'interdic- 
tion est reellement maintenue par une force suffisante pour en assurer 
le respect. 

Partant de ces idees communes, les Gouvernements en ont separe- 
ment poursuivi l'application par des voies, a l'aide desquelles l'analyse 
doctrinale des auteurs a peu a peu echafaude des systemes, qui ont 
plus obscurci qu'ecla irci les resultats pratiquement constates. 

En realite, les navires condamnes pour violation de blocus sont 
captures avant d'avoir accompli veritablement l'acte interdit, c'est- 
a-dire, avant d'avoir atteint le lieu bloque, quelque rapproches qu'ils 
en puissent etre. 

Ce qu'exige la saisie c'est que l'acte de violation soit manifestement 
caracterise et que la sanction corresponde vraiment a l'infraction. 

Ce n'est qu'au fur et a mesure que le navire s'approche du lieu 
bloque que l'infraction se caracterise, jusqu'au moment oil l'expedi- 
tion destined au port bloque arrive dans le rayon d'action de la force 
bloquante et alors l'infraction devient manifeste, la saisie est justifiee. 



DISCUSSION AT NAVAL CONFERENCE. 87 

Si ces considerations sont exactes, il semble que les vues exprim£es 
dans les differents Memorandums seraient avantageusement rap- 
portees a leur origine commune, et pourront se rencontrer dans une 
formule egalement commune, enoncant ce qui est, en somme, le 
resultat pratique auquel elles paraissent toujours aboutir. (Ibid., p. 91.) 

Basis of discussion at the International Naval Confer- 
ence. — The basis of discussion was drawn up in the follow- 
ing form : 

24. La saisie des navires neutres pour violation de blocus ne peut 
etre effectuee que dans le rayon d'action des batiments de guerre 
charges d'assurer la realite du blocus. 

25. Le navire qui, en violation du blocus, est sorti du port bloque, 
reste saisissable tant qu'il est poursuivi. Si la chasse en est abandon- 
nee, la saisie n'en peut plus etre pratiquee. (Ibid., p. 91.) 

The discussion. — -The discussion of this form was ac- 
companied by certain suggestions as to changes in the 
phraseology. 

The Netherlands delegation proposed — 

Si la chasse en est abandonnee, ou si le navire atteint un port neutre, 
ou bien si le blocus est leve, la saisie n'en peut plus etre pratiquee. 
(Ibid., p. 244.) 

Other propositions were also made and discussed, but 
the question of limit of distance of pursuit was over- 
shadowed by that as to the limit of the area of operation 
of the blockading fleet. 

The instructions to the British delegation referring to 
this matter were as follows : 

There arises in this connection the question as to the limit of distance 
or time up to which the pursuit of a vessel that has broken blockade 
outwards may be continued. According to the British theory, the ves- 
sel would remain liable to pursuit and capture until she had reached 
the terminal point of her homeward voyage. The opposing school holds 
that the right to pursue and capture ceases when the pursuit has been 
abandoned. His Majesty's Government are advised that the accept- 
ance of the latter view would not be likely to inflict any material injury 
on the interests of Great Britain. They therefore consider that it will 
not be necessary to insist on the rigorous adoption of the British princi- 
ple on this point. (Correspondence and Documents, International 
Naval Conference, British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), 
p. 26.) 

Rule of the Declaration of London. — The International 
Naval Conference at length reached an agreement upon 



88 PURSUIT OF NEUTRAL BLOCKADE RUNNER. 

many questions relating to blockade. The limit of 
pursuit was the subject of Article 20. 

A vessel which in violation of blockade has left a blockaded 
'port or has attempted to enter the port is liable to capture so 
long as she is pursued by a ship of the blockading force. If 
the pursuit is abandoned, or if the blockade is raised, her 
capture can no longer be effected. 

Of this Article the General Report, which by the 
approval of the Conference became an official commen- 
tary upon the Declaration of London, says: 

A vessel has departed from the blockaded port or has tried to enter it. 
Shall she be indefinitely liable to capture? An absolutely affirmative 
reply would be too extreme. This vessel must remain liable to capture 
so long as she is pursued by a ship of the blockading force; it would not 
suffice that she be encountered by a cruiser of the blockading enemy 
which did not belong to the blockading squadron. The question 
whether or not the pursuit is abandoned is a question of fact; it does 
not suffice that the vessel should take refuge in a neutral port. The ship 
which is pursuing her can wait her departure, so that the pursuit is 
necessarily suspended, but not abandoned. Capture is no longer 
possible when the blockade has been raised. (Naval War College 
International Law Topics, 1909, p. 55.) 

Application to Situation IV. — According to the state- 
ment of Situation IV, the Moon has broken the blockade 
regularly maintained, and when pursued by a ship of the 
blockading squadron, the Moon runs into a near-by 
neutral port though not the port from which she sailed. 
The voyage of the Moon is not therefore complete and 
the pursuit was continuous till the vessel entered neu- 
tral waters. In view of the fact that the action of the 
blockading force is by the Declaration of London confined 
to the "area of operation/' the question of pursuit 
received special attention. The General Report of the 
International Naval Conference states under Article 20 
of the Declaration of London, "The question whether or 
not the pursuit is abandoned is a question of fact; it does 
not suffice that the vessel should take refuge in a neutral 
port. The ship which is pursuing her can wait her de- 
parture, so that the pursuit is necessarily suspended, but 
not abandoned.'' 



SOLUTION. 89 



SOLUTION. 



The pursuit by the cruiser was not abandoned. The 
protest of the master of the Moon is not valid. The 
captain of the cruiser should send the Moon into port for 
adjudication as prize. If for any reason she should be 
released by the court, the action of the captain could 
be justified. 



Situation V. 

INFLUENCE OF DESTINATION ON CONTRABAND CHARACTER. 

(In this Situation it is granted that the Declaration of 
London is binding.) 

There is war between Great Britain and European 
State X. Hostile operations are confined to the Euro- 
pean Continent. State X has no ports in the Pacific 
Ocean, but one of her cruisers chances to be in the Pacific 
Ocean and overtakes an American merchant vessel loaded 
with coal consigned to, and of a kind commonly used by, the 
civil Government of New Zealand. The merchant vessel's 
papers are regular and she is on the proper course. The 
merchant vessel contends that she is exempt from cap- 
ture. The commander of the cruiser maintains that the 
coal is conditional contraband. 

Which is correct ? What should be done ? 

SOLUTION. 

The contention of the master is correct. The com- 
mander of the cruiser should allow the vessel to proceed. 

NOTES. 

Coal in time of war. — In the long period during which 
a list of contraband has been evolved the treatment of 
coal has varied. The decisions of courts and the opinions 
of text writers have likewise varied. Some writers have 
maintained that the treatment of coal in time of war 
should be determined by conventional agreement. (Gali- 
ani, De Doveri, 1, cap. IX, sees. 3-7.) Others with the 
desire to leave neutrals free in time of war have demanded 
that only articles of the nature of absolute contraband be 
liable to seizure. 

The treaties of earlier days show how coal and other 
articles were regarded in conventional agreements. The 
Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, Article 20, shows the tendency to 
exempt many articles from the list of contraband. Coals 
are definitely exempted. 
90 



TREATY PROVISIONS AS TO COAL. 91 

These merchandises which follow shall not be reckoned among pro- 
hibited goods; that is to say, all sorts of cloths, and all other manufac- 
tures woven of any wool, flax, silk, cotton, or any other materials what- 
ever; all kinds of cloths and wearing apparel, together with the species 
whereof they are used to be made; gold and silver, as well coined as 
uncoined, tin, iron, lead, copper, brass, coals; as also wheat and barley, 
and any other kind of corn and pulse; tobacco, and likewise all manner 
of spices, salted and smoked flesh, salted fish, cheese and butter, beer, 
oils, wines, sugars, and all sorts of salt, and, in general, all provisions 
which serve for the nourishment of mankind and the sustenance of 
life. Furthermore, all kinds of cotton, hemp, flax, tar, pitch, ropes, 
cables, sails, sailcloths, anchors, and any parts of anchors; also ship 
masts, planks, boards, and beams, of what trees soever; and all other 
things proper either for building or repairing ships; and all other goods 
whatever, which have not been worked into the form of any instrument 
or thing prepared for war, by land or by sea, shall not be reputed con- 
traband, much less such as have been already wrought and made up 
for any other use; all which shall wholly be reckoned among free goods, 
as likewise all other merchandises and things which are not compre- 
hended and particularly mentioned in the preceding article, so that 
they may be transported and carried, in the freest manner, by the sub- 
jects of both confederates, even to places belonging to an enemy, such 
towns or places being only excepted as are at that time besieged, 
blocked up round about, or invested. (1 Chalmers, Treaties, p. 403.) 

This treaty was frequently reaffirmed during the eight- 
eenth century, and this clause occurs in other important 
treaties during the eighteenth century as in the treaties 
between the United States and France in 1778 (Art. 24), 
the United States and Sweden, 1783 (Art. 10), and Great 
Britain and France in 1786 (Art, 23). 

Treaties of the earlier part of the nineteenth century in 
general made no mention of coal. Treaty provisions 
specifically excluding from capture articles not of the 
nature ' of absolute contraband are common during the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Some treaties forbid 
capture of goods not enumerated though actually bound 
to a seat of operations. The treaty of 1828 between the 
United States and Brazil (still in force) is an example of 
this practice: 

Art. 17. All other merchandise and things not comprehended in the 
articles of contraband, expressly enumerated and classified as above, 
shall be held and considered as free, and subjects of free and lawful 
commerce, so that they may be carried and transported in the freest 
manner by both the contracting parties, even to places belonging to an 



92 INFLUENCE OF DESTINATION. 

enemy, excepting only those places which are at that time besieged 
or blockaded; and, to avoid all doubt in this particular, it is declared 
that those places are only besieged or blockaded which are actually 
attacked by a force capable of preventing the entry of the neutral. 

This clause was repeated in the treaty between the 
United States and Colombia in 1846 (Art. 18), and in the 
treaty with Bolivia in 1858 (Art. 17). 

The article relating to this subject was somewhat modi- 
fied in the treaty with Haiti in 1864, by omitting the last 
clause. 

Art. 21. All other merchandises and things not comprehended in 
the articles of contraband explicitly enumerated and classified as above 
shall be held and considered as free, and subjects of free and lawful 
commerce, so that they be carried and transported in the freest manner 
by the citizens of both the contracting parties, even to places belonging 
to an enemy, excepting only those places which are at the time besieged 
or blockaded. 

Goal as contraband. — In the days of sailing vessels, 
when the wind was the sole means of propelling ships at 
sea, articles of fuel were not thought of as potential 
contraband of war. Soon after the middle of the 
nineteenth century the treatment of fuel in time of war 
became a matter of growing importance. 

Secretary Cass, writing to the United States Minister 
to France in 1859, said: 

The discussion which at this time is going on respecting the military 
character of coal, and whether it is now excluded from general commerce 
as contraband of war is a striking illustration of the tendency to enlarge 
this power of prohibition and seizure and of the necessity of watching 
its exercise with unabated vigilance. Here is an article not exclusively 
nor even principally used in war, but which enters into general con- 
sumption in the arts of peace to which, indeed, it is now vitally neces- 
sary. It has become also important in commercial navigation. It is 
a product of nature with which some regions are bountifully supplied, 
while others are destitute of it, and its transportation, instead of meeting 
with impediments, should be aided and encouraged. The attempt to 
enable belligerent nations to prevent all trade in this most valuable 
accessory to mechanical power has no just claim for support in the law 
of nations; and the United States avow their determination to oppose 
it as far as their vessels are concerned. (Quoted in 7 Moore, Inter- 
national Law Digest, sec. 1252, p. 673.) 

The attitude of the United States changed with the 
change of conditions. A considerable correspondence 



AMERICAN ATTITUDE IN 1862. 93 

was carried on between Secretary Seward and the British 
charge d'affaires in 1862, which gives evidence of the 
drift of opinion. Mr. Seward says in part in a long letter 
of October 3, 1862: 

On the 14th of April, 1862, before the act of Congress was passed, it 
had been reported to the President that anthracite coal was being 
shipped from some of the ports of the United States to southern ports 
within and to other southern ports without the United States for the 
purpose of supplying fuel to piratical vessels which were engaged in dep- 
redating on the national commerce on the high seas. The Secretary of 
the Treasury, therefore, by authority of the President, who is charged 
with the supreme duty of maintaining and executing the laws, issued 
to the collectors of the customs at New York and other ports the fol- 
lowing instruction : 

"Clear no vessel with anthracite coal for foreign ports nor for home 
ports south of Delaware Bay till otherwise instructed." 

It was thereupon represented to the President that this order was 
unnecessarily stringent and severe upon general commerce, because 
it prohibited the exportation of coal to ports situated so far from the 
haunts and harbors of the pirates that the article would not bear the 
expense of transportation to such haunts and harbors, and thereupon 
the Secretary of the Treasury, by the President's authority, on the 
18th of May issued a new instruction on the subject to the collectors of 
the customs, which was of the effect following: 

"The instructions of the 14th ultimo, concerning the prohibition of 
the exportation of coals, are so far modified as to apply only to ports 
north of Cape St. Roque, on the eastern coast of South America, and 
west of the fifteenth degree of longitude east. Coal' may be cleared to 
other foreign ports, as before, until further directed." 

The subject of supplies of coal and other merchandise having, in the 
meantime, engaged the attention of Congress, with the result of the pas- 
sage of the law before mentioned, the Secretary of the Treasury, on the 
23d of May last, and as speedily as possible after the approval of the law, 
issued the following instruction to the collectors of the customs of the 
United States: 

Until further instructed you will regard as contraband of war the 
following articles, viz: Cannon, mortars, firearms, pistols, bombs, 
grenades, firelocks, flints, matches, powder, saltpeter, balls, bul- 
lets, pikes, swords, sulphur, helmets or boarding caps, sword belts, 
saddles and bridles, always excepting the quantity of the said articles 
which may be necessary for the defense of the ship and of those who 
compose the crew, cartridge-bag material, percussion and other caps, 
clothing adapted for uniforms, rosin, sailcloth of all kinds, hemp and 
cordage material, ship lumber, tar and pitch, ardent spirits, military 
persons in the service of the enemy, dispatches of the enemy, and 
articles of like character with those specially enumerated. 



94 INFLUENCE OF DESTINATION. 

You will also refuse clearances to all vessels which, whatever the 
ostensible destination, are believed by you, on satisfactory grounds, to 
be intended for ports or places in possession or under the control of 
insurgents against the United States, or that there is imminent danger 
that the goods, wares, or merchandise, of whatsoever description, will 
fall into the* possession or under the control of such insurgents. And 
in all cases where, in your judgment, there is ground for apprehension 
that any goods, wares, or merchandise shipped at your port will be used 
in any way for the aid of the insurgents or the insurrection, you will 
require substantial security to be given that such goods, wares, or mer- 
chandise shall not in any way be used to give aid or comfort to such 
insurgents. You will be especially careful upon applications for clear- 
ances to require bonds with sufficient sureties for fulfilling faithfully 
all the conditions imposed by law or departmental regulations from 
shippers of the following articles to the ports opened, or to any other 
ports from which they may easily be and are probably intended to be 
reshipped in aid of the existing insurrection, namely, liquors of all 
kinds, coals, iron, lead, copper, tin, brass, telegraph instruments, wire, 
porous cups, platinum, sulphuric acid, zinc, and all other telegraph 
materials, marine engines, screw propellers, paddle wheels, cylinders, 
cranks, shafts, boilers, tubes for boilers, fire bars, and every article 
whatever which is, can, or may become applicable for the manufacture 
of marine machinery or for the armor of vessels. (Message and Diplo- 
matic Correspondence, U. S., 1862, p. 302.) 

In 1864 Mr. Dayton, the American representative at 
Paris, reported to Secretary Seward as follows: 

[Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.] 

Paris, May 16, 1864. 
No. 465.] 

Sir: In a recent conference with M. Drouyn de l'Huys he com- 
plained seriously of your late action in refusing to the French navy a 
supply of coal bought by it in New York. He says France never has 
declared and never will declare coal contraband of war; that if the 
United States should do so, it would be a retrograde move, inasmuch as 
its traditional policy had always been in favor of neutrals and in limita- 
tion rather than in extension of the list of contraband. He hopes that 
we will not retrace our steps, but in this matter adhere to our past 
policy; that France has always gone with us, or we with her, on these 
questions of maritime law, and he does not think it for the interest of 
either country to part company; at least that was the inference from 
his language. 

He informed me, further, that your opinion was understood to be 
favorable to letting the coal go to the French vessels, but difficulty was 
made by the Secretary of the Treasury. I told him, if this were so 
there might be some question connected with the revenue which had 



SOUTH AMERICAN ATTITUDE. 95 

interfered, but he thought otherwise, and said that it was made to rest 
purely upon the question, Is coal contraband of war? This is a question 
of deep interest to the French Government— deeper, perhaps, than 10 
us, she having a large navy and little coal, while Great Britain and the 
United States have an abundance of the latter article. 

He said, further, that if the United States should declare coal con- 
traband of war, it would place France in a false position in reference to 
our country. That she, France, holding coal not to be contraband, 
would be compelled to supply it to our enemies in time of war, and to 
the Confederates, while denying it to us, because we denied it to them. 
That they would dislike much to be placed in a position indicating 
such apparent want of neutrality, yet that it would be inevitable if 
coal was declared by us contraband of war. 

There is a good deal of sensitiveness manifested here on this point. 

M. Rouher, minister of state, referred to it, I observe, in his late speech 

in the Chamber of Deputies. 

I am, sir, your obedient servant, 

Wm. L. Dayton. 

(Diplomatic Correspondence, U. S., 1864, Part 3, p. 84.) 

Attitude of Peru in 1866. — In the war with Spain in 
1866, Peru issued the following decree: 

Lima, February 9, 1866. 

Mariano Ygnacio Prado, Provisional Supreme Chief of the Republic, 
considering: 

That in Jhe actual state of war in which the Republic finds itself 
with the Government of Spain, it is necessary to determine the condi- 
tions of certain articles which being of lawful commerce may be con- 
sidered according to circumstances as contraband of war; 

I decree: 

Sole article. Coal and provisions will be considered contraband of 
war when one or other are destined for the use of Spanish ships of war. 

The Secretary of State in the Foreign Office is ordered to fulfill this 
decree. (56 British Foreign and State Papers, p. 917.) 

The Peruvian Instructions for the Guidance of the 
Commanders of Vessels of War, issued on February 10, 
1866, after enumerating the articles of contraband gen- 
erally mentioned, said, " Equally so are coals destined 
for the vessels of war of the enemy or his privateers, etc." 
(56 ibid., p. 914.) 

Coal in the war between Spain and Chile, 1866. — During 
the war between Spain and Chile in 1866 there was a dec- 
laration by the Spanish admiral in regard to Chilean 



96 INFLUENCE OF DESTINATION. 

coal. The following note was addressed by him to the 
dean of the consular corps at Valparaiso: 

Headquarters of the Squadron of Her Catholic 

Majesty in the Pacific, Frigate Numancia, 

Valparaiso, January 29, 1866. 
My Dear Sir: Inclosed is the declaration which, in reference to 
Chilean mineral coal and in the exercise of my rights as a belligerant, 
I have issued this day. 

I beg your excellency, as the worthy dean of the consular corps resi- 
dent in Valparaiso, to inform it thereof. 

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excellency the assur- 
ances of my respect and to repeat that I am your most obedient servant. 

Casto Mendez Nunez, 
The Consul General of Her Faithful Majesty in Valparaiso. 



The commander-in-chief of the Spanish squadron in the Pacific — 

Considering, That the vessels of war, both Peruvian and Chilean, 
provide themselves with coal from the mines of Chile for their hostile 
operations on this coast; 

Considering, That the laws of war permit belligerents to take posses- 
sion of everything employed by the enemy in hostile operations against 
them, in which category the said combustible is included, being, more- 
over, a product of the soil of that enemy; 

Considering, That the belligerent is authorized to declare new articles 
contraband of war whenever by the circumstances of said war, they 
become, in the hands of the enemy, elements for the undertaking and 
carrying on of hostilities; 

Considering, finally, That the Government of Chile has declared coal 
destined for Spanish vessels of war or privateers to be contraband; 

I have resolved — 

1. Mineral coal of the different mines of Chile is hereby declared 
contraband of war. 

2. Neutral vessels, on board of which those of this squadron may 
find Chilean mineral coal, whatever be the port for which they are 
bound, shall remain subject to the provisions of the fourth article of the 
instructions of blockade, circulated in establishing that of the ports of 
this Republic. 

3. The object of this declaration, circumscribed as it is to a special 
instance of the present war, is not to lay down any precedent whatever 
respecting the general principle that stone coal ought not to be con- 
sidered as contraband of war. 

4. This declaration, made by the commander-in-chief of the naval 
forces of Her Catholic Majesty in the Pacific, shall bear a temporary 
character until his Government shall decide as it may deem proper in 
regard thereto. 



JOINT REPLY OF CONSULS. 97 

On board the frigate Numancia, in the Bay of Valparaiso, January 29, 
1866. 

Casto Mendez Nunez. 

(Diplomatic Correspondence, 1866, Pt. 2, p. 371). 

To this note the consular representatives of twenty- 
one States sent the following joint reply: 

The undersigned members of the consular corps, assembled at the 
consular general of His Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal, have made 
themselves aware of the contents of the note which his excellency, the 
commander-in-chief of the squadron of Her Catholic Majesty in the 
Pacific, was pleased to address to the dean of the consular corps of this 
city on the 29th of January last. In that note and the accompanying 
resolution, the commander-in-chief is pleased to set forth that he has 
declared the coal of the different mines of Chile to be contraband of war, 
and that consequently neutral vessels on board of which those of the 
squadron of Her Catholic Majesty may find this combustible, whatever 
be its port of destination, will be subject to the provisions of the fourth 
article of the blockade instructions. 

It is not the intention of the undersigned to enter into a discussion 
either upon the greater or less right possessed by the commander-in-chief 
to make the said declaration, nor upon the considerations upon which 
it is founded, nor upon the consequences to be deduced therefrom and 
they leave to their respective Governments the reservation to discuss 
with that of his excellency the questions involved in the measure 
adopted. 

The undersigned, in conformity with the principles contained in the 
protest which they presented to the predecessor of his excellency, under 
date of the 5th of October last, deeming it their unavoidable duty to 
assist and protect the commerce of their peoples and the free navigation 
of the vessels bearing the flag of their respective nations, whenever they 
are employed in lawful traffic, can not do otherwise than protest in the 
most formal manner, and make the Government of the commander-in- 
chief responsible for all damages that may be caused to their people in 
consequence of the said resolution relative to coal from the different 
mines of the Republic of Chile. 

For this purpose the undersigned have likewise agreed that the present 
be drawn up in duplicate, one being addressed to the commander-in- 
chief of the squadron of Her Catholic Majesty in the Pacific, through 
Mr. George Lyon, consul general of His Faithful Majesty and dean of 
this consular corps, and the other of the same tenor filed in the consulate 
general of His Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal. 

The undersigned, begging the commander-in-chief to be pleased to 
acknowledge the receipt of the present communication, have the honor 
to offer to his excellency the assurances of their high consideration and 
respect. (Ibid, p. 374.) 

70387—11 7 



98 INFLUENCE OF DESTINATION. 

Destination as an element in contraband. — In determina- 
tion as to the nature of contraband, questions in regard to 
the character, ownership, and destination of the goods and 
the nationality of the vessel arise. The simple carriage 
of goods of the nature of contraband is not in itself an 
offense making goods or vessel liable to penalty, "it is 
the hostile destination of the goods that renders them 
liable to penalty and the vessel liable to delay or other 
consequences according to circumstances." (Wilson and 
Tucker, International Law, 5th ed. p. 319.) " Hostile 
destination" is an essential element in determining the 
treatment of goods in time of war. Goods of the nature 
of absolute contraband in neutral vessels and bound in 
good faith for a neutral destination are exempt. 

Views of States in 1908. — The memoranda submitted 
by the ten States represented at the International Naval 
Conference at London in 1908-9 afforded the common 
ground that "La destination de la marchandise decide 
de son caractere de contrebande." (Proceedings, Inter- 
national Naval Conference, British Parliamentary Papers, 
Miscellaneous No. 5 (1909) p. 70.) 

In the memoranda submitted by Germany, United 
States, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, and Russia, a wide range of opinion in regard 
to destination is found. 

The German memorandum proposed to put burdens 
upon the neutral by forbidding carriage of contraband 
under certain circumstances. The statement of the 
proposed regulations was as follows : 

II est interdit aux navires neutres faisant route vers le territoire d'un 
belligerant ou vers un territoire occupe par lui ou vers sa force arm£e de 
transporter des articles de contrebande de guerre qui ne soient pas 
destines a etre debarques dans un port intermediate neutre. 

Les papiers du bord font preuve complete de la route du navire ainsi 
que du lieu de dechargement de la cargaison, a moins que le navire ne 
soit rencontre ayant manifestement devie de l'itineraire indique par les 
papiers du bord et sans pouvoir justifier d'une cause suffisante de cette 
deviation. 

Sont considered comme contrebande de guerre d'autres objets et 
materiaux pouvant servir a la guerre lorsqu'ils sont destines aux forces 



VIEWS OF STATES, 1908. 99 

armees ou aux services de l'Etat d'un bellierangt et qu'ils ont et6 par 
une declaration notifiee expressement qualifies de contrebande de 
guerre. lis sont compris sous le nom de contrebande relative. 

II y a presomption peremptoire de la destination visee a l'alinea 
precedent, si l'envoi en question est adresse aux autorites d'un belli- 
gerant. 

Cette destination est presumee, si l'envoi est adresse a un commercant 
dont il est notoire qu'il fournit a un belligerant des objets et materiaux 
de cette nature. La meme presomption s'applique dans le cas ou 
l'envoi est a destination d'une place fortifiee d'un belligerant ou d'une 
autre place servant de base d' operations ou de ravitaillement a ses 
forces armees, a moins qu'il ne s'agisse d'etablir le caractere de con- 
trebande des navires memes qui font route vers une de ces places. Les 
presomptions prevues au present alinea peuvent etre detruites par la 
preuve contraire. (Ibid., p. 66.) 

The United States suggested that articles of the nature 
of absolute contraband " destined for ports of the enemy 
or places occupied by his forces, are always contraband 
of war/' while articles of the nature of conditional con- 
traband would be contraband only "when actually and 
especially destined for the military or naval forces of the 
enemy." 

Austria-Hungary, in the discussion of the notion of 
contraband, said: 

D'apres la doctrine generalement adoptee, la contrebande est carac- 
terisee par le fait que le neutre, en transportant des objets propres a 
etre employes dans la guerre, procure au destinataire un avantage sur 
son ennemi. A cet effet, les objets doivent tomber reellement entre ses 
mains. Le fait seul qu'ils sont diriges vers l'adversaire ne suffit point 
pour leur imprimer le caractere hostile. Si la guerre n'a lieu que sur 
terre, le belligerant ne devrait done pas confisquer de blindages ou de 
machines de marine; et si les objets transported sont destines a traverser 
seulement le territoire ennemi, l'entrave mise au transport ne serait 
guere justifiable. Peut-etre dira-t-on que l'adversaire aurait acraindre, 
en ce cas, que l'ennemi ne s'en emparat pendant leur transit. Or, un 
sauf-conduit, delivre par les autorites du pays ennemi et produit par le 
neutre arrete, ecarterait cette crainte. 

II s'ensuite que, en verite, il n'existe qu'une contrebande presumable 
(et non pas absolue), le transport de materiel de guerre creant unique- 
ment la presomption que les articles en route vers l'ennemi seraient 
employes dans la guerre. On ne saurait done refuser aux neutres la 
preuve du contraire. (Ibid., p. 17.) 



100 INFLUENCE OF DESTINATION. 

Spain, following the inclination to limit contraband to 
the single category of what is known as absolute contra- 
band, proposed : 

La contrebande etant reduite aux articles qui n'ont d'utilite que 
pour la guerre, le fait de leur envoi a une flotte ennemie ou a des points 
du territoire ennemi ou occupes par l'ennemi, constitue, par lui-meme, 
une preuve de la condition illicite des marchandises. Si celles-ci, 
destinees immediatement a un point ennemi, n'y vont qu'en transit et 
possedent reellement une destination finale neutre, c'est le destinataire 
qui aura a le demontrer, moyennant avis prealable a l'autre belligerant 
et production d'un sauf-conduit d£livre par l'ennemi dont le territoire 
doit etre traverse par les marchandises. 

Nonobstant le paragraphe precedent, pour que le droit du belligerant 
a reprimer la contrebande puisse commencer a s'exercer, il est neces- 
saire que le navire au bord duquel vont les marchandises se trouve en 
voyage direct vers la flotte ou le point ennemi. (Ibid., p. 67.) 

France proposed to forbid carriage of contraband: 

Le transport par les neutres de la contrebande de guerre a destination 
de l'ennemi est interdit. 

Things of the nature of absolute contiaband were 
regarded as contraband ''lorsqu'ils sont destines a 
l'ennemi." (Ibid., p. 29.) 

Great Britain gave a somewhat full statement of the 
British position: 

PRESUMPTION AS TO CONDITIONAL CONTRABAND. 

There is a presumption that conditional contraband is on its way 
to assist in the operations of the enemy only if there is proof that its 
destination is for the naval or military forces of the enemy, or for some 
place of naval or military equipment in the occupation of the enemy, 
or if there has been fraudulent concealment or spoliation of papers. 

DESTINATION. 

The destination of the cargo is generally presumed to be that of the 
ship. Where the ship is to call at more than one port the presence on 
board of goods which are bona fide documented for discharge at a neu- 
tral port before the ship reaches an enemy port can not be made a 
ground for detention; but if there is no such documentary evidence 
that port which is least favorable to the neutral will be presumed to 
be the destination of such cargo as would be contraband if carried to 
that port. If it is proved that the contraband cargo has an ulterior 
hostile destination, different from that of the ship, to which such cargo 
is to be forwarded as part of a single mercantile transaction, the destina- 
tion of the ship will not protect the cargo. 



BRITISH POSITION IN 1908. 101 

LIABILITY TO SEIZURE. 

A ship carrying contraband as defined in section 1 may be seized at 
any moment throughout the whole course of her voyage so long as she 
is on the high seas or in belligerent waters. The liability to seizure is 
not affected by the fact that the vessel is intending to touch at some 
neutral port of call before reaching the hostile destination. 

When the contraband goods have been discharged the liability to 
seizure is at an end. In exceptional cases it has been held that a ship 
which has carried contraband to the enemy on her outward voyage 
under circumstances aggravated by fraud and simulated papers is still 
liable to capture and condemnation on her return voyage. (Corre- 
spondence and Documents International Naval Conference, British 
Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, Nov. 4 (1909), p. 4.) 

Italy quoted from her domestic law and court decisions : 

(a) II. 1. "Les navires neutres diriges vers un pays ennemi dont la 
cargaison est formee, en totalite ou en partie, par des objets de con- 
trebande de guerre, seront captures et conduits dans un des ports de 
l'Etat, oil le navire et les marchandises de contrebande seront con- 
fisques, et les autres marchandises seront laissees a la disposition des 
proprietaires." 

La disposition susdite a ete interpreted et appliquee dans ce sens, que 
le caractere de contrebande de guerre depend de la destination finale 
et intentionnelle de la cargaison, et non pas de la destination immediate 
et materielle du navire. Dans un cas particulier il a ete juge que la 
contrebande existe lorsque le navire est dirige vers un port neutre 
afin d'y decharger les marchandises destinees a rejoindre par voie de 
terre le pays ennemi, particulierement si le pays en question n'a aucun 
debouche sur la mer. — (Coram, prises, 8 decembre 1896, capture du 
"Doelwijk.") (British Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, No. 5 
(1909), p. 67.) 

Japan made a full statement as to the nature of hostile 
destination : 

I. La contrebande de guerre est classee en deux categories generates: 

(a) Contrebande ab?olue. — Les armes, les munitions et les autres 
articles et materiaux employes immediatement et ordinairement dans 
un but militaire, lorsqu'ils sont destines au territoire de l'ennemi ou 
a un lieu occupe par lui ou a ses forces militaires ou navales. 

(b) Contrebande condiiionnelle. — Les articles et materiaux autres 
que ceux ci-dessus decrits, et qui peuvent etre employes dans un but 
militaire, lorsqu'ils sont destines aux forces militaires ou navales de 
l'ennemi. 

Les articles et materiaux ci-dessus mentionnes sont considered comme 
destines aux forces militaires ou navales de l'ennemi, lorsqu'ils sont 
destines au territoire de l'ennemi et que, d'apres les circonstances se 



102 INFLUENCE OF DESTINATION. 

rattachant au lieu de destination, on peut lea considerer corame devant 
servir a l'usage militaire de l'ennemi. 

II. Lorsque le port de destination ou d'escale d'un navire est sur le 
territoire de l'ennemi ou est un lieu occup6 par l'ennemi, ou lorsqu'il 
y a des raisons de croire que le navire va a la rencontre des forces 
militaires ou navales de l'ennemi, la destination du navire est r£put6e 
etre hostile. 

III. La destination du chargement est ordinairement determined 
par la destination du navire. 

Les marchandises se trouvant a bord d'un navire sont presumees 
avoir une destination hostile, si la destination du navire est un lieu 
qui, geographiquement, ou d'apres d'autres considerations, peut £tre 
regard 6 comme constituant la derniere etape dans le transport des 
marchandises, soit par transbordement, soit par transport terrestre, a 
une destination hostile. (Ibid., p. 68.) 

The Netherlands statement was brief: 

La notion de contrebande s'applique au transport en mer libre ou 
dans les eaux situees sous la juridiction des belligerants vers le territoire 
ennemi, des marchandises comprises dans la liste de contrebande 
absolue inseree dans le rapport de la 4 e Commission de la Deuxieme 
Conference de la Paix. (Ibid., p. 68.) 

The Russian propositions show that the discussions 
consequent upon the events of the Russo-Japanese war 
had emphasized the possibilities of complications if 
explicit rules should not be made: 

I. 1. * * * Les objets de contrebande absolue sont sujets a con- 
fiscation, lorsq'ils sont transportes a destination d'un pays ennemi, 
d'un territoire occupe par l'ennemi ou de forces armees de l'ennemi. 

Art. 2. Le belligerant a, en outre, le droit, apres notification pre- 
alable, d'interdire le transport d'autres objets susceptibles d'etre 
utilises pour la guerre par une armee ou une flotte, lorsque ces objets 
sont transportes a destination de forces armees de l'ennemi (contre- 
bande de guerre relative) . lis sont sujets a confiscation, si les interesses 
ne prouvent pas que les objets transportes ne sont pas destines a etre 
utilises pour la guerre. 

Art. 3. Sous le nom de transport destine - aux forces armies de 
l'ennemi est compris le transport de la contrebande de guerre a desti- 
nation: 

(a) De l'armee ou de la flotte de l'ennemi; 

(6) D'un port militaire ou d'une place fortifiee de l'ennemi; 

(c) D'un port occupe par l'ennemi; 

(d) De tout autre port de l'ennemi, si les objets de contrebande sont 
transportes pour le Gouvernement ennemi ou pour ses fournisseurs. 

Art. 4. La destination illicite dans le sens des articles 1, 2 et 3 est 
considered comme etablie, lorsque les objets de contrebande se trou- 
vent a bord d'un navire: 



BASES OF DISCUSSION AT NAVAL CONFERENCE. 103 

(a) Qui se dirige directement vers un pays ennemi, un territoire 
occupe" par 1'ennemi ou vers les forces armees de 1'ennemi; 

(6) Qui, tout en declarant faussement une destination neutre, se 
dirige en r^alite vers un pays ennemi, un territoire occupe par 1'ennemi 
ou vers les forces armees de 1'ennemi; 

(c) Dont la destination est en fait un port neutre, si les objets de 
contrebande qui se trouvent a bord sont destinees a etre expedies 
ulteVieurement par mer dans un pays ennemi, un territoire occupe par 
F ennemi ou a ses forces armees. (Ibid., p. 68.) 

Bases of discussion at the International Naval Confer- 
ence. — The above propositions were considered, and an 
attempt was made to deduce the elements upon which 
there was accord and to formulate bases which, as points 
of departure for discussion, would facilitate the work of 
the delegates. 

All memoranda were in agreement upon certain prin- 
ciples, while the interpretation of other principles varied. 

Comme le montre tous les Memorandums, la simple destination hos- 
tile suffit pour la contrebande absolue, et en ce qui concerne la contre- 
bande conditionnelle une destination speciale militaire est necessaire. 

BASE DE DISCUSSION. 

4. La simple destination au pays ennemi, comme la destination aux 
forces armees de V ennemi ou a un territoire occupe par V ennemi, est suffi- 
sante pour rendre saisissables les articles de contrebande absolue. 

5. Une destination speciale aux forces armees de V ennemi est necessaire 
pour rendre saisissables les articles de contrebande conditionnelle. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

En presence du developpement des moyens de communication et 
des multiples ramifications du trafic maritime et terrestre 1' experience 
des dernieres guerres maritimes a conduit a appliquer certaines pre- 
somptions de la destination speciale militaire; mais il n'apparait pas 
qu'aucune de ces presomptions ait eu un caractere absolu ecartant 
toute preuve contraire comme on a pu proposer d'en convenir dor£- 
navant pour certains cas. 

BASE DE DISCUSSION. 

6. II y a presomption de la destination aux forces armees si V envoi est 
adresse aux autorites ennemies ou a, un commercant dont il est notoire qu'il 
fournit a V ennemi des objets et materiaux pour la guerre, ou s'il est a desti- 
nation d'une place fortifiee ennemie ou d'une autre place servant de base 
d 'operations aux forces armees ennemies, a moins qu'il ne s'agisse detablir 
le caractere du navire meme qui fait route vers une de ces places. Dans 
les autres cas la destination est presumee innocente. Les presomptions 
ci-dessus admettent la preuve contraire. 



104 INFLUENCE OF DESTINATION. 



OBSERVATIONS. 

Sans discuter ici si des principes nouveaux devraient etre introduits, 
on pent constater que les Memorandums declarant representer les 
regies existantes sent unanimes a considerer que la destination de la 
marchandise prouve son caractere de contrebande. 

BASE DE DISCUSSION. 

7. La destination de la marchandise decide de son caractere de contrebande . 
(Ibid., p. 69.) 

Discussion of Bases. — Basis of discussion Xo. 5 was "Une 
destination speciale aux forces armees de Pennemi est 
necessaire pour rendre saisissables les articles de contre- 
bande conditionnelle." When this came before the Con- 
ference the German delegation proposed to substitute for 
the words "de F ennemi" the words "ou aux administra- 
tions de FEtat ennemi. " In sustaining this change the 
German plenipotentiary said: 

Selon notre avis, k la destination aux forces armees de 1' ennemi de- 
vrait etre assimilee la destination a ses administrations. La meme 
idee a deja ete exprimee dans les propositions franyaises relatives a la 
contrebande, soumises a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, dont 
l'article 4 etait ainsi concu: 

"S'il est etabli qu'un article specialement declare contrebande de 
guerre a, au moment de la saisie, non seulement une destination enne- 
mie, mais une destination reelle aux forces militaires ou na vales ou aux 
services de V Etat ennemi, cet article est sujet a confiscation. " (Ibid., p. 
138.) 

Later the British delegation, in offering a projet upon 

contraband of war, stated this rule as follows : 

Une destination speciale aux forces armees de 1' ennemi ou a Fadmi- 
nistration de FEtat ennemi est necessaire pour rendre saisissables les 
articles de contrebande conditionnelle. (Ibid., Art. 11, p. 251.) 

The German delegation said that this form was in accord 
with their views : 

Elle vise en effet le cas d'articles destines aux forces armees et aux 
administrations de l'Etat ennemi, et la maniere de voir exprimee a ce 
sujet paraissait d'autant plus necessaire a adopter que le projet britan- 
nique ne tient pas compte des propositions tendant a ajouter a la liste 
des obiets de contrebande absolue certains articles, tels que For, Far- 
gent, les rails de chemins de fer, qui, tout en etant susceptibles d' usages 
pacifiques, peuvent servir a augmenter la force militaire d'un belli- 
gerant . II enregistre done avec satisfaction le fait que l'article 11 permet 



DISCUSSION AT NAVAL CONFERENCE. 105 

la saisie de ces articles quand ils sont destines a etre employes dans 
linteret de la Puissance ennemie. (Ibid., p. 200.) 

Basis No. 6, which was sometimes coupled with the dis- 
cussion of Basis No. 5, was as follows: 

6. II y a presomption de la destination aux forces armees si V envoi 
est adresse aux autorites ennemies ou a un commercant dont il est 
notoire qu'il fournit a l'ennemi des objets et materiaux pour la guerre, 
ou s'il est a destination d'une place fortifiee ennemi ou d'une autre place 
servant de base d'operations aux forces armees ennemies, a moins qu'il 
ne s'agisse d'etablir le caractere du navire meme qui fait route vers une 
de ces places. Dans les autres cas la destination est presumee inno- 
cente. Les presomptions ci-dessus admettent la preuve contraire. 
(Ibid., p. 120.) 

In the discussion of this basis various opinions were 
brought forward. Among these were: 

M. le Vice-Amiral Ro'ell: Dans le No. 6 des bases de discussion, il est 
stipule qu'il y a presomption de la destination aux forces armees si 
l'envoi est adresse a un commercant dont il est notoire, etc. 

Or, je ne trouve pas cette definition tres claire; il se peut, selon la 
redaction de l'article, qu'on envisage un commercant neutre ou seule- 
ment un commercant ennemi. Quant a moi, je crois que l'intention 
vise seulement les commercants ennemis, et c'est pour cela que je pro- 
pose de faire suivre le mot "commercant" des mots "residant dans le 
pays ennemi. " 

M. Crowe, fait remarquer que la nature du commerce du destinataire 
peut modifier la presomption de contrebande. C'est ainsi que des com- 
mercants appeles ' ' agents commissionnaires, " tout en ayant un contrat 
avec leur Gouvernement pour la livraison de certains articles, recoivent 
des objets de nature tout a fait variee, et que la marchandise prohibee 
qui leur serait adressee, peut tres bien etre tout a fait en dehors de la 
categorie d'articles qui tombent sous l'application de leur contrat avec 
le Gouvernement, de sorte que l'envoi ne presente pas, dans ce cas, le 
meme caractere de violation des droits de la neutrality . C'est pour cette 
raison qu'il y aurait lieu d'ajouter au texte de la base dont il s'agit les 
mots "de cette nature. " (Ibid., p. 138.) 

The German delegation proposed to insert after the 
words "base d'operations" the words "ou de ravitaille- 
ment." (Ibid., p. 138.) 

The Dutch delegation would add the words "residant 
en pays ennemi" after " commercant. " (Ibid., p. 235.) 

The Italian delegation proposed to substitute the fol- 
lowing rule : 

La destination speciale aux usages de la guerre sera etablie par des 
circonstances se rattaehant soit a la destination territoriale ou a la per- 



106 INFLUENCE OF DESTINATION. 

sonne du destinataire, soit aux modalites du chargement. La preuve 
contraire est admise. (Ibid., p. 239.) 

The British suggested the addition of the words *'de 
eette nature" after "objets et materiaux. " (Ibid., 
p. 239.) 

The United States delegation suggested the suppres- 
sion of the words "d'operations" after "base." (Ibid., 
p. 242.) 

Adaptation to modern conditions. — The extension of the 
area of jurisdiction of many States so that the area of 
hostile operations may be so remote that an act in one 
part of the dominions of a State may have no relation 
to military operations in another part of the dominions 
is a modern phenomenon. European wars may now have 
little effect upon a remote dependency. In order that 
the rights of neutrals may not be unduly disturbed with- 
out corresponding advantage to the belligerents it was 
deemed best at the International Naval Conference to 
recognize : that the area of operations should be some- 
what limited. This is provided for in Article 33 of the 
Declaration of London. 

Art. 33. Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it 
is shown that it is destined for the use of the armed forces 
or of a government department of the enemy State, unless 
in this latter case the circumstances show that the articles 
can not in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress. 
This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming 
under Article 2Jf. (4). (International Law Topics, Naval 
War College, 1909, p. 79.) 

Of this Article the general report gives a somewhat full 
explanation. 

The rules which relate to conditional contraband differ from those 
which have been laid down for absolute contraband in two respects: 
(1) There is no question of destination for the enemy in general, but 
of destination for the use of his armed forces or government authori- 
ties; (2) the doctrine of continuous voyage is excluded. Articles 33 
and 34 refer to the first and Article 35 to the second principle. 

The articles included in the list of conditional contraband may serve 
for peaceful uses as well as for hostile purposes. If, from the circum- 
stances, the peaceful purpose is certain, their capture is not justified; 
it is otherwise if a hostile purpose is to be assumed, which happens, 



EXPLANATION IN GENERAL REPORT. 107 

for instance, in the case of foodstuffs destined for an enemy army or 
fleet, or of coal destined for an enemy fleet. In such a case there is 
clearly no doubt. But what is the decision when the articles are 
destined for the civil authorities of the enemy State? It may be the 
money sent to a civil authority which is to be used in the payment of 
salaries of its officials, or rails sent to a department of public work.*. 
In these cases there is enemy destination rendering the goods liable in 
the first place to capture, and subsequently liable to condemnation. 
This is explained by reasons at once juridical and practical. The 
State is a unit, although the functions necessary for its action are 
intrusted to different authorities. If a civil department may freely 
receive food or money, it is not advantageous to that department 
alone, but to the entire State, including its military administration, 
since the general resources of the State are thereby increased. Further, 
what a civil department receives may be considered of greater use 
to the military administration and may be directly assigned to the 
latter. Money or food really destined for a civil department may thus- 
come to be used directly for the needs of the army. This possibility, 
which is always present, shows why destination for the authorities of 
the enemy State is assimilated to the destination for its armed forces. 

It is the authorities of the State which are dependent on the central 
power that are in question, and not all the authorities which may exist 
in the enemy State. Local and municipal authorities, for instance, are 
not included, and what is destined for their use would not be regarded 
as contraband. 

War may be waged in circumstances such that the destination for 
the use of a civil authority can not be questioned, and consequently 
can not give to the goods the character of contraband. For instance, 
a war exists in Europe, and the colonies of the belligerent countries 
are not, in fact, affected by the war. Food or other articles in the list 
of conditional contraband destined for the use of a civil authority of 
a colony would not be regarded as contraband of war, because the 
considerations adduced above do not apply in this case. It would not 
be possible to draw for the needs of the war on the resources of such 
civil government. Exception is made in case of gold, silver, or paper 
money, because a sum of money can easily be sent from one end of the 
world to the other. (Ibid., p. 79; Correspondence and Documents. 
International Naval Conference, British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. 
No. 4 (1909), p. 48.) 

SOLUTION. 

The contention of the master is correct. The com- 
mander of the cruiser should allow the vessel to proceed. 



Situation VI. 

TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

(It is granted in this Situation that the Declaration of 
London is binding.) 

There is war between the United States and State X. 
Great Britain is neutral. A vessel is met at sea having 
on board a bill of sale showing that the sale was made by 
the owner, a merchant of State X, to a British company 
twenty days before the outbreak of hostilities. 

The captain of the United States cruiser which meets 
this vessel is in doubt what course to pursue, as the papers 
seem to be in regular form, though the vessel is engaged 
in trade similar to that before her transfer. 

What should he do? 

SOLUTION. 

Unless the captain of the United States cruiser has 
other grounds than the fact that the merchant vessel is 
engaged in trade similar to that in which she was engaged 
before her transfer, he should release the vessel. 

NOTES. 

Topic and conclusion in 1906. — At the Naval War Col- 
lege conference on international law in 1906 the subject 
of transfer of flag of merchant vessels in time of war was 
considered. The following was the phrasing of the topic 
and conclusion: 

topic n. 

What restrictions should be placed upon the transfer of flags of mer- 
chant vessels during or in anticipation of war? 

CONCLUSION. 

(a) The transfer of vessels, when completed before the outbreak of 
war, even though in anticipation of war, is valid if in conformity to the 
laws of the State of the vendor and of the vendee. 

(b) The transfer of a private vessel from a belligerent's flag during 
war is recognized by the enemy as valid only when bona fide and when 
the title has fully passed from the owner and the actual delivery of the 

108 



DISCUSSION OF TRANSFER, 1906. 109 

vessel to the purchaser has been completed in a port outside the juris- 
diction of the belligerent States in conformity to the laws of the State 
of the vendor and of the vendee. (International Law Topics and Dis- 
cussions, 1906, p. 21.) 

A brief summary of the general practice as regards com- 
merce was at that time given as follows: 

Any restriction on the sale of vessels in the time of war would be a 
restriction on commerce. As a general rule, a citizen of a neutral State 
may carry on commerce in the time of war as in the time of peace. It 
is generally admitted also that a belligerent has a right to take reason- 
able measures to bring his opponent to terms. It has been held that 
a neutral may be under obligation to use "due diligence" in order that 
acts hostile to either belligerent may not be undertaken within its 
jurisdiction. The arbitrators in case of the Alabama declared that "due 
diligence" should be "in exact proportion to the risks to which either 
of the belligerents may be exposed from a failure to fulfill the obliga- 
tions of neutrality on their part." Citizens of neutral States can not 
perform certain services for a belligerent without rendering themselves 
or their property liable to treatment as hostile. How far the neutral 
State is bound to interfere in order to prevent its citizens from engaging 
in certain transactions is not fully determined. Ordinarily commer- 
cial transactions which can not affect the issue of the war are permitted. 

In certain respects the purchase of goods belonging to a belligerent 
by a neutral may be a most effective method of freeing them from lia- 
bility to capture. In the case of vessels sold by a subject of one State 
to a subject of another State, the transfer to the flag of the nation of the 
new owner ordinarily follows. 

A vessel purchased from a subject of a belligerent by a subject of a 
neutral State would then pass under the protection of the neutral 
State and be exempt from capture. There is a great probability, there- 
fore, that transfers will be made solely for the purpose of obtaining the 
protection of a neutral flag. Such transfers might not be of the nature 
of a valid sale. The opposing belligerent has therefore exercised the 
right of testing the validity of the transfer before the prize court. 
The continental practice has been more in the direction of regarding 
all sales made with a knowledge of the existence of war as invalid. 
There have been many cases before the American and British courts. 
In these courts the neutral purchaser is generally under obligation to 
establish the validity of his claim to the ownership by abundant proof. 
(Ibid., p. 21.) 

The question of transfer of flag raised by Great Britain. — 
The subject of "transfer of merchant vessels from a bel- 
ligerent to a neutral flag during or in contemplation of 
hostili ties' ' was suggested by Great Britain as one of the 
questions of the program of the International Naval 



110 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

( 'onference at London in 1908. The subject had received 
much attention in Great Britain, and cases involving 
transfer had often been before the English courts. The 
memorandum submitted to the Conference by the British 
Government referred to many adjudicated cases. It 
was as follows: 

1. The assignment, either by sale or gift, to. a neutral of an enemy 
ship, other than a ship of war, is not rendered invalid merely by the 
fact that it was made during or in contemplation of hostilities. 

2. Such an assignment is not, however, valid if — 

(a) It is made in a blockaded port. 

(b) It is made in the course of a voyage. For this purpose a voyage 
is at an end as soon as the ship reaches a port where she can actually 
be delivered into the possession of the transferee. 

(r) The vendor retains any share in the ship, or if there is an agree- 
ment to reconvey her at the end of the war. 

3. The onus of proving that the transfer is genuine lies on the claim- 
ant, and the assignment must be complete, bona fide, and for good 
consideration. 

A vessel transferred to a neutral flag is therefore still liable to be 
condemned by the prize court if the circumstances of the transfer 
are attended with suspicion not removed by the claimant; as, for 
example, if — 

(a) No documentary evidence of the assignment is found on board 
at the time of the seizure; 

(6) The transferrer has any control over the ship, reservation of 
profits, or power to revoke the assignment; 

(c) Possession has not been taken by the alleged transferee or by 
some agent of his who is not an enemy; 

(d) The ship is under the control of an enemy; 

(e) The master or other person in command is in the service of an 
enemy. (Correspondence and Documents, International Naval Con- 
ference, British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), p. 10.) 

Prof. TTestlake, citing pertinent sentences from the 
case of the Baltica (11 Moore Privy Council Cases, p. 141), 
says of transfer of flag from the British point of view: 

Further, a ship may have been transferred by enemies to friends 
with all the external completeness necessary by the laws of the neutral 
country for the grant of its flag, but the vendors may have retained 
an undisclosed interest, the apparent transaction being only a blind to 
avoid capture. In that case it is thought to be no want of respect 
to the flag she bears that it shall not protect her. Belligerents, con- 
ceiving themselves to have a right to all enemy property at sea, call 
the transaction a fraud on their rights, and the honor of the neutral 



PROFESSOR WESTLAKE ON TRANSFER. Ill 

State is not thought to be engaged in the protection of fraud. To cut 
short all tedious and often baffling investigations into such frauds, 
the French practice, dating as far back as the Reglement of 1694 and 
confirmed by that of 1778, ignores all sales of ships by enemies not 
made by authentic acts previous to the declaration of war or the com- 
mencement of hostilities. The English practice lays down no rigid 
rule except one which it applies to cargoes as well as to ships, namely, 
that "in case of war, either actual or imminent * * * a mere 
transfer by documents which would be sufficient to bind the parties 
is not sufficient to change the property as against captors as long as 
the ship or goods remain in transitu. * * *" The true ground 
on which the rule rests * * * is that while the ship is on the seas 
the title of the vendee can not be completed by actual delivery of the 
vessel or goods. The difficulty of detecting frauds if mere paper trans- 
fers are held sufficient is so great that the courts have laid down that in 
order to defeat the captors the possession as well as the property must 
be changed before the seizure. * * * The only question of law 
which can be raised is how long the transitus continues and when and 
by what means it is terminated. * * * It is true that in one sense 
the ship and goods may be said to be in transitu till they have 
reached their original port of destination, but "for the present 
purpose" the transitus ceases when the property has come into the 
actual possession of the transferee, as it may do by the ship's calling 
at an intermediate port where the transferee can take possession. 
(International Law, Part II, War, p. 149.) 

When a transfer of a ship made earlier than the commencement of 
her voyage is presented to the court, "the circumstances attending a 
sale are severely scrutinized, and a transfer is not held to be good if it 
is subjected to any condition or even tacit understanding by which 
the vendor keeps an interest in the vessel or the profits, a control over 
it, a power of revocation, or a right to its restoration at the conclusion 
of the war." Moreover, the neutral "claimant shall be held to strict 
proof of ownership, and any circumstances of fraud or contrivance, or 
attempt at imposition on the court in striving to make out his title, 
shall be taken as fatal." The court "looks for that correspondence and 
other evidence which naturally attends a transaction, accompanies 
it or follows it, and which when it bears upon the face of it the aspect 
of sincerity will always receive its due weight," rather than "to docu- 
ments of a formal nature * * * often procured with extraordinary 
facility." The ship has been left in the trade and under the manage- 
ment of the former owner. Wherever that fact appears the court will 
hold it to be conclusive, because from the evidentia rei the strongest 
presumption necessarily arises that it is merely a covered and pre- 
tended transfer. 

\ Where the character of a ship sailing under a neutral flag is not open 
to question on the ground of any transfer, but the character of the 
persons who were and are owners has changed during her voyage, it is 



112 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

their character at the time of the capture that will determine her 
fate. (Ibid., p. 150.) 

Decisions of the British Court of Admiralty show that a 
transfer of a merchant ship from a belligerent to a 
neutral will not be regarded as valid if the sale is condi- 
tional and may be withdrawn (the Minerva, 6 C. Robin- 
son Admiralty Reports, 399), if the transfer is not com- 
plete and the new owner in possession (the Vrouw Mar- 
garetha, 1 C. Robinson Admiralty Reports, 336), if the 
payment of purchase money has not been made (the 
Argo, 1 C. Robinson, Admiralty Reports, 158), and if 
bona fides is not observed in the transaction (the Ariel, 
11 Moore, Privy Council Cases, p. 119). 

On the subject of transfer of merchant vessels to a 
neutral flag the instructions given to the British delega- 
tion to the International Naval Conference of 1908 were 
as follows: 

The point of difference between the Powers on the question of the 
transfer to a neutral flag is, broadly, whether bona fide transfers after 
the outbreak of war, or within a fixed period before the war, are or are 
not permissible. Some Powers hold such transactions to be invalid. 
Great Britain, and several other Powers, adopt the view that, subject 
to certain conditions, such transfer is legitimate, but that it is for the 
purchaser to establish the bona fides of the transaction. A rule exclud- 
ing altogether the right of transfer after the commencement of war 
appears to His Majesty's Government to be too serious a burden to 
impose on any country which carries on a large trade in building and 
selling ships. The equity of the case seems to demand that transfer 
should be permissible, but that the belligerent should be entitled to 
inquire closely as to the bona fides of the transaction, and that the 
onus should be on those concerned therein to establish that the trans- 
fer was complete and the transaction was genuine. His Majesty's 
Government think that the British delegates should maintain this 
view at the conference. They hope that it may be possible to con- 
vince the representatives of the other powers of its justice, and that an 
agreement may be arrived at on the subject. It seems, however, 
doubtful whether any such agreement could be established on the 
basis of a statement or an interpretation of existing law, and the solu- 
tion may accordingly have to be sought by way of a conventional 
stipulation. (Correspondence and Documents, International Naval 
Conference, British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), p. 31.) 

Opinion oj the United States Supreme Court. — The 
United States Supreme Court, in passing judgment in 



FRENCH SYSTEM AND THEORY. 113 

1900 upon the case of the Benito Estenger, captured 
during the Spanish- American War, refers to the opinion 
of Hall and quotes from the following paragraph : 

The right which a neutral has to carry on innocuous trade with a 
belligerent of course involves the general right to export from a bel- 
ligerent State merchandise which has become his by bona fide purchase. 
Vessels, according to the practice of France, and apparently of some 
other States, are, however, excepted on the ground of the difficulty of 
preventing fraud. Their sale is forbidden, and they are declared good 
prize in all cases in which they have been transfered to neutrals after 
the buyers could have knowledge of the outbreak of war. In England 
and the United States, on the contrary, the right to purchase vessels 
is in principle admitted, they being in themselves legitimate objects 
of trade as fully as any other kind of merchandise, but the opportuni- 
ties of fraud being great, the circumstances attending a sale are severely 
scrutinized, and a transfer is not held to be good if it is subjected to 
any condition or even tacit understanding by which the vendor keeps 
an interest in the vessel or its profits, a control over it, a power of revo- 
cation, or a right to its restoration at the conclusion of the war. (Hall 
International Law. 5th ed., p. 505.) 

The tiansfer of the Benito Estenger from the Spanish 
to the British flag was held to be merely colorable, "which 
furnished in itself ground for condemnation. " 

The French system and theory.^The French point of 
view, which is held by some other continental States, is 
set forth by Dupuis in such fashion as may well be 
quoted at length: 

En ce qui concerne les navires, "la nationalite," disaient les instruc- 
tions francaises du ministre de la marine, en date du 25 juillet 1870, 
"ne derive pas seulement de celle de leurs proprietaires, mais encore 
de leur droit legitime au pavilion qui les couvre." La formule n'est 
pas tres precise; elle demande a etre expliquee. Mais les precedents, 
la jurisprudence constante des conseils de prises ne laissent aucun 
doute sur sa portee; elle signifie que la nationalite du navire est li£e 
au droit au pavilion. 

Tout navire ayant droit de porter pavilion, ennemi est ennemi; tout 
navire ayant droit de porter pavilion neutre est neutre. 

Peu importe la nationalite des proprietaires. Generalement, les 
proprietaires de navires sont sujets de l'Etat dont leur vaisseau porte 
pavilion; la plupart des legislations subordonnent l'acquisition du 
droit au pavilion a la condition que la plus grande partie du batiment 
appartienne a leurs nationaux. Si la propriete du navire est divisee 
entre sujets d'Etats differents, le systeme francais rend le sort du 
vaisseau, en tout cas, indivisible; le pavilion ennemi entraine confis- 
70387—11 8 



114 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

cation des parts qui appartiennent a des proprietaires neutres; le 
pavilion neutre emporte liberation des parts des proprietaires ennemis. 

La qualite neutre ou ennemie des proprietaires est d'ailleurs essen- 
tiellement liee a leur nationality quels que soient leur domicile ou 
leurs occupations, les sujets de l'ennemi, partout et toujours, sont 
ennemis et sont seuls ennemis; les sujets d'Etats neutres conservent, 
en tout cas, leur qualite de neutres. 

Le sort indivisible du navire ne peut etre modifie par la division 
de la propriete; il ne peut l'etre davantage par le demembrement de 
la propriete. L'hypotheque prise sur un navire ne permet pas au 
creancier qui s'en prevaut de revendiquer son gage; l'hypotheque est 
sans valeur si le navire est sujet a capture. 

Que la confiscation atteigne, en principe, tout navire portant pavilion 
ennemi par cela seul qu'il porte ce pavilion, cela est un effet naturel 
de 1'interdiction de l'usage de la mer, resultant de l'etat de guerre. 
C'est au pavilion ennemi que s'adresse avant tout cette interdiction; 
c'est lui que l'adversaire pretend tout d'abord depouiller du benefice 
de la liberte des mers. Logiquement lui seul, semble-t-il, devrait 
etre touche. Le systeme francais toutefois ne se tient pas a la stricte 
logique; quelles que soient ses preferences pour elle, il a du s'en 
affranchir sous peine de laisser a l'ennemi un moyen trop simple de 
se mettre a couvert; il l'a fait d'ailleurs d'une facon radicale. 

Si le pavilion neutre suffisait, en tout cas, a exempter de la capture, 
les armateurs avises ne manqueraient pas, au debut de la guerre, de 
vendre aux neutres leurs vaisseaux menaces; ou plutot encore ils 
feindraient une vente pour les mettre a l'abri durant la lutte et les 
recouvrer, le danger passe, lorsque la guerre serait terminee. 

Mille formes diverses pourraient etre employees pour reserver leurs 
droits et dejouer l'ennemi. Afin de couper court a toutes les ruses, 
l'edit de juillet 1778 proclame la nullite de toute cession de navire 
ennemi consentie apres l'ouverture des hostilites. De peur qu'une 
antidate ne vienne mettre en echec sa prevoyance, l'edit de'1778 
subordonne la validite d'une vente anterieure au debut des hostilites 
a la constatation du contra t par un acte authentique. Ainsi le pavilion 
neutre est sans valeur pour le navire qui ne l'a pas acquis d'une facon 
certaine, indiscutable, avant que la guerre eclatat. Son acquisition 
ou manifestement tardive ou de date douteuse reste sans effet, et le 
navire repute ennemi demeure sujet a capture. 

Cette extension du caractere ennemi a des vaisseaux battant pavilion 
neutre est d'ailleurs la seule qu'admette notre systeme. Elle pourrait 
etre l'occasion de conflits avec les pays qui autorisent leurs nationaux 
a acheter, durant la guerre, des navires appartenant a des sujets bel- 
ligerants; mais un certain nombre d'Etats, pour prevenir ces conflits, 
prohibent en pareil cas l'achat; et d'autres, tout en tenant l'acquisi- 
tion pour bonne et leur pavilion pour legitime, n'entendent cependant 
pas le proteger a l'encontre du belligerant qui le meconnait; ils 
permettent a leurs sujets d'acquerir, ils les previennent que c'est a 



REGULATIONS IN 1904. 115 

leurs risques et perils: telle est la solution britannique. (Le droit de 
la guerre maririme, sees. 96, 97, pp. 126-128.) 

Russian regulations. — The Russian regulations are in 
general opposed to any transfer after declaration of war. 

Merchant vessels acquired from a hostile power or its subjects by 
persons of neutral nationality are acknowledged to be hostile vessels 
unless it is proven that the acquisition must be considered, according 
to the laws of the nation to whom the purchasers belong, as having 
actually taken place before the purchasers received news of the decla- 
ration of war, or that the vessels acquired in the manner mentioned, 
although after the receipt of such news, were acquired quite conscien- 
tiously and not for the purpose of covering hostile property. (Foreign 
Relations, U. S., 1904, p. 736.) 

Japanese regulations. — The Japanese regulations of 1904 
look to the good faith of the transactions. 

Art. VI. The following are enemy vessels: * * * 
4. Vessels, the ownership of which has been transferred before the 
war, but in expectation of its outbreak or during the war, by the enemy 
State or its subjects to persons having residence in Japan or a neutral 
State, unless there is proof of a complete and bona fide transfer of 
ownership. 

In case the ownership of a vessjel is transferred during its voyage, 
and actual delivery is not effected, such transfer of ownership shall 
not be considered as complete and bona fide. (Naval War College, 
International Law Topics, 1905, Appendix, p. 192.) 

Attitude of States in 1908. — The attitude of the States 
mainly affected by transfers in time of war is shown in the 
propositions put before the International Naval Confer- 
ence at London in 1908. 

Germany proposed a period prior to the opening of 
hostilities during which transfer would not be valid: 

Art. 3. Le caractere neutre ou ennemi d'un navire de commerce est 
determine par le pavilion qu'il porte. 

Un navire battant pavilion neutre pourra neanmoins etre* traite en 
navire ennemi — 

1. Si, jusqu'a l'ouverture des hostility ou dans les deux semaines 
qui l'ont precedee, il a porte le pavilion ennemi. (Proceedings of the 
International Naval Conference, British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. 
No. 5 (1909), p. 112.) 

Austria-Hungary explains its position in regard to 
transfer as follows: 

(G) D'apres la pratique de presque tous les Etats, la vente d'un navire 
ennemi faite en cours de voyage et apres l'ouverture des hostility ne 



116 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

peut empecher la capture du navire, celui-ci continuant, dans lea 
circonstances dont il s'agit, d'etre considere comme ennemi. 

L'ancienne theorie francaise, en vertu de laquelle les navires ennemis 
ne pourraient, a partir du commencement des hostilites, changer de 
nationalite, c'est-a-dire perdre leur qualite de navires ennemis, com- 
porte une restriction exageree du commerce neutre, puisque ce com- 
merce doit, en principe, rester libre, raeme en temps de guerre. La 
France elle-meme a, d'ailleurs, deroge a cette theorie en 1870. 

Le § 26 du projet d'un reglement des prises, vote par PInstitut de droit 
international dans sa session de Turin, semble contenir une solution de 
la question d'autant plus heureuse qu'elle tient compte des interets des 
belligerants et des neutres. Ledit paragraph e est ainsi concu: 

" L'acte juridique constatant la vente d'un navire ennemi faite durant 
la guerre doit etre parfait, et le navire doit etre enregistre conformement 
a la legislation du pays dont il acquiert la nationalite, avant qu'il quitte 
le port de sortie. La nouvelle nationalite ne peut etre acquise par une 
vente faite en cours de voyage." 

Rien ne s'oppose, d'ailleurs, a l'etablissement de garanties supple- 
mentaires contre la lesion, au moyen de ventes fictives operees par les 
ressortissants de l'un des belligerants, des interets legitimes de l'autre 
belligerant. (Ibid., p. 112.) 

Spain affirms the British point of view as stated already: 

(G) Le gouvernement de S. M. C. estime acceptables les regies suggE- 
rees par le Cabinet de Londres dans la section 7 de son Memorandum. 
Lorsque le changement de pavilion du navire correspond a un transfert 
effectif de propriete ou a d'autres motifs d'ordre prive, sa validite sera 
reconnue; mais s'il est l'effet de l'intention de se derober par une 
simulation aux risques existant aujourd'hui pour la propriete privee 
ennemie en cas de guerre maritime, il doit etre repute nul. (Ibid., p. 
112.) 

France proposes more definite regulations than those 
previously announced b}' that state: 

(G) Le changement de nationalite des navires de commerce effectue 
apres la declaration de guerre est nul et sans effet. Le transfert anterieur 
k la declaration de guerre, regulierement intervenu, est valable. La 
date du transfert sous pavilion neutre ant£rieurement a la declaration 
de guerre doit etre etablie par des pieces authentiques trouvees a bord, 
et la cession doit avoir ete suivie d'un enregistrement devant les 
autorites competentes. 

On doit tenir pour suspect un acte de naturalisation intervenu de la 
part d'un gouvernement neutre en faveur du proprietaire du navire, 
posterieurement a la declaration de guerre. II faut, dans ce cas, 
agir suivant les circonstances et les autres indices recueillis, notamment 
suivant le lieu de construction du navire, la composition de son Equi- 
page, {'observation des conditions nationales imposees au pavilion 
arbore\ (Ibid., p. 113.) 



PROPOSITIONS IN 1908. 117 

Italy cites its existing law and decisions : 

(g) "La nationality italienne ne pourra etre accordee a aucun navire 
provenant de la vente qui en aurait ete faite par un individu sujet 
d'une Puissance se trouvant en etat de guerre avec une autre Puissance 
qui serait en etat de paix avec le gouvernement du Roi. 

" Le ministre de la marine pourra toutefois, si la verite de la vente est 
constatee, accorder la nationalisation du navire." ( Cod. M. if., art. 42.) 

II resulte de cette disposition que, selon l'esprit du droit positif 
italien, la vente d'un navire ennemi a un acheteur neutre, aprte 
Vouverture des hostilites, est presumee Active, et, comme telle, ne 
saurait etre reconnue. La preuve du contraire est toutefois admise 
avec des garanties tout a fait speciales. 

Le Conseil du contentieux diplomatique s'est prononce dans un sens 
analogue. II a declare, en effet, que la translation de la propriete d'un 
navire ne saurait etre considered valable si elle ne resulte pas des 
papiers de bord, et qu'il n'y aurait pas lieu de tenir compte d'une 
vente qui n'aurait pas pu etre enregistree sur ces documents par suite 
du fait que le navire se trouvait en cours de voyage. II resulte toutefois 
de l'ensemble de l'avis que la preuve de la realite et de la legalite de 
la vente est admise. (Cont. dipl., 16 juin 1866, capture du navire 
"Venezia." (Ibid., p. 113.) 

Japan expanded slightly its regulations of 1904: 

Le transfert de propriete d'un navire au cours ou en prevision de la 
guerre par l'Etat ennemi, ou par une personne ennemie a une autre 
personne ayant son domicile dans l'autre Etat belligerant ou chez son 
allie ou dans un Etat neutre, n'est valable que si une preuve suffisante 
d'une cession complete et de bonne foi est apportee. 

Dans le cas oil la propriete d'un navire est cedee pendant qu'il 
effectue son voyage, cette cession ne doit pas etre considered comme de 
bonne foi et complete jusqu'a la livraison effective. (Ibid., p. 114.) 

The Netherlands proposition looked toward a large 
degree of freedom: 

VII. (1) La validite du transfert de navires de commerce du pavilion 
belligerant au pavilion neutre au cours ou au debut des hostilites est 
reconnue sans restrictions. 

(2) Un navire de commerce transfere du pavilion belligerant au 
pavilion neutre dans un port ou sur une cote bloquee ne peut reclamer 
le traitement accorde au pavilion neutre. (Ibid., p. 114.) 

The Russian proposition was somewhat shorter than 

the regulations announced in 1904: 

VII. Les belligerants ont le droit de ne point reconnaitre le caractere 
neutre de tout batiment de commerce achete par des personnes neutres 
a un Etat ennemi ou a un de ses ressortissants, a moins que le nouveau 
proprietaire ne prouve que 1' acquisition est devenue definitive avant 
qu'il eut connaissance du commencement de la guerre. (Ibid., p. 114.) 



118 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

In proposing a basis of discussion for the Interna- 
tional Naval Conference it was said: 

On ne saurait admettre le transfert dont un navire est l'objet en vue 
d'echapper aux consequences qu'entraine pour lui sa qualite de navire 
ennemi . 

La plupart des Memorandums, exposant le droit actuel, ont suivi des 
voies diff erentes pour interpreter et pour appliquer ce principe commun. 
La preuve etant difficile en pareille matiere, des presomptions simples 
ou absolues, plus ou moins justifiees, ont ete posees, notamment lorsque 
le transfert a lieu au cours des hostilites. En pareil cas la presomption 
absolue de nullite ne constitue pas, d'apres tous les Memorandums, 
une regie generale sauf dans le cas de transfert en cours de voyage. 

Avant l'ouverture des hostilites la pratique commune aboutit a 
reconnaitre la validite du transfert toutes les fois que ce transfert est 
regulierement intervenu, c'est-a-dire qu'il ne comporte rien de fictif 
ou d'irregulier qui le rende suspect. (Ibid., p. 114.) 

The basis of discussion took the following form: 

35. Un navire ne peut pas etre transfere soUs pavilion neutre en vue 
d'echapper aux consequences qu'entraine pour lui sa qualite de 
navire ennemi. 

36. Le transfert effectue" avant l'ouverture des hostilites est valable 
e'il est regulierement intervenu, c'est-a-dire s'il ne comporte rien de 
fictif ou d'irregulier qui le rende suspect. 

37. Apres l'ouverture des hostilites, il y a presomption absolue de 
nullite du transfert qui est effectue pendant que le navire est en voyage . 
(Ibid., p. 114.) 

Discussion at the International Naval Conference, 

1908-9. — When the above basis of discussion came 

before the conference, Dr. Kriege, the German plenipo- 

tentiar} r , said: 

Nous sommes d' accord avec les auteurs du sommaire sur le principe 
qu'un navire ne peut pas etre transfere sous pavilion neutre en vue 
d'echapper aux consequences qu'entraine pour lui sa qualite de navire 
ennemi. Mais au point de vue du droit existant, comme pour des con- 
siderations d'ordre pratique, nous voudrions bien voir adopter le sys- 
teme de notre Memorandum, qui aurait le double avantage de faciliter 
la tache des commandants de croiseurs et d'eviter des surprises au com- 
merce neutre. Les commandants de croiseurs sauraniet toujours s'ils 
devraient, oui ou non, respecter le pavilion neutre d'un navire qu'ils 
rencontreraient en mer. Les armateurs neutres, d'autre part, sauraient 
a quoi s'en tenir, et ne courraient pas le risque de voir saisir, et, peut- 
&tre, declarer de bonne prise un navire dont le transfert, opere de bonne 
foi, serait, pour une raison quelconque, suspect a ces officiers navals. 
(Ibid., p. 166.) 



DISCUSSION AT NAVAL CONFERENCE. 119 

In explanation Mr. Crowe, of the British delegation, 
said — 

Le principe que Ton a voulu exprimer dans la base 35 est celui que 
le Gouvernement britannique a cru pouvoir degager des Memorandums, 
c'est T a-dire qu'un commercant, sujet de l'Etat belligerant, ne saurait 
eluder les consequences de la guerre en transferant ses navires sous 
pavilion neutre. Pour l'application de ce principe, il est difficile de 
trouver parmi les Memorandums une regie a la fois precise et gen£rale- 
ment reconnue. Le principe une fois accepte dans ses consequences, 
il ne serait pas difficile, apres un examen suffisamment approfondi, de 
trouver quelques regies pour gouverner sa mise a execution. Ainsi, 
par exemple, dans la base 37 on a formule une presomption utile et 
qui parait etre a peu pres universellement reconnue. 

II est certain que, au cours de chaque guerre, les cours des prises 
auront a se prononcer sur nombre de ventes faites de bonne foi, puis- 
qu'il y aura toujours un commerce regulier en navires comme en 
d'autres objets. Le caractere licite ou illicite d'une vente de ce genre 
est naturellement une pure question de preuve. II s'agit de pourvoir 
a la protection de telles transactions en formulant des regies qui laissent 
toute liberte a ce commerce en tant qu'il est fait de bonne foi, et si, 
comme il le croit, les Puissances desirent preciser de telles regies, le 
Gouvernement britannique est tout dispose a leur preter son concours. 
(Ibid., p. 167.) 

The German delegation later proposed a new additional 
Article as follows: 

Une pareille intention illicite est pr^sumee lorsque le transfert est 
intervenu apres l'ouverture des hostilites. La bonne foi des con- 
tractants est, au contraire, presumee lorsque le transfert a ete effectue" 
avant l'ouverture des hostilites. (Ibid., p. 179.) 

The United States delegation proposed regulations 
embodying those approved by the Naval War College 
(International Law Topics and Discussions, 1906, p. 21), 
mentioning that these corresponded with existing treaties 
with certain of the States represented at the International 
Naval Conference. 

35. Le transfert d'un navrie d'un pavilion a un autre avant l'ouver- 
ture de3 hostilites est valable, meme dans le cas oil il est fait en vue 
des hostilites, pourvu qu'il soit fait en conformite avec les lois na- 
tionales du vendeur et de l'acheteur. 

36. Le transfert au cours des hostilites d'un navire prive* portant le 
pavilion d'un belligerant n'est valable que lorsqu'il est de bonne 
foi, et que le transfert des droits du propri^taire est entier. Encore 
faut-il que la livraison du navire a l'acheteur soit completee dans un 



120 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

port en dehors de la juridiction de< Etat> belli, grants conform6ment 
aux Lois nationalea du vendeur et de l'acheteur. 

37. La bonne foi des contractants n'esl presumee que lorsque le 
transfert a ote" effectue avant Pouverture de^ ho tilite-. 

Lorsque le transfert e>t intervenu apres l'ouverture de? hostilites, 
c'est aux contractants a etablir sa validite. (Proceedings of the Inter- 
national Naval Conference, British Parliamentary Papers. Misc. No. 
5 (1909), p. 245.) 

Great Britain made a new proposition and submitted 
reasons therefor: 

35. La bonne foi est necessaire dans le cas du transfert d'un navire 
sous pavilion neutre en vue d'hostilites. 

36. Le transfert effectue avant l'ouverture des hostilites est presume 
etre regulierement intervenu, e'est-a-dire, ne rien comporter de fictif 
ou d'irregulier qui le rende suspect. La preuve contraire est admise. 

37. Apres l'ouverture des hostilites, il y a presomption absolue de 
nullite du transfert: 

(a) S'il est effectue en cours de voyage ou dans un port bloque; 

(6) S'il y a faculte de reinere ou de retour; 

(r) Si, apres le transfert, le navire a ete maintenu dans le service 
auquel il etait affecte auparavant; 

(d) Si les conditions auxquelles est soumis le droit de pavilion, 
d'apres la legislation du pavilion arbore, n'ont pas ete observees. 

37 bis. Le transfert est presume etre nul si Facte de transfert ne se 
trouve pas a bord alors que le navire a perdu la nationality belligerante 
au cours des hostilites ou moins de deux mois avant l'ouverture des 
hostilites. La preuve contraire est admise. 

MOTIFS DE LA PROPOSITION. 

Comme il a ete explique par les "observations'' (voir p. 59) sur les 
bases 35 et 36, ces bases ont l'intention d'exprimer le principe commun 
sur lequel sont fondees les differentes regies comprises dans les Memo- 
randums. 

De ces Memorandums il n'a ete possible de deduire qu'une seule 
regie, applicable en pratique, de laquelle on puisse dire qu'elle a ete 
acceptee a l'unanimite. C'est celle qui est consignee dans la base 37. 

Au moment, cependant, ou les representants des differentes Puis- 
sances ont l'occasion d'entrer en discussion directe de cette question, 
la Delegation britannique se croit justifiee a deposer la proposition 
precedente par laquelle elle a formule des regies que les Gouvernements 
representes pourront considerer comme offrant une garantie suffisante 
du principe commun. 

Si ces regies, dans leur ensemble, sont de nature a obtenir les resultats 
pratiques vises par les regies divergentes jusqu'a present en vigueur, la 
Delegation aime a croire que, bien qu'elles aient ete prises a des sources 
differentes et qu'elles representent l'usage de nations diverses, elles 



EXPLANATION IN REPORT. 121 

pourront, neanmoins, etre considerees comme faisant partie du droit 
generalement reconnu. (Ibid., p. 244.) 

Report of the commission to the International Naval 
Conference. — That part of the report presented to the 
full Conference by the commission, which was embodied 
in the General Report finally approved by the Conference, 
said: 

Un navire de commerce ennemi est sujet a capture, tandis qu'un 
navire de commerce neutre est respects. On comprend, des lors, 
qu'un croiseur belligerant, rencontrant un navire de commerce qui se 
reclame d'une nationalite neutre, ait a rechercher si cette nationalite 
a ete legitimement acquise ou si elle n'a pas eu pour but de soustraire 
le navire aux risques auxquels il aurait ete expose s'il avait garde son 
ancienne nationalite. La question se presente naturellement quand 
le transfert est de date relativement recente, au moment ou a lieu la 
visite, que ce transfert soit, du reste, anterieur ou posterieur a l'ouver- 
ture des hostilites. Elle est resolue differemment suivant qu'on se 
place plutot au point de vue de l'interet du commerce ou plutot au 
point de vue de l'interet des belligerants. II est heureux que l'on se 
soit entendu sur un reglement qui concilie les deux interets dans la 
mesure du possible et qui renseigne le3 belligerants et le commerce 
neutre. (Ibid., p. 367.) 

It was further said in the report presented to the Con- 
ference by the commission — 

La solution la plus simple consisterait a faire une distinction tranchee 
entre la periode qui precede et la periode qui suit l'ouverture des 
hostilites. Dans la premiere, l'interet commercial prevaudrait, et 
tous les transferts operes d'une maniere reguliere, juridiquement par- 
lant, seraient maintenus et devraient etre respectes par les bellige- 
rants. Dans la seconde, au contraire, ce serait l'interet des belligerants 
qui l'emporterait, et tous les transferts pourraient etre considered 
comme nuls par le belligerant dont ils auraient pour resultat d'entraver 
le droit de capture. Ce systeme serait d'une application facile pour 
les croiseurs qui n'auraient qu'a verifier une date. Mais, comme tous 
les systemes absolus, il donne lieu a des critiques, de nature opposee. 
Pour la periode anterieure a l'ouverture des hostilites, l'interet d'un 
belligerant peut etre gravement sacrifie, parce que, dans une periode 
de tension politique, a la veille d'une guerre, des navires de commerce 
portant le pavilion de son adversaire pourront, grace peut-etre a un 
avertissement secret, etre soustraits aux risques de la guerre par suite 
de transferts effectues rapidement. D' autre part, il est rigoureux 
d'annuler sans distinction tous les transferts posterieurs, parce que 
certains d'entre eux peuvent etre motives par le jeu naturel des trans- 
actions commerciales, et non par le fait meme de la guerre; si done il 



122 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

est raisonnable de presumer alors que la nationality neutre a ete attri- 
bute a un navire portant le pavilion d'un belligerant pour le faire 
ben£ficier de la protection due a la neutrality, il est equitable d'ad- 
mettre qu'en general la preuve contraire sera possible. (Ibid., p. 326.) 

The proposition about which centered a protracted dis- 
cussion was as follows : 

Un transfert effectue avant l'ouverture de la guerre est valable s'il 
est absolu, complet, de bonne foi et conforme a la legislation des pays 
interesses, et s'il a pour effet que ni le controle du navire, ni le benefice 
provenant de son emploi ne reste plus entre les memes mains qu'avant 
le transfert. 

Si le capteur peut £tablir que les conditions susmentionnees n'ont 
pas £te remplies, le transfert est presume etre intervenu avec l'inten- 
tion d'eluder le& consequences de la guerre, et il est nul. (Ibid., p. 326.) 

There was much difference of opinion as to what con- 
stituted good faith (bonne foi). The report of the commis- 
sion further said : 

La validite du transfert est d'abord subordonnee a l'accomplisse- 
ment de certaines conditions juridiques ayant pour but de demontrer 
que le proprietaire s'est bien dessaisi d'une maniere definitive et sans 
reserve de la propriete du navire, sur laquelle il ne doit conserver 
aucun controle. Si ces conditions ne sont pas remplies, par exemple, 
si 1' effet du transfert a ete subordonne a l'eventualite de la guerre, le 
transfert est presume intervenu dans 1' intention d'eluder les conse- 
quences de la guerre, et il est declare nul. Cela sera simple. Voici 
le point difficile: toutes les conditions juridiques ont ete remplies, 
mais le capteur est a meme d'etablir que ce transfert, regulier au fond 
et en forme, a ete opere en vue d'eluder les consequences qu'entraine 
le caractere ennemi. Sera-t-il admis a faire cette preuve pour arriver 
a faire declarer nul le transfert? Ou bien l'intention d'eluder les 
consequences de la guerre ne peut-elle resulter que de l'inaccomplisse- 
ment des conditions juridiques? C'est douteux, a-t-il paru a quelques- 
uns; on a rappele que la condition de bonne foi etait exigee d'une 
maniere distincte, independamment des conditions juridiques et 
qu'ainsi, meme si ces conditions etaient remplies, on pouvait prouver 
que la vente avait ete faite de mauvaise foi. Mais, comment celle-ci 
devait-elle etre entendue? C'est le point delicat. Le capteur n'en- 
visage eVidemment pas la bonne foi de la meme maniere que le ven- 
deur. Celui-ci estimera qu'il agit tres loyalement s'il se d£fait regu- 
lierement et definitivement de ses navires, parce qu'il ne veut pas 
courir le risque de les perdre par l'exercice du droit de prise. Le 
capteur pensera qu'il n'y a pas eu bonne foi a vouloir eluder les conse- 
quences naturelles de la guerre. 



RULE ADOPTED BY NAVAL CONFERENCE. 123 

Si on considere la simple interpretation juridique, il semble bien 
qu'une cour des prises, en presence de la proposition rapportee plus 
haut, tiendrait le transfert pour valable, des que les conditions juridi- 
ques auraient ete remplies, et ne se placerait pas au point de vue du 
capteur pour apprecier s'il y a eu bonne ou mauvaise foi. La majorite 
du comite n'acceptait pas cette consequence, et, par suite, desirait une 
formule non equivoque. (Ibid., p. 327.) 

The rule adopted by the International Naval Confer- 
ence. — After long and careful consideration the following 
rule was adopted as Article 55 of the Declaration of 
London: 

Art. 55. The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, 
effected before the opening of hostilities, is valid, unless it is 
proved that such transfer was made in order to evade the 
consequences which the enemy character of the vessel would 
involve. There is, however, a presumption that the trans- 
fer is void if the bill of sale is not on board in case the vessel 
has lost her belligerent nationality less than sixty days 
before the opening of hostilities. Proof to the contrary is 
admitted. 

There is absolute presumption of the validity of a transfer 
effected more than thirty days before the opening of hos- 
tilities if it is absolute, complete, conforms to the laws of 
the countries concerned, and if its effect is such that the 
control of the vessel and the profits of her employment do not 
remain in the same hands as before the transfer. If, how- 
ever, the vessel lost her belligerent nationality less than 
sixty days before the opening of hostilities, and if the bill of 
sale is not on board, the capture of the vessel would not give 
a right to compensation. 

The General Report of the Conference says of this 
Article 55: 

The general rule laid down in the first paragraph is that the transfer 
of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag is valid, assuming, of course, that 
the ordinary legal requirements relative to validity have been fulfilled. 
It is for the captor, if he wishes to have the transfer annulled, to prove 
that the object of the transfer was to evade the consequences of the war 
in prospect. There is one case which is regarded as suspicious, that, 
namely, in which the bill of sale is not on board when the ship has 
changed her nationality less than sixty days before the opening of 
hostilities. The presumption of validity set up by the first paragraph. 



124 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

in favor of the vessel is transposed in favor of the captor. It is pre- 
sumed that the transfer is void, but proof to the contrary may be 
admitted. With a view to establishing the contrary, proof may be 
given that the transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences 
of the war; it is unnecessary to add that the ordinary legal require- 
ments relative to validity must have been fulfilled. 

There was a wish to give to commerce a guarantee that the right to 
regard a transfer as void on the ground that it was made in order to 
evade the consequences of war should not extend too far and should 
not cover too long a period. Consequently, if the transfer has been 
made more than thirty days before the opening of hostilities, it can 
not be assailed on that ground alone, and it is regarded as unques- 
tionably valid if it has been made under conditions which show that 
its character is genuine and final. These are as follows: The transfer 
must be absolute, complete, and in conformity with the laws of the 
countries concerned, and its effect is to place the control of and the 
profits earned by the vessel in other hands. When once these condi- 
tions are established, the captor is not allowed to contend that the 
vendor foresaw the war in which his country was about to be engaged, 
and wished by the sale to shield himself from the risks which he would 
incur in respect of the vessels he was transferring. Even in this case, 
however, if the vessel is encountered by a cruiser and her bill of sale 
is not on board, she may be captured if the change of nationality has 
taken place less than sixty days before the opening of hostilities; that 
circumstance renders her suspect. But if before the prize court she 
furnishes the proof specified by the second paragraph, she must be 
released, though she can not obtain compensation, inasmuch as there 
was sufficient reason for capturing the vessel. (International Law 
Topics, Naval War College, 1909, p. 123.) 

Consideration of Article 55. — Article 55 of the Declara- 
tion of London states in general that when the bill of sale 
is on board "a transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral 
flag before the opening of hostilities is valid, unless it is 
proved that such transfer was made in order to evade 
the consequences which the enemy character of the vessel 
would involve." When the bill of sale is on board and 
the transfer is made more than thirty days before the 
opening of hostilities and is absolute, complete, in con- 
formity to the laws of the countries concerned, and "its 
effect is such that the control of the vessel and the profits 
of her employment do not remain in the same hands as 
before the transfer, there is absolute presumption of the 
validity of the transfer." 

According to this Article 55, therefore, there are specifi- 
cations as to what constitutes absolute presumption of 



APPLICATION OF ARTICLES. 125 

validity of transfer for vessels transferred more than thirty 
days before the opening of hostilities. For vessels having 
the bill of sale on board and transferred within thirty days 
of the opening of hostilities the general rule of the first 
paragraph would apply; i. e., the transfer "is valid, unless 
it is proved that such transfer was made in order to 
evade the consequences which the enemy character of 
the vessel would involve." 

Application of Article 55 to Situation VI. — According to 
the statement of Situation VI there is war between the 
United States and State X. A United States cruiser 
meets a merchant vessel having regular papers and a bill 
of sale showing that she was sold by a merchant of State 
X to a British company twenty days before the open- 
ing of hostilities. 

If the transfer had been made more than thirty days 
before the opening of hostilities and had been absolute, 
complete, in conformity to the laws of the countries con- 
cerned and the control and profits had not remained in 
the same hands as before the transfer, there would have 
been absolute presumption of the validity of the trans- 
fer. The transfer was, however, according to the bill of 
sale on board made twenty days before the opening of 
hostilities, and therefore this clause of Article 55 does not 
apply. 

The bill of sale is on board the vessel, and all papers 
seem to be regular; therefore she seems to have con- 
formed to the legal requirements so far as papers are 
concerned. 

The transfer would therefore be valid according to 
Article 55 "unless it is proved that such transfer was 
made in order to evade the consequences which the enemy 
character of the vessel would involve." 

The only evidence afforded by Situation VI that the 
transfer was to evade the consequences of enemy char- 
acter is that "the vessel is engaged in trade similar to 
that in which she was engaged before her transfer." Is 
this evidence sufficient to justify the captain of the United 
States cruiser in sending the vessel in as prize or in taking 
any other action ? 



126 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

Application of doctrine of Article 56. — It was proposed 
at the International Naval Conference that when mer- 
chant vessels were transferred from a belligerent to a 
neutral flag after the opening of hostilities and remained 
in the same trade, there should be absolute presumption 
that the transfer was void. As is said in the General 
Report, referring to Article 56: 

Provision was at one time made for the ease of a vessel which was 
retained, after the transfer, in the trade in which she had previously 
been engaged. This would be a circumstance in the highest degree 
suspicious; the transfer has a fictitious appearance, since nothing is 
changed as regards the vessel's trade. This would apply, for instance, 
in case the vessel maintained the same line of sailing before and after 
the transfer. It was, however, objected that the absolute presumption 
would sometimes be too severe, as certain vessels, for example, tank- 
ships, could, on account of their build, engage only in a definite trade. 
To recognize this objection, the word "route" was added, so that it 
would have been necessary that the vessel should be retained in the 
same trade and on the same route; it was thought that in this way there 
would be given to the contention sufficient consideration. However, 
in consideration of the insistence on the suppression of this case from 
the list, its suppression has been conceded. Consequently the transfer 
now comes within the provision of the general rule; it is certainly pre- 
sumed to be void, but proof to the contrary is admitted. (Interna- 
tional Law Topics, Naval War College, 1909, p. 127.) 

As a transfer made after the opening of hostilities in 
which the vessel remained in the same trade is not neces- 
sarily void but admits of proof of its validity a transfer 
made before the war in which the vessel transferred en- 
gages in similar trade to that before the opening of hostil- 
ities would certainly not be hastily condemned. 

Consideration of Article 64- — In this Situation VI, as 
in all cases of capture, there is a liability that the captor 
may have to pay compensation if there is not good reason 
for capturing a vessel. The Declaration of London of 
1 909 provides for this case in Article 64 and in the Gen- 
eral Report on this Article, saying : 

Art. 64. If the capture of a vessel or of goods is not 
upheld by the prize court, or if without being brought to 
judgment the captured vessel is released, those interested 
have the right to compensation, unless there were sufficient- 
reasons for capturing the vessel or goods. 



CONCLUSIONS. 127 

A cruiser has captured a neutral vessel, for example, on the ground 
of carriage of contraband or violation of blockade. The prize court 
releases the vessel, declaring the capture void. This is evidently not 
enough to indemnify those interested for the loss incurred in conse- 
quence of the capture, and this loss may have been considerable, since 
the vessel has been during a period, often very long, prevented from 
engaging in her ordinary trade. May they claim to be compensated 
for this injury? Logically it is necessary that an affirmative answer 
should be given, if the injury is undeserved, that is to say, if the capture 
was not occasioned by some fault of the parties. It may, indeed, 
happen that the capture was for reason, since the master of the vessel 
visited and searched did not produce evidence which ought ordinarily 
to be available, and which was furnished later. In such a case it would 
be unjust that compensation should be awarded. On the other hand, 
if the cruiser has really been at fault, if she has made a capture in a 
case in which there were not sufficient reasons for doing so, it is just 
that compensation should be decreed. 

It may also happen that a vessel which has been captured and taken 
into a port has been released by administrative action without inter- 
vention of a prize court. The practice in such circumstances varies; in 
some countries the prize court has jurisdiction only on the question of 
a capture, and can not adjudicate on a claim for compensation based 
upon the ground that the capture would have been held unjustifiable; 
in other countries the prize court would have competence in a claim 
of this kind. There is therefore a difference which is hardly equitable, 
and it is desirable to lay down a rule which will produce the same 
result in all countries. It is reasonable that every capture effected 
without sufficient reasons should give to those interested a right to 
compensation, without distinguishing as to whether the capture has 
or has not been followed by a decision of a prize court, and this is all 
the more reasonable when the capture may have so little justification 
that the vessel is released by executive action. A general provision 
capable of covering all cases of capture has therefore been adopted. 
(Ibid., p. 149.) 

The merchant vessel which had been transferred to the 
British company was engaged in similar trade to that in 
which she had been engaged before her transfer. This 
might be natural for many reasons, particularly if the 
vessel was fitted by construction for a single line of trade 
as a tank steamer, or a cattle boat, or if the trade was 
confined to certain fairly defined routes. The fact that 
the trade was similar and not the same would seem to 
indicate that the transfer was one that could not easily 
be proven void. 



128 TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FLAG. 

As the captain would not wish without good reason to 
involve his State in an obligation to pay compensation 
he would take less risk in case of a vessel which had been 
transferred to another flag than in case of a vessel carry- 
ing articles of tha nature of contraband which might be 
of direct service in war. The vessel under consideration 
in Situation VI is engaged in trade similar to that in 
which she was engaged before the war; but even if she 
were engaged in the same trade there would be no abso- 
lute presumption that the transfer was not valid. This 
would have to be established by additional evidence above 
the simple fact of the nature of the trade. It would 
therefore be incumbent upon the captain of a ship of war 
to have other reasons than continuance in similar trade 
in order that there should be reason sufficient to justify 
capture. 

SOLUTION. 

Unless the captain of the United States cruiser has 
other grounds than the fact that the merchant vessel is 
engaged in trade similar to that in which she was engaged 
before her transfer, he should release the vessel. 

o